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FOREWORD
When Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the United States
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the judiciary had
the power to declar an act of Congress unconstitutional, he phrased
the issue before the Court this way: "The question, whether an act,
repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a
question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily, not of
an intricacy proportioned to its interest." By assuming in this
statement of the question that courts have the power to review
legislation in order to decide whether it actually is repugnant to the
Constitution and focusing instead on whether a la.w known to be
unconstitutional nevertheless could be valid law, Marshall verbally
sidestepped the truly hard question: why should courts have the
power to set aside statutes acts enacted by a body, the legislature,
that is presumed to be as loyal and subservient to fundamental law
as the courts themselves? This truly is a question whose intricacy is
directly proportional to its interest. It is a question that American
constitutional lawyers ponder regularly as they endeavor to explain
and to criticize the role of the courts in our constitutional system.
Other aspects of American judicial review - for example, review of
executive action and review of the federal constitutionality of state
laws are now somewhat less controversial than review of congressional action - but any exercise of judicial power to nullify actions of
popularly elected officials still is likely to cause some concern.
Judicial review, if still controversial, is so well established in the
United States that we often forget how special our concept of the
judicial role is. In many countries throughout the world, there is
neither a written constitution nor anything resembling judicial review
of the validity of laws. In other countries a written constitution exists
but judicial review of legislation under the constitution is not
exercised. Yet, it seems that judicial review of some sort is more
common today than ever before. In some places, a special constitutional court performs this function. In others a court, more like ours,
with broader jurisdiction, performs the task. Whatever the approach,
more courts are entrusted with authority to assess whether law is in
accord with fundamental or constitutional principles.
What seems evident is that judicial review is not a uniform
concept, even in one country. It is only in the last half-century, for
instance, that the United States Supreme Court has been so strongly
identified with the protection of personal liberty. In the early days of
the nation, judicial review was more important in the effort to

strengthen the union against the states and to recognize federal
power to promote commerce and general welfare. It is only against a
background of America's relative world power and economic prosperity that judicial review to protect fundamental rights and vulnerable
minorities has developed.
This book compares judicial review and the role of the courts in
the Republic of China with American ideas about the responsibility of
courts. The authors describe the way in which courts function in the
Republic of China, and in necessarily condensed fashion, how this
came to be. They described and explain the Constitution of the
Republic Of China and trace its roots. And they carefully detail the
composition and· function of the Chinese equivalent of our Supreme
Court, the Council of Grand Justice of the Judicial Yuan.
The work of the Chinese court for the most part has not involved
protection of personal liberties. This is not surprising. For some time
concern about security against outside agression and the competitiveness of its exports in world markets have dominated public affairs in
the Republic of China. Until political and economic security are
assured, it may be that no judiciary is likely to stand in the way of
legislative and executive officials responsible for the security and
prosperity of the nation. Judicial review that entails the power to
frustrate the temporary will of lawmakers and lawenforcers may be a
luxury that a country only can afford when it is strong enough that
any particular frustration of majority will is not likely to jeopardize
its position- politically, militarily, or economically- in the world.
Judicial review is still relatively new in the Republic of China.
By watching how it grows with the economic prosperity of the nation
and how it is affected by developments in the relationship between
the Republic of China and the People's Republic on the mainland, we
may learn much about the impact that political and economic forces
have on the role of the judiciary.

Stephen A. Saltz burg
September 10, 1980

PREFACE
Following the Second World War, a conspicuous phenomenon in
the legal systems of many countries has been the adoption of a
system of control legislation. Judicial review, once characteristic
solely of the United States, has spread to many parts of the world; as
the system has spread, it has assumed a variety of forms. Particularly
noteworthy is the rise of the European system, represented by West
Germany and Italy; this system, in fact, is modeled after the Austrian
system of 1920. By creating a special Constitutional Court, it stands
in contrast to the American type in many respects.
This development has made the comparative study of judicial
review more meaningful. In this paper I examine the Chinese system
of judicial review with two purposes in mind: one is to see how it is
organized and functions; another is to analyze problems that it has
encountered in the last three decades and the responses it · has
proposed for settlement. This is a case study of an American judicial
system operating in the foreign context of Chinese law and politics.
This study owes much to many people. The untiring patience and
numerous suggestions of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg are warmly
appreciated. I also thank Professor Saltzburg for his kindness in
writing a foreword for this book. Acknowledged, too, is the help of
Professor John Norton Moore, who arranged the necessary financial
support for me from the Graduate Program of the Virginia Law
School during 1977-1979. I also thank Professor Kenneth Redden for
his valuable assistance throughout my work on this project. Professor
Calvin Woodard also has my appreciation for his unprecedented
decision to accept both myself and my wife as participants in the
Graduate Program in 1975.
My heartfelt thanks, long overdue, go to Professor Hundgah Chiu
of University of Maryland School of Law, whose abiding interest in
my scholarly activity during the past ten years is greatly appreciated.
The good counsel- solicited and unsolicited- from Professor and
Mrs. Shao-chuan Leng of the University of Virginia are warmly
appreciated. I am also grateful to Mr. David Simon and Professor
David Bogen of the University of Maryland School of Law for reading
my manuscript and offering many constructive criticisms, to Mr.
Mark Robson for compiling the index, and to Julia Fang for
administrative work in connection of publication.

Finally, I am personally indebted to my parents, whose encouragement and inspiration were never failing. My profound
appreciation goes to Ming-ju~ Fa for her contribution to research and
useful suggestions throughout.

Jyh-pin Fa
Taipei, Taiwan
Republic of China
September 15, 1980

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER NATIONALIST CHINESE AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
by Jyh-pin Fa

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized in the modern world that the doctrine of rule
of law' is the best protection offered for individual liberty. The
concept of the rule of law is the establishment of a hierarchy of
normative rules in the political system. To be more specific, the
regulations issued by the local government must conform to the laws
of the state or province, and those of the latter to the laws of the
nation. The decrees and resolutions of administrative organs should
not overstep the limits imposed by. the statutes that provide for them.
Further, the epitome of this concept is the notion that any law must
be in harmony with a paramount constitution. It is from this notion
that the theory of judicial review arises. According to Professor
Abraham, judicial review is "the power of any court to hold
unconstitutional and hence unenforceable any law, any official action
that it deems . . . to be in conflict with the Basic Law, in the United
States its Constitution."2
Judicial power to invalidate unconstitutional law represents a
major shift of political development from the principle of majority
1. According to Albert Ven Dicey, the internationally known British constitutional lawyer, the rule of law "has three meanings, or may be regarded from three
different points of view": controls are exercised through regular law instead of
arbitrary power; the law of the land is administered by the ordinary courts of law
equally for all people; constitutional law is not the source but the consequence of the
rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts, that, in short, the
constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land; see A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-03 (10th ed. 1959). Because the
last meaning is derived from the English tradition that ordinary law and a constitution
cannot be separated, it is open to serious doubt that this may equally be applied to
other countries. For a criticism of this definition, see W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND
THE CONSTITUTION 305-17 (5th ed. 1959).
2. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 280
(3d ed. 1975).
(1)
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rule to the principle of limited rule. Since provisions of a constitution
are generally rather limited while their applications in particular
circumstances are not certain, controversy will inevitably arise
during the law-making process in the legislative or administrative
government agencies as to whether these statutes are in conformity
with the constitution. When they hagan the process of democratization in the last century, almost of all of the European countries
viewed the legislature as the suitable organ to guard the inviolability
of the constitution. 3 After independence, the United States took a
different direction by arming the judiciary with the power to review
the constitutionality of statutes passed by the legislature!
3. Under the immeasurable influence of the volonte g~n~rale, Rousseau's version
of popular sovereignty, continental European countries were hardly allowed the
opportunity to use a legal check like judicial review. The sovereignty was transferred
from the monarch to the people who in tum delegated to their representatives.
Furthermore, judges in those nations traditionally did not enjoy independent status
and served as an instrument of the monarch's exercise of cabinet justice. For a brief
discussion, see Dietze, America and Europe - Decline and Emergence of Judicial
Review, 44 VA. L. REV. 1233, 1238-41 (1958).
Although as early as 1610, Lord Coke of England in Dr. Bonham's Case [8 Co.
Rep. 113b at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 at 652, C.P. 1610)], emphatically declared that
"when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be
void . . . ." For comment on this case, see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial
Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30-70 (1926). The doctrine of the parliamentary supremacy
of sovereignty nevertheless, was firmly established after the Glorious Revolution of
1688. The opinion voiced by Blackstone that "what the Parliament doth no authority
upon earth can undo" replaced Coke's dictum; see 1 COOLEY, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, 161 (2d ed. rev. 1872). An oft-quoted metaphorical aphorism stated
by De Lolme best illustrates this absolute doctrine: "Parliament can do everything
except make a man a woman or a woman a man" quoted in E. CORWIN, THE
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 87
(1955). For the study of the supremacy of the legislature, see Mitchell, Sovereignty of
Parliament- Yet Again, 79 L.Q. REV. 196 (1963).
4. This is because during the American Revolution, the English Parliament,
rather than the King, appeared to be the great oppressor. Its various acts, imposing
discriminative treatment upon American colonies, thus constituted the major source of
resentment of English dominance. Accordingly, the conditions existing in America
differed from those in European nations and were conducive to the adoption of judicial
review in America and its rejection in Europe.
The greatest advocate for the adoption of judicial review in this new nation
was Alexander Hamilton, who in his famous Federalist No. 78 laid out the reasoning
that Chief Justice Marshall followed fifteen years later in Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the epoch-making decision in the history of judicial review.
Another prominent American Founding Father, James Madison, the so-called "Father
of the Constitution," also supported the adoption of judicial review; see C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 740 C1937l. Even Thomas
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Although the proposal of a court with authority to determine the
constitutional validity of a statute is not a purely American idea, 5 it
cannot be denied that this system has survived over more than a
century and constitutes the most striking feature of the American
political structure. It may even be appropriate to say that the
doctrine of judicial review is the most valuable contribution to
political theory made by America. All agree that America became the
model for those countries considering the establishment of a constitutional government.

Jefferson, who hardly could be classified as an admirer of judicial review, nevertheless
favored some degree or type of judicial control. He wrote Madison from Paris in 1789,
two years after the drafting of the Constitution, that one good reason for adding a Bill
of Rights to the new Constitution was "the legal check which it puts into the hands of
the judiciary." 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
Further, before and after acquiring independence, a number of state courts actually
practiced the power of judicial review. For a discussion of state precedents, see C.
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-121 (2d ed.
1932). Some scholars also asserted that most of the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 favored judicial review; see C. BEARD, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-79 (1912); E. CORWIN, THE
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-12 (1914); Beard, The Supreme Court Usurper or Grantee? 27 POL. SCI. Q. 1 {1912). However, a critique of these historical
assertions can be found in L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS 25-32 (1972).
5. Charles Warren in CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT vii (1935) argures that "just as a written Constitution amendable only
by the people was wholly an American idea, so the proposal of a court with authority to
determine when Congress had overstepped the bounds set by the Constitution and to
curb attempts by Congress to amend or alter the Constitution was purely American."
This is supported by C. Friedrich; see THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 92 (1967). However, a close examination of the historical
material indicates that this conclusion seems doubtful. Some political philosophy in
Greece and Rome implied that political rulers are and should be subjected to an order
of higher law. The prevailing doctrine during the Middle Ages was the supremacy of
natural law. Positive law was invalid and should not be applied by the courts if it
conflicted with the former. For a survey of the theoretical background of the
development of judicial review, see M. CAPPELLETII, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 28-44 {1971); E. CORWIN, supra note 3; C. HAINES,
THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); C. MciLWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM OF ANCIENT AND MODERN (1947); Radin, The Judicial Review of
Statutes in Continental Europe, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 112-30 (1934); Cappelletti & Adams,
Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1207, 1209-10 (1966).
These ancient and medieval political philosophies doubtless contributed to the
emergence of modem judicial review even though there is not sufficient concrete
evidence to attribute the development of the latter to the former; see Deener, Judicial
Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1079, 1080 (1952>.

4
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This viewpoint was much more obvious after World War II.
Almost one-half of the nations of the world had by then officially
adopted some form of judicial review. The bitter experience of most
European countries with dictatorial regimes made them eager to try
to find an effective way of dealing with the abuse of government
power. Not only had legislatures been unable to prevent repressive
actions from being carried out, but, ironically, repressive regimes
often obtained their power through the legislatures. 6 Hence, the loss
of faith in the legislature's capacity to serve as a guardian of the
constitution is understandable.
Since the United States emerged from the war as a leading power
and seemed to maintain a comparatively stable democratic system, it
was quite natural for those defeated countries to view the United
States not only as a military liberator, but as the best model of
democracy and its virtues. One principal characteristic of democracy
was its guarantee of fundamental rights; in the United States it was
the great emancipator from majoritarian despotism. And judicial
review was the fundamental aspect of the emancipation. Moreover,
the United States made known its "expectations" that the defeated
countries would reform their political and legal system. They took
these "recommendations" seriously. 7
America also has been a model for newly emerging nations. Even
as United States commercial law has been vigorously studied by a
large number of foreign scholars as a result of her leading position in
international trade and investment, so too can the lessons of her
constitutional experience be easily identified in almost every constitutional work of other countries. It is fair to say there is no other
aspect of the American legal system that has been probed so deeply
and extensively as her constitutional law.

6. Hitler, Mussolini and Petain all received plenary power from their legislatures
through the formal legislative procedure; see Dietze, supra note 3, at 1233, 1255, n.88.
7. However, a German constitutional authority, Rudolf Katz, who was the Vice
President of the Federal Constitutional Court until 1961, categorically denied that
there was a necessary causal relationship between original Allied demands and final
German action. Instead, he argued that the adoption of the judicial review was favored
by all democratic parties and groups after World War II and thus it was the Germans
themselves made up their mind; see Bundesverfassungsgericht und U.SA. Supreme
Court, 7 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 98 (1954), cited in Cole, The West
German Federal Constitutional Court: An Evaluation After Six Years, 20 J. POL. 278,
281-82 (1958). There is no concrete evidence to show the direct pressure exercised by
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Nevertheless, each country has its own distinctive cultural and
historical background; the political and social conditions of few
countries are identical. Recognizing this diversity, no country follows
the American example in all respects, although often the American
form of judicial review is very influential. But it does not always take
the form to which Americans are accustomed. One important
structural difference lies in the fact that some countries separate the
constitutional court from the hierarchy of ordinary courts. This is a
significant development from the establishment of the system of
judicial review, because it presents an alternative means of guarding
the constitution. 8 China adopted this alternative approach. The
underlying reasons for creating this different system are many and
will be dealt with at length in Chapter IV. The implications
associated with this important departure are also covered there.
Compared with the abundant material about the constitutional
courts in West Germany, Italy, and Austria, with the Supreme Court
of Japan and with the Constitutional Council of France (which is said
only to possess rather limited review functions), the work of the

the United States upon them to adopt judicial review as a way of promoting a
democratic way of life. Henry Abraham maintained, however, that the establishment
of the Federal Constitutional Court in West Germany was the result of the United
States insistence; see ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 299.
In the case of Japan the conclusions reached by foreign and Japanese
constitutional scholars are the same. That is, the present Constitution reflects the
enormous influence of the American notion of constitutionalism. It might even be said
that it was virtually drafted by the hands of the Occupation Authorities; see H.
QUIGLEY & J. TURNER, THE NEW JAPAN 94 !1956); McNelley, The Japanese
Constitution: Child of the Cold War, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 176, 185 !1959). For a vivid
description about strong American pressure upon the Japanese; see C. WHITNEY,
MacARTHUR: HIS RENDZEVOUS WITH HISTORY 250-52 !1956). It is thus natural
that the doctrine of judicial review is explicitly recognized in article 81, which provides
that "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation of official act." Williams, Making the
Japanese Constitution: A Further Look, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 665-79 !1965).
8. Austria was the first country which established the archetype of this
alternative according to her 1920 Constitution. The well-known Austrian jurist Hans
Kelsen was the most influential figure in the drafting of this document. For a concise
introduction to the Austria .. system of judicial review, see Grant, Judicial Review of
Legislation under the Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 670-76
(19341; Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian
and American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183-200 (1942).
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Council of the Grand Justices in China is entirely ignored. As a
Chinese student interested in constitutional law, I hope to bring the
work of the Grand Justices to the attention of international
constitutional scholars. The Chinese experience will add to the
richness of current inquiries about the legitimacy and proper scope of
judicial review.
The absence in the legal literature of an examination of Chinese
constitutional law is explained by the recent development of Chinese
judicial review. The terms "constitution" or "constitutional law" can
be found in ancient Chinese books, which were published not only
before Marbury v. Madison, but also before America had been
dis~overed by Europeans. But it would be misleading to conclude that
China was the pioneer in the establishment of constitutional
government, because these terms do not bear modern meaning and
significance. In ancient books the term "constitution" only designated
various laws and ordinances promulgated by the Imperial Court. 9 As
a matter of fact, law in traditional China never assumed a prominent
role. After Confucianism was firmly established two thousand years
ago, Chinese legal theories and practices in the dynasties that
followed were virtually governed by the concept of rites, because
Confucians advocated government by gentry and maintained that
people should be governed by a system of ethics rather than by law.
China, however, has had various legal codes during her long history,
but never a constitution.
Until the beginning of this century, the Chinese were totally
unfamiliar with constitutional rules. This situation began to change
in the beginning of the twentieth century when the last monarchy in
Chinese history, the Ching dynasty, was forced by unceasing
revolutionary movement and the world-wide trend toward constitutionalism to overhaul its political system. Because the people were
dissatisfied with the delay and the slowness of this political reform, a
large-scale revolution erupted in 1911 and overthrew the Ching
dynasty. Even after the establishment of the first republic in Asia,
the following political development did not pave the way for

9. In theory, the monarch in traditional China was the head of state whose
authority was subjected to no limitations except those imposed by God. Thus, the
limitation on the exercise of governmental power, which is the cardinal element of
constitutional government, is absent. However, the emperor actually was under a
number of restraints; this phenomenon may in some way approximate the meaning of
modern constitutionalism. For those limits on Chinese royal power, see F. HOUN,
CHINESE POLITICAL TRADITION 45-98 119651.
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establishing a constitutional government in China. The existing
conservative politicians and military simply did not believe in
constitutional rule. They fought each other in every part of the
country in order to seize as much power as possible. As many as three
constitutions and four constitutional drafts were promulgated during
the. next seventeen chaotic years. Since those drafts and constitutions
either were drafted by the constitutional commission, whose members
were backed by a warlord who happened to occupy Peking, or were
never put into practice, their significance has been minimized by
many students of Chinese constitutional law.
Less than ten years after the unification of the whole nation
under the leadership of the Nationalist Party in 1928, the short
period of peace was shattered by the Japanese. Only after World War
II did China,· along with other newly independent nations, have its
first "legitimate" Constitution, which was made and promulgated by
the National Assembly on December 25, 1946 and became effective
as of January 1, 1947. The process of making this constitution was
not a simple one and will be described i_n full in the next chapter.
The power of judicial review was explicitly recognized and
entrusted to a special organ, the Council of Grand Justices. 10 The
Council did not, however, function until the Nationalist government
moved to Taiwan three years later. Compared to the American
experience, it is no exaggeration to say that judicial revi_ew in China
is in its infancy. Thus, a study comparing Chinese institutions and
those of the leading democratic countries has the potential to benefit
China, because she can assimilate the wisdom that the experience of
other countries has generated and avoid the problems in which some
more experienced countries still find themselves entangled.
In this paper I hope to contribute to the ultimate realization of
this potential, but I recognize that China cannot borrow wholesale
from other countries and other customs. If judicial review is to be not
only transplanted to China, but is also to work, it must be adjusted to
the local customs of the world's oldest civilization. It will be
important in the remainder of this paper to see how the American
concept of judicial review must be changed to suit Chinese culture.
10. Article 78 provides: "The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and
shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders." The following
article 79, paragraph 2 provides: "The Judicial Yuan shall have a certain number of
Grand Justices to take charge of matters specified in article 78 of this Constitution,
who shall be nominated by the President of the Republic." The functions and structures
of Judicial and Control Yuan and other governmental organizations will be fully dealt
with in the next chapter.
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Also important is the question whether judicial review in its Chinese
form has itself changed the culture of this ancient land.
After tracing the historical development of the Chinese political
and legal system and studying the influence on the current governmental structure and the people's attitude towards the government, I shall examine the organization and function of the co~stitu
tional framework in which the Council of Grand Justices, ordinary
courts, and also the administrative courts operate. Then I shall
discuss the actual practice of, and some of the most far-reaching
decisions rendered by, the Council. I will compare them with their
American counterparts in the hope of discerning significant differences and the underlying reasons for them. Finally, I will deal with
the impact of the constitutional decisions, a subject that is important,
controversial and too often ignored in analysis of systems of judicial
review.
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CHAPTER II
Background of the Chinese System of Judicial Review
A. Confucianism v. Legalism
It may be an exaggeration to say, as historians usually seem to
do, that the best way to understand anything of importance about the
present is to know everything about the past. Still, one cannot deny
that some aspects of the past do influence, sometimes rather
significantly, the contemporary life of every country. As China has a
long recorded history of over three thousand years, a study of the
legal thought and system prevalent in traditional China is absolutely
necessary for a better understanding of the modern Chinese state. In
addition, traditional Chinese legal practices and conceptions about
law deserve special attention, since in many ways they sharply differ
from those of other civilizations. It might even be suggested that the
difference between China and other civilizations is nowhere so clearly
manifest as in the domain of law. Accordingly, a few words about the
theory, development, and special features of Chinese law are
necessary before we discuss the practical administration of justice.
Like its political philosophies, China's most influential legal
philosophies, which signified conscious reflections on the nature and
end of law, seem to have made their appearance, to have grown, and
to have diversified during the sixth arid third centuries B.C. The
period was characterized by the conflict between Confucianism's and
Legalism's differing conception of government, the one espousing a
belief in "government by men," the other trusting in "government by
law." Because the Confucian school firmly believed that the people
could be influenced through moral education exerted by someone at
the top, ethics was the principal regulator of human conduct and
virtue the chief requirement of the rulers.' In addition, the doctrine of

1. E.g., Confucius said, "The people [are] like grass, the ruler like the wind, as
the wind blows, so the grass will be inclined." THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS,
Book 12, ch. 19, at 168 (A. Waley trans. 1938). Mencius, the great Confucianist second
only to Confucius, also said, "When the ruler is beneovolent, all will be benevolent,
when the ruler is righteous, all will be righteous, when the ruler is correct, all will be
correct," J. LEGGE, CHINESE CLASSICS II: 186 (1870).
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the mandate of heaven2 and the right to rebellion 3 all contributed to
the emergence of the conception of "government by men," because the
people were not bound to obey tyrants; that is, emperors' unwise
behavior and bad fortune were taken as evidence that they had lost
their celestial mandate to govern. Such principles called for a
government of men rather than of laws. Legalists, on the other hand,
denied that moral influence could determine the social order and
could alone create order within the state. They strongly rejected any
"government by men" principle, simply because it would be precarious. What they wished to produce was a system of law before which
all men were equal and through which proper social behavior would
be inculcated by means of severe penal sanctions imposed by the state
regardless of the person involved!
2. This doctrine was said to have originated in the early Chou period (1000-771
(B.C.)). As a border nation militarily dependent on the Shang state, Chou finally
overthrew the latter and justified this conquest by invoking an elaborate doctrine in
which the emperor retained his mandate from heaven by displaying virtue and the
capacity to exercise a benign heaven's will. Once the emperor proved incapable of doing
this, he would be responsible to heaven for the disturbance of the natural harmony.
Consequently, the mandate would be withdrawn and might even be transferred to
another. Heaven's will was made known by way of the saying: "Heaven looks
accordingly as the people look and heaven listens accordingly as the people listen."
This indicates that the "heavenly mandate" was not a family property to be inherited
from one generation to another as was the general practice. It might become negated as
soon as one's virtue waned. The saying also means that the virtue and the ability of the
emperor were measured by the degree of satisfaction of the people under his rule. A
letter by Kuang-we, founder of the Later Han dynasty, provides a better illustration of
the impermanence of the heavenly mandate. Addressing King-sun Shu after having
restored the throne which was usurped by Wan Mang from an infant sovereign of the
Former Han dynasty, Kuang-we wrote that despite its recent restoration, the Han
dynasty, like all its predecessors, would eventually come to an end since mandates of
heaven are never meant to be permanent. F. HOUN, CHINESE POLITICAL
TRADITION 8 (1965).
3. The doctrine of the mandate of heaven obviously implied a right of rebellion. It
was the last but effective resort of the populace against the tyrannical government.
People justified their rebellion by claiming that heaven's mandate for the existing
dynasty had been revoked. The success of their rebellion would thus legitimize the
establishment of a new dynasty. We shall bear in mind that it is erroneous to say the
right of revolution instead of rebellion. Centuries of authentic Chinese history have
shown that when political disaffection developed it did not take the form of a demand
that the system of government be drastically changed until 1911. In other words, the
Chinese people were traditionally concerned only with the personal character of the
rulers who held the reins of authority. Meadows, in his old but still valuable work,
concluded that the Chinese are the least revolutionary and the most rebellious; see T.
MEADOWS, THE CHINESE AND THEIR REBELLIONS 25 (1953).
4. E.g., Han Fei Tzu said: "To put aside laws and to rely upon one's heart in
governing would make it impossible even for Yao [the king in ancient time to whom
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However, the concept of law employed by the Legalist differed
from that of the West because the former had such a narrow view of
human nature: in order to produce an effective system of law which
was powerful enough to suppress feudal privilege at home and
eliminate rival kingdoms abroad, only two motives needed to be
reckoned with; namely, fear and profit. Thus, the Legalist's belief in
the overriding importance of punishment and reward to ensure good
government was inevitable. 6 The idea of subjective human rights was
totally unknown to these partisans of positive law, although they
ardently advocated the equality of individuals before the law.
Like many other reformers and great thinkers, Confucius was
frequently ridiculed by people of his own day, and his lofty ideas were
never given the opportunity to be put into practice. This may be due
in large part to the constant warfare which many countries fought in
order not only to preserve their own existence, but also to make
themselves strong enough to subdue their neighbors. Society was
disordered and the relationship between people and government was
fragile. Under the circumstances, the moral ethics expounded by
Confucianism were indeed unrealistic. Legalism doubtlessly was
better suited to the needs of these rulers, for it required people to do
everything to contribute to the strength of the state by clearly defined
and impersonal commands and penalties. Hence, the Legalists held
the advantage in the actual battles of that time. By adopting those
dynamic and ruthlessly efficient programs designed by the Legalists,
the Chin dynasty finally unified China. However, the excessive use of
manpower to build the Great Wall and other magnificent buildings
made the people intolerant. The infamous "burning of the books and
Confucious attributed many virtues] to rectify a country." I W. LIAO, THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF HAN FEI TSU 269 (1959). Also, the Lord of Shang said:
"What I mean by the unification of punishments is that punishments should know no
degree or grade, but that from ministers of state and generals down to great officers
and ordinary folk, whosoever does not obey the king's commands, violates the
interdicts of the state, or rebels against the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty
of death and should not be pardoned." J. DUYVENDARK, THE BOOK OF LORD
SHANG 778-79 (1928).
5. One leading contemporary philosopher, Fung Yu-lan, elaborated this by
saying:
In ruling the world, one must act in accordance with human nature. In human
nature there are the feelings of liking and disliking, and hence rewards and
punishment are effective. When rewards and punishment are effective, interdicts
and commands can be established, and the way of government is complete.
See Y. FUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 162 (D. Bodde ed.
1948).
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burying of the scholars" in which Confucian classics were burned and
scholars of the Confucian faith were buried alive led to a break with
the intellectuals. Under the circumstances the Chin dynasty was
short-lived and overthrown within twenty years by the Han dynasty.

B. Confucianization of Law
The failure of the Chin dynasty vastly enhanced the prestige of
Confucian teaching. During the reign of Wu-ti, at the advice of Tung
Chung-shu, Confucianism was exalted, to the denigration of other
schools of thought. It is said that from that time until 1911 Chinese
political and legal thought was dominated by Confucianism. 6 This
statement is based more on appearance than on fact. The Confucianism which now became the accepted orthodoxy was subtly transformed somehwat into an amalgam which included substantial parts
of Legalism. Institutions of law and organizations with which
Legalism was identified survived into the next Han dynasty and
thereafter, in an exceptional symbiosis with those belonging to the
classical Confucian order. This might be the result of the Confucianists' realization of the necessity and advantages of the administrative
machinery established by the Chin dynasty for the actual conduct of
public affairs. This Chin structure was vital to the maintenance of a
centralized government.
The survival of the Legalist structures and laws also occurred
because legal sanctions were never rejected totally by the Confucianists from the very beginning; they only objected to replacing moral
influence by punishment. Mencius succinctly pointed out, "Virtue
alone is not sufficient for the exercise of government, laws alone
cannot carry themselves into practice." 7 As time passed, the supplementary function of punishment was increasingly emphasized by
the Han Confucianists. Wang Tu was quoted as saying, "When law
and order are operating, there will be good government; when law
and order are by-passed, the nation will be in disorder." 8 Practically
speaking, some economic policies adopted by the government such as
"governmental monopolies of salt, iron and other products, or
6. The other reasons contributing to the long dominance of Confucianism in
Chinese political arena are that it was most conducive to the maintenance of
monarchical institution; that the right of rebellion was used only as a last resort; that
the works of Confucius were employed as subjects of ancient historical, political, and
moral essays in the competitive civil service examination, etc. For a more detailed
study, see P. HSIEH, THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA (1644-1911), at 12-15 (1923).
7. LEGGE, supra note 1, at II: 65.
8. T. CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 272-73 (1961).
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ever-normal granary, various government efforts to equalize private
holdings of land, all probably owed as much or more to Legalism than
they did to early Confucianism."9 Even the civil service examination,
which has traditionally been thought to be a peculiarly Confucian
institution, was challenged as a Legalist invention. 10
Fully recognizing the value of Legalism, the Confucianists in the
Han dynasty and thereafter worked out a legal system in which the
polarity of law and morality was embodied in the same code. The
result was a legalization of morality or the Confucianization of law .11
In other words, these Confucianists adopted from Confucianism the
substance of moral duties, while from the Legalists they adopted the
procedure of enforcing those duties. This process began during the
Han period and gradually matured in the Tang dynasty (618-916
A.D.), whose code is clearly and succinctly expressed:
Virtue and morals are the foundation of government and
education, while law and punishments are the operative agencies
of government and education. Both the former and the latter are
necessary complements to each other, just as it takes morning
and evening to form a whole day, and spring and autumn to form
the whole year.' 2
The natural consequence of such synthesis is that moral duties
are ipso facto legal duties in the sense that the law sanctions them by
penalizing their breaches. Whatever is immoral is not only illegal but
a criminal offense. 13
Under the dominance of such ideology, civil law could hardly
have evolved in traditional China. Even a debtor who failed to
discharge his obligations was made punishable with flogging in
addition to being compelled to pay the full amount owed. Therefore,
not until recently can the Chinese be said to have developed any

9. D. BOD DE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 28 <1967!.
10. Creel, The Meaning of Hsing Ming and the Fa-Chia: 'Legalists' or Administrators'?, 4 BULL. INST. HIST. & PHILOLOGY 607-36 <196ll.
11. See CH'H, supra note 8, at 267-78.
12. Vol: 1 Chap. 1 at lla. For English translation see THE TANG CODE 54 (W.
Johnson trans. 1979).
13. A catchall of Confucian moralism provides: "Whoever does anything which he
ought not to have done is punishable with 40 blows light flogging; and when the
impropriety is of a serious nature, 80 blows heavy flogging." Vol: 10, art. 450.
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considerable body of civil, as distinguished from criminal, law. 1• The
code in each dynasty, without exception, dealt exclusively with
questions of criminal and administrative law; questions of family,
succession, and other areas of private law were mentioned only in
connection with criminal or administrative law. 15 This marked a
sharp contrast to the development of law in Europe, where the great
compilations of Roman jurisprudence were concerned primarily with
the institutions of private law.
In this connection, it is helpful to give a brief historical
development of Chinese written codes. Leaving aside the studies on
the semi-historical period and the legal reference in the Book of
History, important as these are to the historian, we come to firm
ground in the period of the "Warring Kingdom," which was also
characterized as a period of competition for a variety of philosophies
like that mentioned above, with the publication of the Code of Six
Chapters edited by Li Kwei of the state of Wei. The Six Chapters
dealt respectively with (1) theft, (2) brigandage, (3) imprisonment, (4)
procedure, (5) various enactments, and (6) definitions. From this time
forward those elements that were to make up the traditional
composition of the various dynastic codes began to appear. The Han
dynasty added three chapters to the existing code, dealing respectively with murder, mortal wounding, and a different type of theft. After
the Han, only a few dynasties added notably to the volume and
quality of the legal literature of China. During the Tang dynasty, a
very comprehensive and, at least according to the ancient standard,
quite systematic code was enacted. 16 Since the older codes had been
lost save for chapter headings or fragments, the Tang Code was the
14. This can be substantiated by the finding of one of the best known Sinologists,
E. H. Parker: "In the whole history of China, I have not come across a single case of
civil jurisprudence in the strict sense, i.e., where any abstract rights between
individuals have been thrashed out with considerations touching relevancy of evidence,
damage to character, equitable set-off, nice definitions in contract, and so on." E.
PARKER, CHINA: HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY AND COMMERCE 327 !1917>.
15. However, the district magistrate did dispose of civil cases arising from the
failure of mediation, and the financial commissioner of the provincial government as
well as the Board of Revenue at the national capital handled the appeal cases. As civil
cases generally never reached the highest court and thus could not be found in the
usual compilation of cases, not a few scholars have had the misconception of the
non-existence of civil cases in the Chinese courts. See Buxbaum, Some Aspects of Civil
Procedure and Practice at the Trial Level in Tanshui and Hsinchu from 1789-1895, 30
J. ASIAN STUD. 255, 262-63 <1970l.
16. It is important to note here that Wallace Johnson recently completed a
translation of the general principles of the Tang Code, which is a major contribution to
the study of Chinese legal history. See Johnson, supra note 12.
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first in which the full text was preserved. The high quality of the
Tang Code made it a worthy model for all the codes of the succeeding
dynasties; in fact, the series of these codes was said indeed to present
a remarkable continuity of provisions. 17 In addition, the Tang Code
had great influence even beyond the confines of China; Japan
borrowed it as the very model for her "Ta Pao Code." The most recent
and the last code of imperial China that is also marked by its
exhaustive substance and systematic form is the Code of the Ching
dynasty, also known as Ta Ching Lu Li. 18
Since the ministers entrusted with the task of drawing upon
codes of law in the various dynasties were all scholars well versed in
the Confucian classics as a result of the civil service examination,
these ministers consciously or unconsciously seized the opportunity to

17. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 59; see also J. ESCARRA,
CHINESE LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 16 (1926l; Cheng, Fragments of Chinese Law Ancient and Modem, 1 CHINESE CULTURE 1:1, 7 (1958).
Contra, a highly qualified Chinese author, Hsieh Yun-sheng, a former President of the
Board of Punishments who devoted a life-long study to problems of Chinese law,
declared that there is a considerable difference between the Tang and the Ming
(1364-1644 A.D.) codes, the latter having undergone the influence of the law during
Mongol times (1271-1368 A.D.); see Y. HSIEH, TANG MING LU HO PIEN (The
Combined Compilation of the Tang and Ming Codes) 2a (1922). For a detailed study of
legal adjustments in Yuan dynasty; seeP. CH'EN, CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION
UNDER THE MONGOLS (1979).
18. Sir George Staunton in his introduction to the translation of the Ta Ching Lu
Li observed:
By far the most remarkable thing in this code is its great reasonableness, clearness
and consistency, the business-like brevity and directness of its provisions, and the
plainness and moderation in which they are expressed. There is nothing here of the
monstrous verbiage of most other Asiatic productions, none of the superstitious
deliberation, and the miserable incoherence, the tremendous non sequiturs and
eternal repetitions of those oracular performance . . . nothing even of the turgid
adulation, accumulated epithets and fatiguing self-praise of other Eastern
despotisms . . . but a calm concise and distinct series of enactments, savouring
throughout of practical judgment and European good sense, and if not always
comformable to our improved notions of expediency, in general approaching to
them more nearly than the codes of other nations . . . for the repression of disorder
and the gentle coercion of a vast population, it is equally mild and efficacious.
Cheng, supra note 17, at 7. It was also translated into French by Renouard de
Sainte-Croix in 1812 and an Italian version was published about the same time.
Another edition dated 1890 has been extensively translated into French, with
commentaries, notes and appendices by Father Gui Bonlais; see Cheng, The Development and Reform of Chinese Law, 1 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 170, 173 (1948l. An
excellent analysis of the Code in its own terms has been done by William Jones in
Studying the Ch'ing Code - The Ta Ch'ing Lu li, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 330 (1974).
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incorporate as many of the moral ideas and concepts of Li into the
codes as possible. 19 Aside from the work of codification, officials from
the lowest magistrates, who were also the local chief executive, to
various higher authorities in the government hierarchy were inclined
to dispense justice in Confucian terms, because they were also the
successful candidates in the competitive civil service examination.
Furthermore, where the law was silent or where there was no
provision of law applicable to a particular suit, the judge often turned
to Confucian doctrines for guidance. Tung Chung-shu gained prominence in this area by invoking the principles set down in the Chun
Chiu, the Confucian classic in which Confucius exalted some of the
great ethical principles as cardinal rules for regulating human
relations. His work "Chun Chiu Chueh Yu" (Judging Cases by Chun
Chiu) included 232 cases, and he was frequently consulted even after
his retirement. 20 Another Confucianist in Later Han, Ying Shao,
wrote a book entitled "Chun Chiu Tuan Yu" on the same subject.
Besides these two, there were many others who used the same
principles in rendering judgment. 21
The most important charcteristics of traditional Chinese law are
to be found in the concept of family and in the system of social
hierarchy. In China, the family, not the individual, constitutes the
19. The definition of the word "Li" varies and is difficult to translate. Literally, it
may be translated as "ceremonies", "rites", "etiquette", or "a code of behavior".
However, this magic word means much more to the Chinese. Indeed, it covers the whole
scope of proper human behavior in family, social, economic, and official dealings.
According to Needham, a veteran in Chinese history, Li meaning customs of the society
based on ethics or on ancient taboos, includes in addition all kinds of ceremonial and
sacrificial observances. See II J. NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN
CHINA 519 (1969). In the definition offered by a Chinese student, Leonard Hsii, the
essential element in Li is the exercise of reason and judgment. He further breaks Li
down into three aspects: first, an ordering of society in which each individual knows his
rights and duties so that obedience to the natural order will naturally ensue; second, a
code of morality which, being based on human nature, operates not by external control
but through individual conscience; third, Li provides an ideal of social harmony,
emphasizing the individual's obligation to society; L. SHU, THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF CONFUCIANISM 93-99 (1932). Thus, Li embodies an ethical
content. As the English language seems incapable of supplying a term which can
express the full meaning of Li, it is interesting to note the late Dr. Hu Shih, a
prominent modern Chinese philosopher, has translated Li into a German term
Sittlichkeit, the concept of ethics of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. See Michael, The
Role of Law in Tradition, Nationalist, and Communist China, 9 CHINA Q. 124, 127
<1962).
20. Ch'U, supra note 8, at 276.
21. /d.
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unit of the social and the political community and serves as a model
by which the state is governed. Just as the highest duties inculcated
by the moralists are those owing to parents and elders, so the
strictest obligations of the law are attached to these relationships.
Such considerations of relationships could have either a mitigating or
an aggravating influence in regard to penalties. Although space does
not permit the citation of all the interesting examples in which the
presence of a certain relationship would increase or decrease the
penalty, several of them should give a fair understanding of this
characteristic.
A relationship had a mitigating influence whenever the rigor of
the law was softened to meet the requirement of justice, that is, the
harmony of the universe. It could, for instance, save the life of a
convicted murderer whose parent or grandparent was old, or
disabled, when he himself was the sole able-bodied member in the
family. In this instance, serving his parents and continuing the
family were more important than punishing the offender. In addition,
those offenders under the age of 15 and above 70, as well as the
partially disabled, were entitled to redemption when sentenced to any
punishment not greater than banishment. Offenders under the age of
7 or above 90 were not punishable at all, even for crimes worthy of
death. 22
A punishment was made more severe when, within a family, the
offender was of a junior generation. The most severe punishment
doubtless was imposed upon patricide. The Ching Code provided that
"any person convicted of a design to kill his or her father or mother,
grandfather or grandmother, whether on the father's or mother's side
. . . shall . . . suffer decapitation." 23 In contrast to this terrible
punishment is that inflicted upon a father who kills a son, which is
only 70 blows and banishment for a year and a half. Between these
two extremes the punishment varied, depending upon the degree of
the relationship between the parties, and upon whether the crime
was committed by the older or the younger relative.
Moreover, Confucianism placed a strong emphasis on filial piety,
even at the expense of public interest. Thus, we have the following:
The Duke of Sheh informed Confucius, saying "Among us here
there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If
22. For a more detailed discussion, see Gen, Some Characteristics of the Ancient
Chinese Law, 48 ASIATIC REV. 156, 159 C1952l.
23. ~CCLXXIV, in SIR G. STAUNTON, TA TSING !CHING! LEU CLU> LEE CLI>,
at 305.
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their fathers have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the
fact." Confucius said, "Among us, in our part of the country,
those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals
the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of
the father. Uprightness is to be found in this." 24
This can be further illustrated by the fact that only in the gravest
matters, such as treason, could a son or daughter denounce a parent
to the magistrate. Any attempt by a child to invoke the protection of
the state against parental ill-treatment was itself an enormous crime
and was punishable by death. In order to protect the solidarity of the
family, the law went further in providing allowances for the natural
disposition of family members to shield each other from the
consequence of a crime except in cases of rebellion or joining the
emperor's enemy, where failure to give information, whether between
father and son or between brothers, was grounds for heavy
punishment. 25
24. CONFUCIUS Book XVIII, ch. 18. Another well-known statement by Mencius
is also worth quoting in full:
Tao Ying asked Mencius, saying "Shun being emperor, and Kao-yao chief minister
of justice, if Ku-son (Shun's father) had murdered a man, what would have been
done in the case?" Mencius said, "Kao-yao would simply have apprehended him."
"But would not Shun have forbidden such a thing?" "Indeed, how could Shun have
forbidden it? Kao-yao had received the law from a proper source." "In that case
what would Shun have done?" "Sun would have regarded abandoning the empire
as throwing away a worn out sandal. He would privately have taken his father on
his back, and retired into concealment, living somewhere along the seacoast. There
he would have been all his life, cheerful and happy, forgetting the empire."
See MENCIUS, Book VII, ch. 35.
25. A typical provision in this respect can be found in ll XXXII of the Ta Ching Lu
Li in STAUNTON, supra note 18, at 34-35, which provided:
All relations connected in the first and second degree and living under the same
roof, maternal grand-parents and their grandchildren, fathers and mothers-in-law,
sons and daughters-in-law, grandchildren's wives, when mutually assisting each
other, and concealing the offences, one of another, and moreover, slaves and hired
servants assisting their masters and concealing their offences, shall not, in any
such cases, be punishable for so doing.
In like manner, though they should inform their relations of the measures adopted
for their apprehension, and enable them to conceal themselves, and finally to effect
their escape, they shall still be held innocent.
When relations in the third and fourth degrees assist and protect each other from
punishment in the manner here described, they shall for such conduct be liable to
punishment, but only in a proportion of three degrees less than would have been
inflicted on strangers under the same circumstances.
The same offences committed by relations in still more remote degrees of kindred,
shall be punished with one degree less of the extent of the punishment inflicted in
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The same purpose appears in the enactment regarding larceny.
Every member of the family was regarded as having a qualified
interest in the property of each other, the interest being greater the
nearer the kinship. The law therefore provided that "all persons
found guilty of stealing from a relation by blood or by marriage, in
the first degree, shall suffer a punishment five degrees less severe
than that which is legally inflicted in ordinary cases of theft in the
same amount. In like manner all persons found guilty of stealing
from relations in the second degree shall suffer punishment four
degrees less severe than that ordinarily inflicted; from relations in
the third degree, three degrees less severe."26
The correlative of the provisions just quoted was a system ofjoint
responsibility, in which members of the family were made mutually
responsible for each other's conduct. As the scope of implication
might be extended through generations, the severity of this principle was unprecedented. It was even said that the members of
the offenders' concubines' families were involved and sentenced to
death. 27 Fortunately, this law was limited to offences involving the
state and the public; injuries to persons or to the property of an
individual were not included.
Another inequality within relationships in the family was the
inferior status shared by women. For example, the Ta Ching Lu Li
provided that:
If a principal or first wife is guilty of striking her husband, she
shall be liable to the punishment of 100 blows; and the husband,
if he desires thereof, may obtain a divorce by making application
for the same to the magistrate of the district. If any such wife
strikes for as to wound her husband, she shall be punished by
three degrees more severely than in the case of striking in the
same manner an equal in ordinary cases. 26

ordinary cases. . . . Nevertheless, none of provisions of this law in mitigation or
remission of the punishment of harbouring, concealing, and assisting relations,
shall be pleaded, or have any effect, in cases of high treason or rebellion.
26. §CCLXXII, see id., at 287.
27. Such was the case of Shun-yu Chang, whose six concubines had been
remarried after he was arrested and before he was sentenced to death, but whose
concubines' families were eventually sentenced to death regardless of some officials'
protest against it; see Cheng, The Chinese Theory of Criminal Law, 39 J. CRIM. L. 461,
467 (1948).
28. §CCCXV, in STAUNTON, supra note 18, at 341.
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On the other hand, it was no crime for a husband to strike his wife. 29
Nevertheless, Chinese women were less liable to prosecution and
punishment. Except for adultery and crimes worthy of death, there
was no imprisonment for women. In addition, women were entitled to
send their sons, younger brothers or nephews as their representatives
to the court, and they sometimes could even thus be punished.
Beyond the family, different social status also significantly
determined the amount of punishment, particularly in cases involving special privileged groups which includes those who qualified
under the "eight conditions for consideration." These were (1)
imperial clansmen, relatives of the emperor or empress, (2) old
faithful officials of the government who saw the emperor often, (3)
those who had rendered service to the government on the battlefield,
(4) great learned scholars, (5) the very able employees of the government, civil or military, (6) the diligent and dutiful employees of
the government, (7) any official, either civil or military of at least the
third rank, and (8) guests of the state. The most significant privilege
granted to these groups was that they could not be investigated,
arrested, or tortured without the permission of the emperor; the
sentences of those found guilty of an offense were subjected to
consideration and approval by the emperor with a view to possible
reduction. Even after a sentence was imposed, it was still possible for
officials to avoid actual punishment. For example, the giving up of an
official post would cancel out a punishment of three years
imprisonment. 30
During litigation in court the official was further granted the
legal privilege of declining to appear before the court with the
opposing party, if the latter was a commoner. However, since officials
were required by Confucian morality to set a moral example to those
beneath them, for certain offenses they were exposed to heavier
punishments than those prescribed for the ordinary man. An official
who debauched a woman living within his jurisdiction would receive
a !'Unishment two degrees greater than the normal punishment for
his offense. 31

29. "A husband shall not be punished for striking his first wife, unless the blow
produces a·cutting wound; in which cases, complaint having been made by the wife to a
magistrate, punishment shall be awarded two degrees less than in ordinary cases
between equals." Id. at 342.
30. CH'U, supra note 8, at 181.
31. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 35. For a more detailed account of
this special Chinese system, see CH'U, id at 177-84.
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C. Administration of Justice
The code was implemented and enforced primarily by the county
(hsien) magistrate, who was the emperor's all-purpose surrogate in
dealing with the people at large. Since all cases, civil as well as
criminal, were to be decided by him in the first instance, 32 and since
he was also required to conduct investigations and to detect crimes in
addition to hearing cases and rendering decisions, he could exercise
awesome punitive powers. In short, he acted as detective, prosecutor,
coroner, judge, and jury.
As the judicial system was not separated from the executive
branch of government in traditional China, the magistrates had to
perform a variety of administrative functions in addition to the
administration of justice. Those included tax collection, maintenance
of social order, education, social welfare, granaries, and supervision of
local public work. Hence, magistrates were not primarily legal
officers, but administrative officers of the government. Besides, they
were among the lucky ones who had passed the civil service
examination, with its emphasis on the Confucian classics; consequently they lacked the necessary legal knowledge and training, as Li
was put above Fa, which amounts to law, during their education
process. Under the circumstances, they had to rely exclusively upon
their clerks and secretaries for the administration of justice. Those
secretaries of law were extremely skillful in sifting and weighing
evidence and in applying the law to the case in hand. Their work
included endorsing or rejecting a complaint, arranging dates of
hearings, providing legal advice, and writing legal reports on serious
cases to the superior officials who supervised the district. 33 However,
they were unable to attend trials, and this no doubt constituted an
obstacle to the efficient handling of legal cases. 34
32. There was no time limitation on criminal cases; they could be reported to a
magistrate at any time. The acceptance of civil complaints, however, had been
restricted to only six or nine days of each month except during the "busy season for
farmers," that is, from the first day of the fourth month to the thirtieth day of the
seventh month; see T. CH'U, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE
CH'ING 118 (1962l.
33. For an account of their work, see id., at 98-101.
34. This is because those legal secretaries were not part of the formal administrative system; their salaries came from the private purse of the magistrate and they were
the latter's personal employees. Another interesting point is that since there was no
formal legal education, a legal secretary always had some pupils with him. In the
course of time these were recommended for employment to magistrates in want of
secretaries. As a result, they were usually from the Chekiang province, and, further,
from the Shaoshingfu !Shaoshing County).
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Several characteristics about the manner of conducting trials in
traditional China must be mentioned here. First, the employment of
torture to obtain confession was a necessary part of the penal system,
particularly since a magistrate was not permitted to pass sentence
unless the prisoner confessed guilt. 35 Accordingly, unless the case was
to be abandoned, the accused had to be confined and tortured until he
or she broke down and made a clean breast of things by telling all of
his or her misdeeds and by giving the names of all who were
associated with him or her. Needless to say, the innocent were not
protected by this system. The modes of torture were numerous and
very severe. Still, according to the Penal Code of the Tang dynasty,
torture could not be employed except in a case where there was
sufficient and plain evidence against the offender; it was confined to
beating with the stick, and limited to no more than three occasions,
totaling no more than 200 blows altogether. 36 In addition, all
instruments of torture had to accord with standard sizes and forms.
They had to be examined and branded by the superior administrative
agency. Some privileged groups such as persons entitled to the "eight
considerations," the aged, juveniles and the disabled, were also
exempted from torture.
Second, the concept of justice in traditional China was very
different from the popular ideas of court proceedings in Western
lands. Instead of assuming innocence as a basis, the defendant was
presumed to be guilty. 37 Not only did the magistrate himself have to
conduct the examination, questioning and cross-examining the
defendant in order to extract the truth, but also no lawyer was in
court to consult and assist the defendant. As a result of the elevation
of the Confucianist concept of Li over the Legalist emphasis of Fa, it
is understandable that the attitude of the people toward the practice
of law as an honorable profession had never been encouraged. In fact,
those who provided legal advice, which could only be provided
secretly, were generally men of bad reputation. The Ta Ching Lu Li
expressly provided that those who incited others to undertake
litigation or made profit out of managing a lawsuit would be
penalized. 38 This restriction severely impeded the technical development of law in China.
35. This system was said to have originated in the notorious Chin dynasty where
Legalism dominated the then-prevailing political ideology.
36. Gen, Some characteristics of the Ancient Chinese Law- II, 48 ASIATIC REV.,
233, 239 (1952).
37. Contra, Buxbaum, supra note 15, at 269-70.
38. See S. SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA 66, 69
(1962).
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Third, the most peculiar aspect of the traditional legal system
was the comprehensiveness of its appeal system, which automatically
took all but a few cases to higher levels of litigation for final
judgment. To be more specific, the magistrate was only authorized to
pronounce sentence in civil and minor criminal cases where punishment was no more severe than beating or imposing the cangue. Even
so, he had to make monthly reports to his superior on the details of
cases. For those serious cases that called for penal servitude, the
magistrate had to report to the superior officer, who might approve
the former's recommended sentences. Cases involving a sentence of,
exile, banishment, or penal servitude as a penalty for homicide were
retried by the superior officers and were reported to another higher
agency. Most importantly, all capital offences were sentenced by the
emperor himself, after discussion with a committee of leading
mandarins from several governmental bodies, including the Board of
Punishment. This Board was one of the six regular departments of
the government. 39 Thus, a case, without any action of either party,
might undergo a certain number of retrials to reach final judgment by
the authorized superior, whose level was specified according to the
grade of punishment. 40
On the other hand, a person was generally free to take an appeal
to the superior if he was dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower
courts. Such an appeal was nothing more than a petition asking for
the superior's supervision of his inferior.
D. Preference for Mediation
We should bear in mind that the maintenance of social order and
the settlement of troubles in the social life of traditional Chinese
society did not wholly or even in the main depend upon the
governmental administration of justice. A kind of justice administered in an informal manner by autonomous organizations of the
people, such as family, clans, villages, guilds, etc., was, in fact, far
more effectively and extensively employed by the people. As mentioned above, according to the dominant Confucianist ideology, law
was considered useful only when it served as an instrument for the
39. Hudson even concluded, "What seems to have struck the sixteenth century
observers as most remarkable in the operation of the Chinese law was the system of
reviewing cases in which a death sentence had been pronounced." G. HUDSON,
EUROPE AND CHINA 241 t193U.
40. For a fairly detailed account of this system, see CH'U, supra note 32, at
116-18; SPRENKEL, supra note 38, at 67-68.

24

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

legislation of morality. Its existence was but a necessary evil. Because
law had never been freed from its dependence on morality, Chinese
traditional values emphasized not the rights which are an inevitable
development of the laws themselves, but the duties of the individual.
Once individuals were familiar with their rights, they were inclined
to assert them and thus caused disputes. The very existence of a trial
was a scandalous disturbance of the natural order which might lead
to a further disturbance of the social order to the detriment of all
society. Any sort of trial was thus condemned, because it was a sign of
troubled relationships between individuals. The mere act of appealing
to a magistrate, even when the appeal was justified, was enough to
have a man branded a troublemaker. Therefore, some middle road
had to be sought which took into consideration the interests of both
parties when interests conflicted.
In other words, it was better for those who felt they had been
wronged to "suffer a little and smooth the matter over rather than
make a fuss over it and create further dissension." 41 Specifically, if
one stood in the right, it was recommended that he "be merciful to the
offending party and set an example of the kind of cooperation that
fostered group solidarity rather than exact one's pound of flesh and
further alienate the offender from the group." 42 This philosophy is in
marked contrast to the western legal procedure which tends to
depersonalize claims in order to bring out more sharply the question
at issue. The Chinese system, on the other hand, tries to personalize
all claims, seeing them in the context of human relationships.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising to find that there
were many social groups (families, clans, villages, guilds and
associations) available to intervene and act as arbitrators or
mediators. 43 For difficulties within the family the head of the family
acted as a conciliator or mediator; sometimes, more remote relatives
or even outsiders who were highly respected were sought. The
standards applied by these mediators seeking compromise came from
41. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1201, 1207 (1966).
42. /d.; as John Wigmore has written: "The 'struggle for rights,' which the great
German jurist, von Ihering, inculcated as the basis of civil law and order, is alien to
Chinese thought. An unyielding insistence upon principle, and a rigid demand for one's
due, are almost as reprehensible as a vulgar physical struggle." See J. WIGMORE, A
PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 141, 150 (1936l; see also
SPRENKEL, supra note 38, at 114-15.
43. The preference for settlement of disputes in a private, rather than public
institution, of course, contributed to the scanty development of the civil law.
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the rules of behavior or the Li, the practices of their area, and from
the mediators' own experience and knowledge of the world. The
prestige of the mediator was often sufficient to bring considerable
social and moral pressure upon the parties and to succeed finally in
obtaining an agreement. Similar procedures applied where the
parties were not related to each other but belonged to the same clans,
lived in the same villages, or were members of the same guild; here
the elders of the clan, seniors of the guild or other persons of the local
elite were invited to act as mediators.•• The parties in these civil and
minor criminal cases45 could take their cases to the official courts, but
it was normal for them to try mediation first. As a matter of fact they
had to try mediation if they were to avoid social censure. In most
cases the members of the clans and guilds were specifically prohibited
by each group's internal regulations from seeking official help
directly! 6 Therefore, even though Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868),
which expressly provided that civil cases must be mediated first
before resorting to the courts;7 literally differed from the traditional
Chinese legislation, which did not require extrajudicial mediation as
a compulsory first step in the process of resolution of disputes, in the
actual context of Chinese life there was not much difference between
China and Japan.
The most crucial problem generated by extrajudicial mediation
was that since both parties were automatically under pressure to put
an end to a dispute, the agreement finally reached was often not a
real settlement. "The disagreement was merely driven below the
surface and went on simmering, and the situation was ripe for
explosion or provocation."48 Although it occurs in formal judicial
procedures, perhaps even in most civilized countries, that wealthy,
powerful individuals or families have preponderant advantages in
44. For a more detailed description of mediation, see C. CHANG, THE CHINESE
GENTRY 63 (1955J; H. HU, THE COMMON DESCENT GROUP IN CHINA AND ITS
FUNCTIONS 17 (1948); M. YANG, A CHINESE VILLAGE 165 <1945); SPRENKEL,
supra note 38, at 116; Cohne, supra note 41, at 1215-22; Luhman, Mao and Mediation:
Politics and Disputes Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284-1300
(1967).
45. For those cases involving serious violence such as arson, kidnapping and the
like, mediation was less frequent because the local leaders often took seriously their
duty to report to the magistrate; see K. HSIAO, RURAL CHINA 292 (1960).
46. On the clans, see H. LIU, THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE CLAN RULES
156-58 (1959J; on the guilds, see SPRENKEL. supra note 38, at 89-96.
47. D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW, TOKUGAWA
AND MODERN 128-29 (1965).
48. SPRENKEL, supra note 38, at 119-20.
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settling disputes, this was more obvious in the local mediation
process. Futhermore, it was possible for mediators to stir up disputes
in order to profit from mediation. In addition, for those who were not
satisfied with the results of mediation and who felt they had a
legitimate right but were turned down by extrajudicial institutions,
the possibility of challenging mediation in court was rather slim. Not
only was the magistrate often ready to accept the view of those local
institutions, but those seeking to challenge the results of mediation
would be ruthlessly castigated by the public.
On the other hand, the advantages of mediation were numerous.
Most of all, it avoided the time and expense of formal legal suits.
Private problems did not have to be revealed in public. Since the
parties, both defendant and plaintiff, were often incarcerated and
might have further suffered prescribed torture pending the trial,
there is no doubt that the mediation process was literally a more
comfortable one. The persons who presided over the mepiation were
generally most familiar with the facts of the case, and inhabitants
would usually be more receptive to decisions by others from their
locality. There were also practical considerations. In a country as
large as China where transportation was badly in need of improvement, the time and expense for parties traveling to the court seat and
staying there constituted an almost insurmountable problem for
those who did not live nearby. Extrajudicial institutions also relieved
the burden of the government so that it might thus devote more time
and energy to other, more important works. In the seventeenth
century one of the Chinese rulers, the Emperor Kang Hsi, went so far
as to declare:
lawsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people
were not afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of
always finding in them ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to
delude himself concerning his own interests, contests would then
be interminable, and the half of the Empire would not suffice to
settle the lawsuits of the other half. I desire therefore that those
who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any
pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law,
and tremble to appear before a magistrate!9

49. ld., at 77.
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Accordingly, it was not unusual for the magistrate to order would-be
litigants to return to their villages to have the matter settled first by
local mediation. 50

E. Legal Reform in the Mainland
Despite its great tradition, Chinese law gradually displayed its
weakness in the 19th century after dealing with western countries.
As most civil matters were regulated by ethical custom rather than
formal law, the scarcity of civil provisions and a near absence of
commercial law in the traditional codes made Chinese law incompatible with the needs of a modern society. The highly developed doctrine
of responsibility, which held relatives, neighbors, superiors, or even
all the members of a particular nationality liable for an offence
committed by an individual wrongdoer who had fled was a system
which foreigners found simply unacceptable. In addition, the frequent
use of the death penalty and of judicial torture, not only upon the
accused, but also upon witnesses, was also found to be repugnant.
Foreigners alleged that the gradations of punishment, including
decapitation and mutilation of an offender, 51 were too severe.
This unsympathetic attitude toward Chinese jurisprudence,
however, emerged only after the European countries had undergone a
social and political revolution in the eighteenth century which made
their criminal codes less severe and more humane in the administration of justice than those of the Celestial Empire. Before that, the
dispensation of justice under the Chinese system compared favorably
with other systems in its methods and results, as did many other
features of Chinese institutional and cultural life. 52 William Blake
Odgers once described the severity of English law as follows:
In the year 1820 there were more than two hundred crimes
punishable with death, of these more than two thirds had

50. CH'U, supra note 32, at 175, n.51.
51. For a fuller discussion, see 1 G. KEETON, EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY IN
CHINA 96-136 (1928).
52. As early as 850 A.D. an Arab traveler said that the Chinese "administer
justice with great strictness in all their tribunals"; see WIGMORE, supra note 42, at
154-55. Despite the fact that he was held captive in China, Galeoti Pereyra
emphatically asserted that justice is done in China and held it to be one of the best
governed countries in the world; Peake, Recent Studies on Chinese Law, 52 POL. SCI.
Q. 117' 119 (1937).
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been made capital during the eighteenth century. Sir Samuel
Rominlly asserted that there was no other country in the world
where so many and so large a variety of actions were punishable
by loss of life. Nearly all felonies were capital. If a man falsely
pretended to be a Greenwich Pension he was hanged. If he
injured a county bridge or cut down a young tree, he was_ hanged .
. . . If he stole property valued at five shillings . . . he was
hanged. . . . And these barbarous laws were relentlessly carried
into execution. A boy only ten years old was sentenced to death in
1816.53
One is thus justified in concluding: "In the beginning of Western
intercourse with China, Chinese codes were less severe than those of
Europe."54
Realizing its inability to resist the advancement of western
powers, China was forced to grant extraterritorial rights, the excuse
being that Chinese law and its legal system were primitive. The
earliest grant of such rights by China was contained in the
supplemental treaty of July 1843 with Great Britain. 55 At first, the
exercise of extraterritorial rights by the Western powers in China
might not have been regarded by the Chinese as abhorrent. Because
her tradition was to avoid any contact with foreigners, granting
extraterritorial rights was the corollary of her acquiescence in the
, settlement of disputes among foreigners. 56 Some western scholars
53. W. ODGERS, A COUNTRY OF LAW REFORM: CHANGES IN THE
COMMON LAW AND THE LAW OF PERSONS IN LEGAL PROFESSION AND IN
LEGAL EDUCATION 7 (1901).
54. Wing Mah, Foreign Jurisdiction in China, 18 AM. J. INT'l L. 676 (1924),
quoting E.T. Williams; see also E. PARKER, CHINA: HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY
AND COMMERCE 308 (1917); V. KOO, THE STATUS OF ALIENS IN CHINA 77-94
(1912).
55. Article XIII of the General Regulations for British Trade at the Ports of
Canton, Amoy, Foochowfoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai. Other powers which had extraterritorial treaties with China were the United States, France, Norway and Sweden,
Germany, Russia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary,
Brazil, Peru, Portugal, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland. The provisions of these treaties
were collected in 1 G. HERTSLET, HERTSLET'S CHINA TREATIES (1908l.
56. Keeton, The New Chinese Codes, 8 J. COMP. LEG. 3d ser. 225 (1926). S.
Williams gave a famous quotation as follows: "The barbarians are like beasts, and not
to be ruled on the same principle as citizens. . . . To rule barbarians by misrule is the
true and best way of ruling them." However, we must bear in mind that before the
Reformation the Europeans' conceptions of their power over those who visited their
shores were not unlike those which prevailed in China; see II S. WILLIAMS, THE
MIDDLE KINGDON 450 (1904).
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even cited the grant of an exemption from the local Chinese laws to
the Arabians at Canfu in the ninth century as well as to the
Portuguese at Macao in later centuries57 and a series of treaties
entered into with Russia relating to territorial jurisdiction58 as
precedents to the Chinese recognition of the principle of extraterritoriality.59
However, one thing was certain: all cases in which a Chinese
appeared either as plaintiff or as defendant were within the
justifiable reach of a Chinese court, 60 and thus the criminal procedure
of traditional China constituted the principle controversy between the
Chinese and foreigners. The solution to the difficulty was the
imposition of extraterritoriality. Since this decision resulted from a
Chinese military defeat, the Chinese gradually realized that extraterritoriality diminished their sovereignty and was inconsistent with the
legal principle of the equality of states. It is by no means the case,
however, that the argument against extraterritoriality was mainly
one of sentiment. Rather, it was a careful, well-supported statement
which cited numerous practical defects and abuses. These can be
illustrated by an observation made by C. Bishop, a former American
assessor of the Mixed Court at Shanghai: 61
57. T. JERNIGAN, CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE 194 (1905).
58. Article 4 of the Treaty of Nipchu or Nerchinsk 1689 provides: "If hereafter any
of the subjects of either nation pass the frontier and commit crimes of violence against
property or life, they are at once to be arrested and sent to the frontier of their country
and handed over to the chief local authority for punishment." The Treaty of the
Frontier, signed at Kiakhta in 1729, and the Supplementary Treaty of Kiakhta signed
in 1768 contained similar provisions relative to the suppression of brigandage and
other disturbances along the coterminous frontiers. For texts, see THE STATISTICAL
DE'T of INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF CUSTOME, 1 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS,
ETC., CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES 3, 18 (1908).
59. Chinese scholars refuted this by saying that "the Arabian practice seems to
have been forgotten and fallen into disuse long before the formal introduction of
extraterritoriality into China. . . . It was a mere unilateral grant and could have been
revoked at the pleasure of the grantor. As a matter of fact, no claim to special
jurisdiction appears to have been entertained by any power on the basis of this early
grant." S. LIU, EXTRATERRITORIALITY: ITS RISE AND ITS DECLINE 80 (1925).
As for these Russian treaties, as Dr. Koo also pointed out, "far from establishing the
principle of extraterritoriality, they seem to have involved nothing more than an
application, in exceptional circumstances, of the principle of personal law, which is
found in the criminal jurisprudence of substantially all civilized nations to a greater or
lesser extent." see KOO, supra note 54, at 53.
60. 1 H. MORSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE
64 (1910>.
61. For the case of the United States, see Bishop, American Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in China, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 281-99 (1926); Loring, American
Extraterritoriality in China, 10 MINN. L. REV. 407-16 (1926).
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The strongest plea for the abolition of extraterritoriality lies in
the abuse of this privilege on the part of subjects of foreign
powers who use it as a cloak for illegal acts. The continued
smuggling of opium and morphine into China is but a single
example, although the most striking, of the wrong that is being
done to China under the cloak of a foreign extraterritorial
jurisdiction.62

In a number of instances foreign courts imposed comparatively light
sentences upon criminals.83 Also, the Chinese litigants were placed at
a disadvantage because the variety of foreign laws and legal
arrangements were confusing and conducive to distrust. These were
merely the most obvious difficulties involved in extraterritoriality. 64
Since extraterritorial rights grew out of a dissatisfaction with
Chinese law, it was widely believed that modernization of the law
would assist China in overcoming her weakness and would eliminate
the demand for extraterritoriality. This attitude gained added
impetus from the Japanese legal reform and the resulting successful
abolition of extraterritoriality before the close of the century.
Moreover, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Sweden, and
Switzerland had promised in their respective treaties with China to
abolish extraterritoriality as soon as the state of Chinese law
permitted it.65 The result was the establishment of the Imperial Law

62. Bishop, Extraterritoriality in China and its Abolition, 5 CHINESE SOC. &
POL. SCI. REV. 3: 175 (1920).
63. Id.
64. On the defects of extraterritoriality in China, the references are plentiful; see
W. WILLOUGHBY, FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 67-87 U927l; Tyau,
Extraterritoriality in China and the Question of its Abolition, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
133-49 {1921-23); Price, Extraterritoriality in China, 11 OREG. L. REV. 264, 278-81
(1932).
65. In Article XII of the revised Commercial Treaty in 1902, Great Britain made
the following promise:
China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring
it into accord with that of Western nations . . . Great Britian agrees to give every
assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her
extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the
arrangement for their administration and other consideration, warrant her in so
doing.
A similar provision also appeared in the Commercial Treaties concluded a year later
with the United States, Japan, and Sweden in 1908, and Switzerland in 1918; for texts,
see TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 351, 414, 431, 745, 1430 CJ. MacMurray ed.
1921).
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Codification Commission in 1904, which included Dr. Wu Ting-fang, a
member of the English Bar and a former Minister to the United
States, and Shan Chia-pan, an eminent jurist in Chinese jurisprudence. Japanese advisor Mutsuoka Yoshitada was associated with the
Commission,56 and it is not surprising to find that a number of draft
codes of procedure and of criminal and civil law were considerably
influenced by the Japanese code, which in turn was based upon
Continental Codes, primarily the German and the French.
There was considerable wisdom in the appointment of Japanese
experts since Japan had recently solved the difficult problem of
adapting western legal principles to eastern requirements. Moreover,
there also was plausible reason for the reproduction in the Chinese
code of the chief characteristics of continental rather than AngloAmerican law. It is said that "Anglo-American law emphasizes the
individual at the expense of the family, while continental faw inherits
something of the old 'familia.' The family being the unit of Chinese
society, anything which weakens the existence and power of that
institution must be as unacceptable in principle as it would be
unworkable in practice."67 The more important consideration was that
Anglo-American law existed not only in statutes but also in judicial
as well as administrative decisions which were too complex and too
little systematized at that time. To a country which had to borrow
foreign codes, a ready-made code of comprehensive rules clearly and
concisely set forth article by article was not only simpler and more
systematic, but a more promising method of obtaining satisfactory
results. As one eminent Chinese jurist once said to G. Keeton, a keen
English observor of extraterritoriality in China, "We like your law
and for some reasons we would have preferred them as a model for
our own, but we cannot codify your own laws for you."68
The first modern code ever drafted by the Codification Commission was the KUNG-SSU-LU (Company Law) of 1904. The Code was
a hybrid of Japanese and English company laws in an abridged
form. 69 The Anglo-American influence was, however, limited to that
particular field. In addition to this, a number of codes on civil law,
maritime law, bankruptcy law, criminal law, and civil and criminal
66. lnfonnation provided in J. ESCARRA, LE DROIT CHINOIS 154 (1936).
67. Wang, Revision of the Chinese Criminal Code, 13 ILL. L. REV. 219 233 (1918).
68. Keeton, The Progress of Law Reform in China-II, 20 J. COMP. LEG. 3d ser.
210, 220 (1938). As the codification in Anglo-American law has been sped up recently,
its influence on Chinese law is more obvious than ever. We will deal with this later.
69. For a full discussion of this law, see Li, The Kung-ssu-lu of 1904 and
Modernization of Chinese Company Law, 10, CHENGCHI L. REV. 171 and 11 ibid 163
(1974).
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procedure were also drafted. 70 Of those early efforts, however, only the
"Provisional Regulations of the Organization of the Courts and
Subordinate Courts" (1907), the "Law of the Organization of the
Judiciary" (1909), and the Criminal Code ever carne into operation;
the rest remained only on paper, because they were generally the
result of hasty drafting and because the sponsoring Ching government fell within a few years. According to these organic laws, a
hierarchy of modern courts of four classes - the Local Court, the
District Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court - was
created. Subsequently, the Local Court was abolished. Since then the
District Court has become the court of first instance, where the trial
is conducted by one judge. An appeal may be made to a High Court
where three judges sit, and the last appeal is usually heard by five
judges without oral argument and is limited to questions of law in the
Supreme Court. 71
To every modern court, a procurator of corresponding grade is
attached. The Chinese procurator has no exact equivalent in American legal terminology. His authority is quite extensive and powerful.
He is the combination of prosecutor, coroner, or grand jury under
American system; that is, he has the power to hold a preliminary
examination of the accused and the witness so as to decide whether
the case should be prosecuted or not. In exercising this power he may
summon, arrest, and detain the accused without first getting approval
from a judge; he may also compel a witness to appear and make such
searches and investigation as may serve to throw light on the case. 72
This structure of the modem courts continues to function today even
though related laws have been revised several times.
The drafted Criminal Code was promulgated by an imperial edict
at the end of the Ching dynasty. The republican government, by a
presidential mandate of March 3, 1912, adopted the said Code, with
the exception of those provisions pertaining to the royal family of the
late regime. Several revisions were made in 1914, 1921, and 1928 to
bring it in line with most recent developments in criminal jurispru-

70. Laws relating to commercial matters were probably the first to be drafted
because China had a large number of foreigners residing in her territory through treaty
relations. It was therefore necessary that the scanty provisions of the then civil law,
particularly in matters of commerce, were far too inadequate to cope with the many
legal problems incidental to the modem age.
71. According to the current Code of Civil and Criminal Procedure (art. 474 and
389, respectively), when it is deemed necessary oral argument may be conducted.
72. See Pound, Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. 345, 357 (1948).
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dence. 73 This code provided, for the first time, that no person could be
held guilty of an offense unless it was expressly provided for. It also
ended the principle of collective responsibility of the family and clan
for the crimes of members, and torture was abolished. These revised
codes were again drafted by the Codification Commission now with
different members after the establishment of the Republic. Dr. Wang
Chung-hui, a graduate of Yale and a deputy-judge of the Permanent
Court of International Justice as well as the famous translator of the
German Civil Code into English, was among them. In addition, Tung
Kang, the Chief Justice of the Chinese Supreme Court, later Minister
of Justice and the last living authority on ancient Chinese law, and
Lo Wen-kan, an Oxford M.A. and procurator-general of the Republic,
were also members. In addition to two Japanese advisors, Itakura
Matsutaro and Iwata Shin, the Frenchman M. G. Padoux was also
associated with the Commission. The latter had been responsible for
the modernization of the Siamese codes which led to the eventual
abolition of extraterritoriality in that country.
The work of this Commission was quite impressive. It published
the following volumes within ten years: The Regulations Relating to
Criminal Procedure, The Ordinance of the General Regulation of
Traders, The Trade Mark Law, The Regulations Relating to Civil
Procedure, The Chinese Supreme Court Decisions, Chinese Prisons,
and many others. Nevertheless, the external political turmoil which
had resulted from the incessant civil wars among warlords and the
continued interference by the military seriously impeded the progress
of legal reform, particularly in the area of the administration of
justice. In other words, the whole system of Chinese law at the time,
satisfactory in theory, was inefficient and arbitrary in practice.
Therefore, it is natural that the report of the Commission sent to
China by the resolution of the Washington Conference of 1922 to
inquire into the present practice of extraterritoriality in China, and

73. The Provisional Code had been prepared with the Hungarian Criminal Code of
1878, the German Criminal Code of 1871, the Dutch Criminal Code of 1881, the Italian
Criminal Code of 1889, the Austrian Draft Criminal Code of 1893, the Swiss Draft
Criminal Code of 1903, the Egyptian Criminal Code of 1904, the Siamese Criminal
Code of 1908, and the Japanese Criminal Code of 1907 as guides. The so-called Revised
Draft of 1928 was prepared with the Austrian Draft Criminal Code of 1903, the
Resolutions of the German Commission of 1914 on Criminal Law Reforms, and the
counter-draft submitted by certain German criminologists in 1911 as additional guides;
see Chang, supra note 18, at 185.
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into the laws and judicial system and the methods of judicial
administration 9f China, 74 was a disappointment to the Chinese. 75
Although the existing system of extraterritoriality was still
desirable according to the survey of Chinese law made by the
Commission, this disheartening fact did not discourage the continuance of the law reform movement. 76 Between the establishment of
the National Government in 1928 and the outbreak of the war of
resistance against Japan in 1937, the work on codification came to
fruition and constituted the most significant domestic achievement by
the National Government. The Commission of Codification of Law
was transformed into a legislative commission headed by Sun Fo, son
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the President of the Legislature. The
Commission produced the Criminal Code (1935), the Code of Civil
Procedure (1935), the Code of Criminal Procedure (1935), the Civil
Code (1929), the Law of Insurance (1929), Company Law (1929),
Maritime Law (1929), Bankruptcy Law (1935), the Negotiable
Instruments Law (1929), and the Trademark Law (1936).
Without exception, the Criminal Code was largely a product of
various foreign codes. 77 One particular feature may be illustrated.
This code was based on the equality of men. No privileged group was
entitled to exemption or mitigation as the traditional codes provided.
Even today, however, family relations still play a part in the
determination of punishments. In offenses such as profaning the

74. The full text of the resolution can be found in II KEETON, supra note 51, at
5-6.
75. For a detailed analysis of the Report, see id., at 8--75.
76. It should be mentioned that when Germany and Austria lost their extraterritorial rights after World War I and when Russia voluntarily relinguished them
in 1924, the reaction of those governments to their nationals treated in the Chinese
courts afterwards was generally favorable; see Quigley, Extraterritoriality in China, 20
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 64-65 (1926).
77. These cases included the German Draft Code of 1925 and 1927, the Cuban
Draft Code of 1927, the Spanish Criminal Code of 1928, the French Draft Code of 1932,
the Italian Criminal Code of 1930, the Japanese Draft Code of 1930 and 1931, the
Philippine Criminal Code of 1930, the Polish Criminal Code of 1932, the Siamese
Criminal Code of 1908 and the Draft Revised Code of 1919, the Swiss Draft Code of
1931, and the Criminal Codes of the cantons of Fribourg !1924) and Vand Cl931l, the
Czechoslovakian Draft Code of 1926, the Turkish Criminal Code of 1926, the Soviet
Criminal Code of 1926, the Proceedings of the International Congress on Criminal
Law, of 1926, 1929, and 1933, and the Proceedings of the International Conferences for
the Unification of Criminal Law of 1927, 1928, 1930, and 1931; see Keeton, The
Progress of Law Reform in China, 19 J. COMP. LEG. 3d ser. 197, 203-4 (1937).
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dead, 78 homicide, 79 causing bodily harm, 80 restraining personal liberty,81 and abandonment,82 the existen~ of a family relation between
the offender and the victim increases the punishment. On the other
hand, in offenses such as theft, 83 fraud, 84 and receiving stolen
property, 86 the presence of a family relationship either requires the
judge to remit the sentence or to limit the sentence or limit judicial
cognizance to cases where the injured party himself starts a private
prosecution.
As civil matters were largely regulated by custom in traditional
China, the codification of civil law was not as aggressive as criminal
law.86 The Civil Code of 1929 also affirmed the principle of the
78. Article 250 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in one of the
Articles 247 through 249 [offences against graves and corpses] against his lineal blood
ascendant shall be subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence increased up
·
to one half."
79. Article 272 provides: "A person who kills his lineal blood ascendant shall be
punished with death or imprisonment for life [it is possible to receive a sentence for
less than ten years if there is no blood relationship involved]."
80. Article 280 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in one of the
Articles 277 or 278 [offen.ces of causing bodily harm] against his lineal blood ascendant
shall be subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence increased up to one half."
81. Article 303 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in one of the
paragraphs I or II of the preceding article [offence against personal liberty] against his
lineal blood ascendant shall be subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence
increased up to one half."
82. Article 295 provides: "A person who commits an offence specified in the
preceding article [offences of abandonment] against his lineal blood ascendant shall be
subject to the punishment prescribed for such offence increased up to one half."
83. Article 324 provides: "If an offence specified in this Chapter [offences of
larceny] is committed along lineal blood relatives, between spouses, or among other
relatives who live together and share their property, the punishment may be remitted."
84. Article 343 provides: "The provisions of Article . . . 324 shall apply mutatis
mutandis to offences specified in the four preceding articles [offence of fraud]."
85. Article 351 provides: "If an offence specified in this Chapter [offence of
receiving stolen property] is committed among lineal blood relatives, between spouses,
or among other relatives who live together and share their property, the punishment
may be remitted."
86. The reason for their delay is, though a revolution may overthrow a political
regime, the law that governed the interrelations of a people for centuries cannot be
revolutionized overnight. However, the legislative commission which drafted the 1921
Civil Code also referred extensively to a series of foreign codes. In addition to the
Japan Civil Code of 1898 and Commercial Code of 1899 (revised 1911!, and German
Codes of 1897, others were the Swiss Civil Code of 1917 and the Revised Swiss Code on
Obligations of 1911, the Soviet Civil Code of 1926, the Turkish Code on Obligations
and the Turkish Commercial Code of 1936, the Draft Italian Commercial Code of 1925,
the Draft Franco-Italian Code on Obligations and Contracts of 1927; see Cheng, Recent
Legislation in China, 4 CHINA L. REV. 119 (1931).
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equality of man and woman. Sons and daughters now shared the
estate equally on the father's death intestate, and in order to prevent
the exclusion of daughters by will, the Code even instituted the
system of the "legitimate compulsory portion."87 As a result of the
admission of women to the rights of succession, a woman might now
have separate estate; the Code introduced the system of "union of
goods," which originated in Switzerland, to regulate the position of
the woman during marriage in the absence of a special agreement.
Under this, the woman retained as her separate estate property for
personal use, the products of her labour, and certain other types of
property. 88
Perhaps the most conspicous characteristic of the Civil Code was
the unification of civil and commercial law, commonly separated in
other societies. The basis for such a distinction between civil and
commercial law is rooted in continental legal history. Since there was
a separate class of merchants in the Middle Ages with their own
customs, special courts were created to try commercial cases. No such
reason existed in China; thus, no useful purpose was served by the
separation. In addition, as Dean Roscoe Pound observed, "It [the
distinction] requires difficult questions of jurisdiction, procedural
distinctions and distinctions of application of law which are simply
anachronisms."89 Therefore, the "abrogation of the separate commercial law and commercial jurisdiction was a real step forward." 90
However, some of the important aspects of commercial law were
left to be covered by special laws later implemented; negotiable
instruments, insurance, commercial companies and maritime commerce were dealt with in four special laws promulgated in 1929. The
underlying reason for this might be that it was easier to make
amendments to a single statute than to the code. By doing this, the

87. Article 1223 of the Civil Code provides: "The compulsory portion of an heir is
determined as follows: 1. For a lineal descendant by blood, the compulsory portion is
one half of his successional portion; . . . . "
88. Article 1017 provides: "That part of the union property [all property belonging
to the spouses at the time of the marriage as well as property acquired by them during
the continuance of the marriage becomes their union property) which belongs to the
wife at the time of marriage as well as that which she acquires by inheritance or other
gratuitous titles during the continuance of the marriage constitutes her contributed
property and remains in her ownership."
89. Pound, The Chinese Civil Code in Action, 29 TUL. L. REV. 277, 279 (1955).
90. ld.

A

CoMPARATIVE STUDY oF JumciAL REVIEW

37

general tenor of the law would be less likely to be disturbed during
the development process in China. 91
In regard to criminal trials, Chinese procedure followed the
normal continental form rather than the Anglo-American one.
Following a preliminary investigation by a procurator, a preliminary
examination was held to cide whether the accused is to be committed
for trial. Then the public prosecution followed. A necessary corollary
of this type of procedure was that lawyers played an insignificant
role. Since pretrial interview of witnesses was forbidden for fear they
may be influenced by the lawyers, a lawyer's pretrial investigation
was largely confined to interviewing his client, possibly members of
the client's family, and examing the documents and any real evidence
under the client's control. During court trials, the customary rule of
lawyers was not that of courageous fighters for the rights of their
clients. It is said that their advice to the criminal defendant was often
not to deny guilt, but to plead mitigating circumstances in order not
to irritate the presiding judge.
Since the judge received and studied the records and dossiers of
the police and procurator in advance of the trial, this practice
inevitably influenced his attitude towards the disposition of the case.
In sum, the trial was actually dominated by the civil law principle of
"judicial prosecution," which means that the judge alone controls the
proceeding of the trial rather than the "party prosecution" in the
American system. In other words, speaking generally, criminal
procedure in the civil law countries is "inquisitorial," while that in
the common law countries is "accusatorial."92
Another important feature in the adoption of the continental
legal system was that in rendering a judgment the court was not
bound by strict rules regarding the probative force of evidence, but
rather was guided by its own conviction. The examination of evidence
was enormously extensive; it could cover any matter deemed relevant
to the issues or the credibility of the witness. The Code of Civil
Procedure provided in article 222 as follows: "Except where it is
91. ld.; contra, Charles Sumner Lobingier, a former judge of the United States
Court for China, regarded this as constituting "the main features of a code of
commerce. Their relegation to separate laws would seem to be even less satisfactory
than their combination in a separate instrument." Lobingier, The Corpus Juris of New
China, 19 TUL. L. REV. 512, 542 (1945).
92. Both systems have their advantages as well as disadvantages. However, this is
only true in a historical context according to Merryman of Stanford, because of a
converging trend towards roughly equivalent mixed systems of criminal procedure. See
J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 134-39 (1969).
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otherwise provided by law, the court, in rendering a judgment, shall
decide on the truth or falsity of the facts according to its free moral
conviction with due consideration given to all the points raised in the
oral proceedings as well as the result of the examination of evidence.
The reasons on which the moral conviction is based shall be stated in
the judgment." The Code of Criminal Procedure contained similar
provisions in the following articles:
Article 154. The facts constituting a crime shall be determined
according to evidence.
Article 155. Evidence shall be evaluated by the court according
to its free conviction.
This liberal attitude towards the admissibility of evidence in the
civil law countries arose from the belief that only ,by placing all the
available information before the court can the truth be discovered. 93
In addition, cases are universally tried before trained judges, sitting
without juries. There are few exceptions to this rule. Hearsay
evidence is not admissible. With regard to evidence obtained irregularly, such as by the ultra vires actions of a police officer, the general
practice is to admit such evidence. 94 However, the confession of the
defendant will not be admitted if it was obtained by coercion, fraud,
illegal detention, or other improper means. 95
93. Judge Marvin E. Frankel summarized his nine years on the federal trial bench
by warning "that our adversary system rates truth too low among the values that
institutions of justice are meant to serve." Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975). This is supported by a statement made
by an eminent scholar after long and careful study; "He said that if he were innocent,
he would prefer to be tried by a civil law court, but that if he were guilty, he would
prefer to be tried by a common law court. This indicates that criminal procedure in the
civil law country is more likely to distinguish accurately between the guilty and the
innocent";- MERRYMAN, supra note 92, at 139.
94. This is not only the practice of other civil law countries, but England and the
Commonwealth system also refuse to follow the American precedent; see Symposium,
The Exclusionary Rule under Foreign Law, 52 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 271 (1961). In
addition, we shall note here that during the American post-trial pre-sentence
procedure, the technical rules of evidence are not generally applicable, Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); U.S. v. Shipiani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970l.
95. Article 156 provides that confession of an accused not extracted by violence,
threat, i~ducement, fraud, unlawful detention or other improper devices and consistent
with facts may be admitted in evidence. Both France and West Germany have the
same exception to the general rule of admissibility; see A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND & FRANCE 29 !1975>; J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 69 !1971>.
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Although these codes were quite advanced according to the then
western standard, one thing could not be ignored: they were totally
alien to the general public in China. Since the country was not only
facing continuing threat from foreign powers, but was also undergoing incessant military actions against the remaining warlords and
the Chinese Communists, and since it had only achieved nominal
unification under the central government in Nanking, it was
impossible to create an efficient, nationwide system for the administration of justice. In the rural areas, the inquisitorial methods of the
imperial regime, together with portions of the old codes and moral
practices, were still enforced. Because the command of the central
government was not carried far enough to reach every part of the
country, many modern rules which ran counter to traditional
practices were simply put aside. This unfortunate condition would
have been temporary and would not have been hard ta overcome if
China had had more time to develop its legal system. 96 The
disappearance of the old social order and the rule of moral code was
imperative to the acceptance of the new legal system. Unfortunately,
Nationalist China had failed to realize this goal on the mainland
when the war of resistance against Japan broke out in 1937 and the
Communists took over in 1949.

F. Legal Reform in Taiwan since 1949.
The legal reforms and provisions of the earlier codes have been
maintained by the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in
Taiwan. Although the administration of justice is still far from
perfect, the westernization of codes continues. Moreover, the influence
of the American legal system has been more obvious in recent years
as a result of the enormous contact between the ROC and the United
States. No longer limited to the sphere of commercial law, other fields
of law have also been influenced by American law. Certain American
rules of criminal procedure were incorporated into the Code of
Criminal Procedure after the 1966 revision. 97 For instance, police
must deliver a criminal suspect to the procurator as soon as possible,
96. Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School, who had served as legal advisor to
the central government at Nanking in 1945-46, praised Chinese codes for being in line
with western ideas of law, and was optimistic that, given favorable conditions, the
operation of a western legal system would eventually operate in China; see Pound,
Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. 345 (1948).
97. See Tao, Reform of the Criminal Procedure in Nationalist China, 19 AM. J.
COMP. L. 747, 748 (1971). The underlying reason is the dissatisfaction among the
Chinese because some due process protections granted to the American servicemen
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and he shall be examined not more than twenty-four hours after his
arrest, 98 search warrants must be secured before searching the
property or person of a suspect,99 and a confession may not be used as
the sole evidence of guilt during a trial unless it is proven to have
been made voluntarily and corroborative evidence supports it. 100
One of the major problems in the Chinese administration of
justice since the modernization has been the control of the Ministry of
Justice. The functions of the Ministry include appointing the judges,
procurators, and other officials connected with judicial administration. It also directs the procurators and supervises their work in
general. It is agreed that these functions are more administrative
-than judicial, and most of the foreign countries have placed the
Ministry under the executive branch. However, China did not accept
this conclusion in the past and until 1943 the Ministry was shuffied
about several times between the Judicial and Executive Yuan. Since
then it has been one of the ministries of the Executive Yuan.
The other controversy, which has not been settled until recently, is
the question of the jurisdiction over the courts. Two of the three
grades of courts, namely, the high courts and the district courts,
together with the whole hierarchy of procurators, have been under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, which is in turn under the
control of Executive Yuan; only the Supreme Court is directly under
the Judicial Yuan. The judicial system not only has been split, but its
freedom from interference by the executive branch was questionable.
This jurisdictional problem evolved into a heated controversy among
Yuans and led to an interpretation rendered by the Council of Grand
Justices which held that the district and high courts should be under
the jurisdiction of the Judicial Yuan. 101 This decision is, however, only
after the conclusion of the Agreement on the Status of United States Armed Forces in
the Republic of China in 1965 were not equally enjoyed by those who were tried by the
same court according to the old Code of Criminal Procedure. For text of the Agreement,
see 1 U.S.T. 373, T.I.A.S. No. 5986 (1966). For a discussion of this treaty, particularly
in the field of the criminal jurisdiction, see Tao, The Sino-American Status of Forces
Agreement: Criminal Jurisdiction Over American Soldiers on Nationalist Chinese
Territory, 51 B.U.L. REV. 1-30 (1971).
98. Article 91 provides: "If an accused is arrested with a warrant or because of a
circular order without a warrant, he shall be sent immediately to the place designated. . . ."
99. Article 128 provides: "A search requires the use of a search warrant."
100. Article 156, para. 2 provides: "Confession of an accused shall not be used as
the sole evidence of conviction and other necessary evidence shall still be investigated
to see if the confession coincides with facts."
101. Interpretation No. 86.
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on paper and not until 1979, did the ROC government decide to
implement it and set effective date on July 1, 1980. The details of the
interpretation and its effect will be dealt with at length in the
following chapter.
In keeping with the French model/ 02 an Administrative Court
has been established along with the Supreme Court under the
supervision of the Judicial Yuan. The court has a number of judges
who have been divided into several chambers. The judges are
required to have had at least four years of previous service in
subordinate positions of due rank. 103 Among the five judges of each
chamber, two must have judicial service. 104 These requirements were
devised to insure that the judges will be familiar with the subject
matter of the disputes. Administrative suits also can be divided into
three grades. Any individual who feels that injury has been done to
his rights or interests through an unlawful decision or illegal
administrative act on the part of a government organ may bring an
action against that authority to the authority immediately higher. 105
If the ruling is unsatisfactory, the petitioner may make a re-appeal to
an authority one step higher than the one which renders the ruling. If
he still is not satisifed with the decision of reappeal, the last organ he
may resort to is the Administrative Court.
The Court considers the argument of both sides, examines the
administrative rulings, and renders accordingly a decision against
which no further appeal is allowed. Since traditional conceptions still
more or less influence the people, their attitude towards the
government is passive; generally, to sue the government is a totally
alien and unthinkable idea. In addition, their legal knowledge is
comparatively inadequate. As a result, only a limited number of
ordinary individuals bring actions against government branches and
most decisions are rendered favorable to the government.
Another agency which is on a par with the Supreme Court and
the Administrative Court in the Judicial Yuan is the Committee on
102. The reasons for establishment of a separate administrative court in France,
which has served as a model to other countries in Europe, are the following: the
deep-rooted notions about the separation of powers, the widespread distrust of the
judiciary as a result of excessive interference with the administrative work of the
government before Revolution, the traditional image of the judge and the judicial
function. See B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND COMMON
LAW WORLD 4-8 <1954).
103. The Organic Law of the Administrative Court, article 6.
104. Id., article 4.
105. The Appeal Law, article 1.
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the Discipline of Public Functionaries. Its members enjoy life tenur.e
and a portion of them are drawn from the judicial service. 106 Its major
function is handling impeachments submitted by the Control Yuan.
The trial is ordinarily conducted by brief and the impeached
defendants may be summoned for questioning when the Committee
deems it necessary. 107 If the case is connected with criminal matters,
the action of the Judicial Yuan has to be delayed until the conclusion
of criminal procedures in the ordinary courts. Since the heaviest
discipline which it can impose on a public functionary is dismissal
and deprivation of the right to hold public office, its significance very
often is overshadowed by the pending criminal action. On the other
hand, the decision of the criminal court will have no effect on the
disciplinary department's application of its own sanctions. The legal
process differs from the United States system in that the United
States Senate upon conviction in an impeachment trial has the
official removed from office. Then he may be indicted and tried for the
criminal offense. 108
The quality of justice depends on a multitude of factors. Among
them the quality of the bench and the bar are obviously important.
As the result of the adoption of the continental civil law system,
China also established the career system. The selection of the higher
court judges is made through promotion from the lower courts.
Although law professors and private lawyers can be recruited into the
judiciary,t09 the overwhelming majority of judges come into the
profession by passing an examination which any graduate from the
department of law of any accredited college or university, both
domestic and abroad, can take. Those who hope to practice must pass
a judicial examination different in form but identical in subjectmatter.110 Another feature of the career system is the assimilation of
106. The Organic Law of the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries,
article 1, 2.
107. Id., article 15.
108. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
109. The Law of Organization of Courts, article 33. However, since the social status
of a law professor is deemed higher than that of a district court judge, few professors
are willing to accept appointment at the district court level, to which all first
appointments are made. Moreover, in addition to this restriction, the attractive income
lawyers attain in private practice contributes to the fact that few, if any, judges have
been recruited from the bar.
110. Both examinations are extremely difficult, with a rate of only 5'k to 15'7c
passing depending upon both the need of the particular year and the caliber of the
candidates. This rate can be compared to the Japanese judicial examination, which
maintains roughly a 5% pass rate; see Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its
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the status of judges and procurators. Both are drawn from the same
examination, receive the same judicial training after passing and
nearly the same salary, and are subject to the same discipline, though
their functions are totally different in nature.
Since legal education is conducted on an undergraduate level
which produces students who are less socially mature, and since few
practicing lawyers who generally know more about trial technique
have ever been recruited into the judiciary, those future judges are,
without exception, young and inexperienced. Moreover, the department of law in Chinese schools is not organized solely for training
lawyers, its courses are oriented toward a general and essentially
theoretical knowledge of law as well as other disciplines such as
political science and economics, and most of its students become civil
servants or enter private enterprise after grad~ion. Therefore, for
successful candidates a period of training emphasizing the necessary
judicial knowledge and skills, namely, the application of the law in
the courts and its actual use by the public procurator, is definitely
needed. Under the existing system, all successful candidates are
required to receive training in the Institute of Training of Judicial
Officials for eighteen months. In the first ten months, the training
covers class work and research which emphasize the study of cases.
All students are then sent to district courts and procurators' offices
for six months. Under the latters' supervision, students attend
trials and draft indictments and judgments. In the remaining two
months, the field work is reviewed and summed up. 111 It should be
indicated here that any candidate who passes the bar examination
can practice immediately without any further training. 112
Since the judiciary is organized hierarchically, original appointments are made to the lower posts and vacancies in the higher
positions are usually filled by promotion from the lower courts. The
reliance upon government for an advancement which results in
increased salaries and higher social status is vulnerable to attack for
possible abuse by the administrative system. 113 On the other hand, a
career judge has the possibility of greater independence from the
Historical Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN 143 (A. von Mehren ed.
1963).
111. For details, see Yang, Career Judiciary in the Republic of China, 2
CHENGCHI L. REV. 122, 130-31 0970).
112. This was the practice of Japan before World War II, which may be the model
followed by China. Hattori, supra note 110, at 128. But now the Japanese lawyer has to
receive the same practical training as that of the judge and procurator.
113. See Yang, supra note 111, at 136-49.
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influence of pressure groups, be they from politics or business, labor
organizations, or others. Furthermore, there is more opportunity to
train a career judge adequately for trial work.
Another characteristic of the career system is the lack of active
cooperation within the legal profession that can be found in the
United States. The typical judge will never have practiced law or
served in any other branch of the legal profession. As a result, a judge
tends to restrict his professional and social contacts to other judges.
The workload of judges, which is much heavier than that of other
executive officials, also contributes to judicial isolation. 114 In addition,
the social status of lawyers cannot be equated with that of judges, as
a result of historical and social factors. Until the beginning of the
twentieth century, professional representation of the parties in both
civil disputes and criminal proceedings was strictly prohibited. Those
persons outside the district government who offered their legal
services to the public were generally held in disrepute and were
commonly called "Song Kouan" (brigands of law suits).
Attitudes and practices developed under the old system have
carried over into the present. Traditionally, disputants were encouraged to reach a solution without relying upon legal procedures or the
legal profession. Great emphasis is still placed upon the solution of
disputes through the mediation process, even in present-day Chinese
society. The Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that the court
may at any time attempt a compromise between the litigants in order
to reach an amicable settlement, and this agreement is as binding as
a definitive judgment. 115

114. The average number of cases to be disposed monthly by the district and high
courts judges is around 100, and 50 in the Supreme Court. Since the responsibility of
Chinese judges includes personally collecting evidence, examining dossiers, holding
public trials and writing judgments, their workload is heavier than their counterparts
in the west. It is not abnormal for them to work until midnight or on weekends. This
workload seriously limits their social life. However, personnel and expenditures will
both be increased according to the "Measures for Improving Judicial Administration
and Strengthening Judicial Function" which has been adopted recently in the cabinet
meeting; see Central Daily News, Dec. 18, 1978.
115. Article 377 provides: "Irrespective of the stage of the proceedings reached, the
court may, in the course of oral proceedings, attempt to bring the parties to a
compromise or cause a commissioned judge or a requested judge to do the same, when it
is considered that there is hope for compromise." Article 380 further provides: "A
compromise concluded before the court shall have the same effect as an irrevocable
judgment."
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CHAPTER III.
THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
It is said that constitutional questions in the modern sense did
not arise in China until the close of the nineteenth century, around
the time of the above-mentioned legal reform movement. The leaders
of the abortive "Hundred Days Reform" 1 were definitely influenced by
Japan's constitutionalism resulting from the promulgation of the
Meiji Constitution in 1889, even though no constructive measures for
framing a constitution were taken in that short period. The ultimate
goal of this campaign was to constitutionalize the absolutism that had
for two thousand years been the characteristic feature of the
monarchy. The concept of constitutionalism was thus harbored by
more than a few intellectuals. It later inspired a major controversy
and was even a major cause in the downfall of the Ching dynasty ..
The failure of the Boxer Movement2 immediately after the
Hundred Days Reform had taught Empress Dowager the painful
lesson that only by the restoration of the reform movement could the·

1. After realizing the futility of limited learning of western technology, the
young emperor Kuang Hsu of the Ching dynasty strongly encouraged more thorough
reforms. A series of decrees aimed at modernizing the armed forces, the bureaucracy,
the legal and educational systems, and the economy were promulgated. New categories
of examination were to be added, new schools were to be integrated into the
examination system, universities were established, and agricultural schools were set
up in each province. These reforms also included free education to children, a national
system of government newspapers, a budget system in government expenditures,
promoting the prosperity of merchants, and, most of all, the abolition of superfluous
offices both central and local which had duplicate functions or had no function at all.
Nevertheless, these reforms only lasted for a brief period of one hundred days in 1898
(June-September). The reforms produced such rapidly increasing consternation among
the officials, both high and low, that a coup d'etat finally occurred. Empress Dowager
Tzu Hsu restored the regency and placed her nephew, Kuang Hsu, under house arrest.
This was a major setback for reformers as all the issued edicts were rescinded and most
of the reformers were executed. For a succinct but complete account of the "Hundred
Days Reform", see Butcher, The Emperor's Attempt to Reform the Chinese Government
in the Summer of 1898, 43 POL. SCI. Q. 544-65 (1928).
2. The Boxer Movement was anti-foreign in nature, advocating superstitious
methods against western weapons. The Empress Dowager lent the movement her
encouragement and support. During the frenzied period, the Boxers killed some foreign
diplomats and over a hundred civilians and missionaries. After the defeat, heavy
indemnities were imposed on China by an international relief expedition.
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monarchy be preserved. The years 1901-05 witnessed the adoption of
many of the measures which essentially originated in the Hundred
Days Reform of 1898 even though the Empress Dowager categorically
denied it, conceivably to save face. However, not until the conclusion
of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 did the need for establishing a
constitutional system in China receive any attention by the imperial
court. Japan was so strong that in less than twenty years she had not
only freed herself from humiliating extraterritoriality, but had also
defeated two colossi of the East, China and Russia. The Chinese
public and its government were amazed by Japan's achievements and
concluded that it was due chiefly to that country's efficiency in
government, which in turn was credited largely to the newly adopted
constitution.
Under an increasing demand from the people, events moved
rapidly. The government sent out a commission of five officials to
Japan, Europe and America to study their constitutional governments in 1905. Upon their return, the commissioners reported
favorably on their investigations and urged the adoption of a
constitution and parliamentary representation at an early date. 3 The
government was happy to learn that in the case of Japan, the exercise
of constitutionalism had not substantially weakened the imperial
authority. As a result, the Ching government decided to commit itself
to a program of constitutional change to placate public opinion and at
the same time to preserve the autocratic power of the emporor.
On September 1, 1906, the throne issued an edict that expressly
declared the adoption of a constitutional government in the near
future. (It also reformed law and finance and reorganized the army.)
The edict clearly stated that supreme control had to remain in the
throne. 4 Two more edicts, issued in the next year, authorized the
establishment of a National Consultative Council and of the Provincial Assemblies respectively to serve as the training ground for the
later actual parliamentary system. 5 A more conspicuous step taken by
the Ching government was the promulgation of the proposed
"Principles of Constitution" and a "Nine-Year Program (1908-17) of
the Constitutional Preparation."6

3.
123-24
4.
5.
6.

H. YEN, A SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
(1968).
For text, see THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 353 !19121.
ld., at 355-56.
ld., at 357-63.
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It is not surprising to find that the "Principles of Constitution"
was a near duplicate of the Japanese 1889 Meiji Constitution, as the
latter had served as the model for the former. Not only did a number
of articles of the Chinese Constitution correspond exactly to those of
the Japanese, but the sequence of articles or order of the clauses was
also almost identical in both documents. However, a close analysis
reveals that several articles in the Chinese version gave powers to the
emperor that were not found in the Japanese original. Article 3 of the
Chinese Constitution gave the emperor alone the power to propose
laws in parliament, although the Japanese Constitution stated that
the Japanese emperor exercised legislative power only with the
consent of the Imperial Diet. Article 12 of the Chinese Constitution
gave the emperor power to raise funds when parliament was not in
session, thus depriving the parliament of its control over the purse
. strings of the government; no equivalent provision appeared in the
Japanese Constitution. The most striking difference is that China's
article 29 forbade Chinese members of the parliament to petition the
emperor; article 49 of the Japanese Constitution expressly gave this
right to members of the Imperial Diet. 7
Other articles, especially the first, which straightforwardly
provided that "The Taching Dynasty [Great Ching Dynasty] shall
rule over the Taching Empire for ever and ever, and be honoured
through all ages," leave little doubt that Chinese constitutionalism
did not imply a lessening of imperial power. All legislative, executive
and judicial power was to remain concentrated in the emperor's
hand. 8 This clearly underlined the insincere attitude of the Ching
government toward the establishment of a truly modern constitutional system in China.
7. For a fairly detailed comparison, see P.C. HSIEH, THE GOVERNMENT OF
CHINA <1644-1911) 352-54 (1923).
8. This is evidenced by a number of articles, such as article three: "The Emperor
alone has power to make laws, and to decide what matters shall be placed before
parliament for discussion." Article four provides: "The Emperor has the power to
convoke, to open and to close, to suspend and to extend the time of and to dissolve the
Parliament." Article ten provides: "The Emperor has supreme power over the
administration of the laws and the appointment of judges, his edicts may supplement
laws from time to time." Simultaneously with the promulgation of this "Principles of
Constitution," a "Principles of Parliamentary Law" was adopted. Citing a few
provisions will sufficiently show the very limited power parliament was to possess.
Article one provides: "Parliament has the power to propose legislation, but not the
power to legislate." Article two: "Measures adopted by Parliament have not the force of
law, and are not to be carried out, until they have received Imperial sanction." Article
seven: "Matters discussed in Parliament must be passed by both Houses before they
can be memorialized to the Throne for its sanction."
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The "Nine-Year Program of Constitutional Preparation," also
borrowed from Japan, was so comprehensive that if it had been
faithfully carried out, it might have created better conditions in
China for the development of a democratic government. Each year
certain changes were to take place, such as census taking, judicial
reform, police reorganization, the introduction of a budget and
auditing system, the introduction of local self-government, the
extension of modern educational facilities, the preparation of a
constitution and parliamental law, culminating in the ninth year in
the establishment of a parliament, privy council and cabinet. 9 On the
one hand, it was necessary to have the Chinese people gradually go
through a process of modern political education in order to be able to
govern themselves. Constitutionalism cannot be realized merely by
the promulgation of a constitution. However, on the other hand, this
nine-year period provided the Ching government time to overcome its
weaknesses and further strengthen its absolute rule.
Unfortunately, the latter more accurately expressed the govern. ment's attitude. This was reflected in the fact that those plans
relating to the drafting of the codes or laws generally came out as
scheduled, while as to those programs requiring actual work, little or
nothing ever was done. This insincere attitude can be further
evidenced by the newly organized cabinet whose members were
dominated by imperial clansmen with a prince of blood as premier.
Accordingly, in the name of constitutional government, the Ching
government learned more from the West and Japan about safeguarding the rights of the government and the throne than about giving to
the people their share in the government.
The provincial assemblies were opened in October 1909. Membership was open to all males thirty years of age and older who had the
necessary qualifications, which included 10 years residency and
literacy. The franchise was opened to all males over twenty-five years
of age who were natives of the province and had attained a particular
standard of education, held certain public offices, or possessed
property or capital valued at $5,000 or more. Those prerequisites for
qualification, of course, degraded the spirit of the democratic election.
Nevertheless, the major restriction imposed by the Ching government
lay in the fact that the provincial assemblies' function was purely
advisory. Those financial propositions which constituted the major
concern in every local government could be considered only when
brought before them by the governor. All measures adopted by the
9. For text, see THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 361-63 C1912l.
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assembly required the assent of the governor before they had the
force of law.
A Consultative Council was established in the nation's capital on
October 3, 1910. Its composition was quite novel. Out of the total
membership of two hundred, the Emerpor had the right to choose one
hundred, the other half being appointed by governors from a list, the
product of elections held in provincial assemblies. The traces of a true
representative government were thus further eliminated under this
peculiar selection procedure. On the surface, the Council's powers
were fairly wide: consideration of the national budget, national
revenues, and public loans; compilation of new laws and revision of
old ones. However, practically every matter within the purview of the
Council had to be handled by the cabinet or submitted to the throne
before being considered by the council.'0 Therefore, it was only
empowered to discuss matters submitted to it by the Emperor.
Another means of limiting the function of the Council was the
selection of its president and vice-president. They were not chosen
among Council members but were appointed by the Emperor.
Moreover, they enjoyed extensive powers ordinarily not shared by the
Council members. Only they had the right to petition the Emperor.
They had the power to order any member to retire from the session or
to deprive him of the right of speech on account of misbehavior. 11
Those limitations imposed on both the provincial assemblies and
the national Consultative Council certainly justify the conclusion
that the object of the imperial government was no more than a
perpetuation of the existing system under a thin veil of constitutional
guarantees.
However, the assemblies and Council turned out to be far more
vigorous than the Ching government had anticipated. Since it was
the first time in Chinese history that the people could vote and be
elected even on a limited basis, not only did the general public place
great expectations on those elected, but representatives were also
eager to pursue their business aggressively. In spite of their limited
sphere of activities, the provincial assemblies were from the beginning able to exert a considerable influence on the politics of the day.
They did not hesitate to oppose unpopular government measures, nor
to denounce what they considered the wrongful practices of the

10. The Revised Regulation of the Tzechengyuan <the Consultative Council),
article 15. The provisions can be referred to in THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 379 <1912!.
11. Articles 45 & 46, id., at 381.
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government officials. They even tried to impeach a governor although
they had not been granted this power. 12
The aggressive activities of the national Consultative Council
were of equal distinction. 13 This is particularly significant in light of
the Council's peculiar composition. Although members were nominated either by the emperor or the governor, on the most critical
constitutional questions, the Council was generally unanimous
against the Ching government.
The most prominent demand made by the provincial assemblies
and the national Consultative Council was for the early assembling of
parliament and a shortening of the time of preparation. Before the
opening of the Council, two organized petitions had already been
delivered to Peking, both of which were flatly rejected by the imperial
court. The representatives of the provincial assemblies constituted
the first petition group. Professional and overseas groups joined
together with them in launching the second petition only three
months later in April 1910. The joining of the Council in the third
petition naturally accelerated the pace of this movement. In addition
to this, most of the governors also lent their support because they
keenly felt the tendency of reviving centralization. Significantly,
"even the Manchu nobles and Mongol princes [in the Council] who
were supposed to be reactionary joined heartily. Newspapers throughout the country praised the action." 14 Realizing that the everincreasing pressure could not be stemmed, an imperial edict was
issued promising the convocation of parliament for the fifth year
instead of four years later. 15 Although some representatives still were
not satisfied with this result and organized another two petitions
demanding that parliament open immediately, they were treated
harshly by the Ching government. 16
The people gradually recognized the Ching government's unwillingness to reform, and the last alternative, revolution, became
inevitable. After the outbreak of the Wachang uprising on October
10, 1911, 17 the government made its last effort to save the dynasty by
12. NAN-TUNG CHANG-CHI-CHIH-HSIEN-SHENG-CHUAN-CHI !The Biography of Chang Chi Chih) 142.
13. Comment, Constitutional Changes in China, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 201, 202-203
(1911).
14. Jd., at 202.
15. THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 372-74 (1912).
16. For details, see 1 C. LE, CHUNG-KUO CHIN-PAI-NIEN CHENG-CHINSHIH (Political History of China in the Last Hundred Years) 282-83 (1942>.
17. The revolutionary movement was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Born near Canton in
1866 into a peasant family, Sun received secondary and advanced education in western
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the promulgation of the so-called "Nineteen Articles" on November 2,
1911.'8 In sharp contrast to the "Principles of the Constitution," the
Emerpor renounced almost all his powers. He could now exercise only
the authority that would be delegated to him by law or in accordance
with the constitution. The legislature assumed the major powers to
govern and as such became almost as powerful as the British House of
Commons. In other words, the ministerial responsibility and the
parliamentary system which were the British product had been
emphasized. Regrettably, it was too good to be true. Had the Ching
government announced the "Nineteen Articles" instead of the "Principles of Constitution" ten years earlier, its dynasty might have been
saved and a constitutional monarchy might also have been established in China.
After the revolution spread to almost all of the central and
southern parts of China, delegates sent by these re~olutionary
provinces met in Hankow. They took only one day to draft an Organic
Law for the Organization of the Provisional Government which
elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the provisional president. As the Organic
Law merely outlined the general organization of the government,
while omitting mention of the rights of the people and the procedure
of amendment, it cannot, in the strict point of view, be classified as a
real constitution. However, in view of the circumstances under which
it was composed (the war was still going on against the imperial army
in the nearby city of Hanyany), and because it was intended to serve
only temporarily, criticism of it should not be too harsh. On the
whole, the model of the American presidential system was incorporated.19
Since both the revolutionary and the imperial government were
seriously troubled by insufficient financial reserves and since neither
could defeat the other decisively, Yuan Shih-Kai, a man of ability and
medicine in Hawaii and Hong Kong. At first he, like other intellectuals, tried to foster
the improvement of the imperial government by presenting a petition to then Premier
Li Hung-chang. But he was abruptly turned away and was not even allowed to see Li.
Realizing that his ideas would not be acted upon by that government, he made up his
mind to overthrow it. After ten unsuccessful armed uprisings, rebels acting in
impulsive haste surprisingly defeated the imperial forces at Wuchang, an important
city in the middle of Yangtze Valley, and occupied that city overnight on October 10,
1911.
18. For text, see THE CHINA YEARBOOK 628-29 (1925).
19. Article 13 provided that whenever the legislature passed a measure which the
President disliked, he might, within ten days after he received such a measure, return
it with a stated reason to the legislature for reconsideration; unless it was again passed
by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, the President had no obligation to promulgate or
execute it. For this and other articles, see id., at 629-30.
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ambition who possessed the allegiance of the imperial army, used his
skill to play on the fears and weakness first of the one and then of the
other side. Eventually he was able to secure a settlement which was
comparatively satisfactory to both sides and consequently left him the
strongest single factor in the whole nation. In exchange for using his
force to help bring down the monarchy, he was awarded the
presidency. 20 After Yuan gave his unconditional promise of support
for the republic, a Provisional Constitution was promulgated on the
same day that he was inaugurated. Since those who drafted the
Provisional Constitution distrusted Yuan's sincerity, they adopted a
provision for minsterial responsibility intended to limit his powers.
This was an inevitable departure from the previous presidential
system in the Organic Law.
All the important powers were placed in the hands of the
legislature at the expense of the executive branch of the government.
Moreover, even some fundamental characteristics of the presidential
system were also incorporated as additional guarap.tees. These
included confirmation by the legislature of appointments of the
cabinet, 21 and the concurrence of the legislature to declare war and
conclude treaties. 22 It is clear that these provisions were devised to
further restrict presidential authority. 23 However, they also caused
numerous unnecessary confrontations between the legislative and
executive branch. Professor Willoughby made the following pertinent
observation:
The fatal error was made of attempting to avoid the danger of
executive autocracy, not by devising means for imposing political
or legal responsibility upon the President for acts that he might
commit, but by making it constitutionally impossible for him to
take essential executive action without first obtaining the

20. It is generally believed that Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself made the initiative of
offering Yuan the presidency of the republic after he secured the end of the Ching
dynasty.
21. Article 34 of the Provincial Constitution; for text, see THE CHINA YEARBOOK 462-63 (1914).
22. Article 35, id., at 463.
23. For an examination of this document and its underlying principles in the light
of the constitutions of other nations, especially the cases of the United States and
France, seeM. TYAU, CHINA'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEMS 22-142 (1920).
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which approval it was often

As the result of a general election in which the revolutionaries
controlled the majority of the legislature, serious conflict between
Yuan and the legislature became inevitable. The aim of the
revolutionaries had been to impose a parliamentary regime on the
country. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that a Constitutional Draft passed by them, the so-called Constitution Draft of the
Temple of Heaven, was again dominated by provisions limiting
executive and augmenting legislative power. 25 As Yuan was a man of
ambition and influence, he certainly could not live with this Draft.
Nevertheless, his several attempts to secure modifications were
disregarded and even his delegates were refused a hearing. A drastic
measure immediately followed. The Kuomintang, composed mostly of
the revolutionaries, was dissolved on the ground that it was a
seditious organization. Since the presence of members of the Kuomintang constituted a necessary quorum, this act virtually rendered the
legislature incapable of doing any business. Yuan lost no time in
securing another Constitution Draft, this time under his direction,
and promulgated it immediately. 26 All power over the administration
was vested in the president; the power of the legislature was cut back.
An astute dictator might have been satisfied with this arrangement, but Yuan was a man of the old regime. He wanted to
perpetuate his power and to be an Emperor. 27 However, the times had
changed and monarchical schemes united the various political parties
against him. 28 After the annulment of all monarchical decrees
24. W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA 36
(1922).
25. For text, see THE CHINA YEARBOOK 490-99 (1914). The place of drafting
was the Temple of Heaven, where ancient Emperors had once offered annual sacrifices
to Heaven on behalf of the people and pledged their obedience to the divine will that
they should minister unto the wellbeing of the root or foundation of the country.
Accordingly, this Constitution Draft was known as the Temple of Heaven Draft.
26. THE CHINA YEARBOOK 437-43 (1916).
27. It is important to note that a President Election Law, which was also his
brilliant product, uniquely provided that not only was the term of office ten years,
which is longer than any other country's president, but also that only the incumbent
President was entitled to nominate three persons as presidential candidates. Moreover,
the incumbent President was also eligible for reelection. For summary, see CHINA
YEAR BOOK 434-35 (1916).
28. Another significant factor that contributed to the end of the monarchical
movement was the reservation of foreign powers. Since it was the time of the First
World War, the international situation was so troubled that western powers had to
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following Yuan's death, the dissolved parliament reconvened and the
Provincial Constitution of 1912 was also revived. Although the final
revision of the Constitutional Draft of the Temple of Heaven occupied
most of the time of the governmental body, two major controversies
prevented it from being effective. One involved the delimitation of
powers between central and local government: that is, whether the
provincial governors should be elected or appointed and what powers
belong to the provinces. Another was the question of joining the
Allied Powers to declare war against Germany. Not only did the
legislature have different opinions, but also President Li and Premier
Tuan were at odds. Under the pressure of local military governors,
the legislature was again dissolved by President Li. Some of its
members went to Canton to protest the illegal dissolution. Dr. Sun
Yat-sen was elected generalissimo and was entrusted to form a
separate government in the south. However, elements of the government included military leaders who were not Sun's true followers. It
was thus impossible to expect it to function smoothly, and nothing of
a constructive nature was ever done to advance the course of
constitutional development. 29
After the failure of the ridiculous restoration of the Ching
dynasty by militarist Chang Hsun, Premier Tuan gained executive
power and formed another parliament. In order to emphasize its
legitimacy, a new Draft Constitution appeared in 1919. 30 This was
essentially the same as the Draft Constitution of the Temple of
Heaven.
However, another strong faction led by Tsao Kun defeated Tuan
in the following year. Tsao was thus scheming for the presidency. At
that time, former President Li was called back again for the purpose
of disputing the legitimacy claimed by the separate southern
government. When Tsao sufficiently prepared himself to be elected

fight for their survival in Europe. They feared Japan would fish in the troubled water
which resulted from the confrontation between Yuan and revolutionaries. Japan had
not had a particular inclination towards the Republic since its inception, and Yuan
himself was even less loved by the Japanese because he had campaigned against the
Japanese interests in Korea during the later period of the Ching dynasty. In addition,
after very comprehensive intelligence work, the Japanese concluded that opposition
against Yuan was considerable and that it was thus unwise to lend support to Yuan.
29. For a detailed examination of the constitutionality of both the Peking and the
Canton government, see WILLOUGHBY, supra note 24, at 18-27.
30. For text, see W. PAN, THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION 179-90, app. F.
(1945).
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president, Li was ousted in an act of outrageous rudeness. 31 Some
members of the parliament could not tolerate this incident and went
south to Shanghai in an attempt to organize another legislature.
However, some of them were bribed by Tsao back to Peking to elect
him president. In order to divert attention from its ignoble behavior,
the legislature hurriedly adopted a Constitution (in only seven days)
and promulgated it on October 10, 1923, the same day Tsao Kun was
inaugurated. 32
On the whole, the similarities between the Constitution and the
Draft Constitution of the Temple of Heaven are considerable. The
major difference lies in the distinct powers of the central and
provincial government. It is unlike either the Constitution of Canada,
where residual powers are not mentioned and belong to the central
government,33 or that of the United States, where the residual powers
are definitely reserved to the states. 34 The Chinese Constitution
stipulated that when any matter arose not specified in the Constitution, it should be under the jurisdiction of the republic if by its nature
it concerned the republic, and under the jurisdiction of a province if
by its nature it concerned the province. 35 Also, the principle of
31. The whole process, summarized as follows, shows the tyranny of warlordism.
At first, units of garrison demonstrated before his residence demanding to be financed,
and police refused to carry out the order to disperse hooligans who were making noise.
Then telephone and water lines were cut off. In response to the demand from Li to
discipline their soldiers, the commanders tendered their own resignations. Knowing his
helpless situation, he left Peking for Tientsin with the presidential seal, apparently
intending to exercise authority there. But he was held prisoner on arrival at the
railway station in Tientsin until he gave up the presidential seal and signed the
resignation proclamation prepared for him. See F. HOUN, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA 1912-1928, 131-32 (1957). However, it is interesting to note that two other
famous Chinese scholars disputed a part of this incident by claiming that President Li
concealed the presidential seal in a French hospital in Peking; see C. LO, CHUNGKUO HSIEN-FA-SHIH (Constitutional History of China) 192 (1967); II C. LE, supra
note 16, at 599.
32. For text, see THE CHINA YEAR BOOK 694-705 (1925).
33. The opening words of section 91 of the British North American Act of 1867
conferred on the federal Parliament the power "to make laws for the peace, order, and
good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of
subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces . . . ."It is
clear from this language that any matter which does not come within a provincial
power must be within the power of the federal parliament. This is said to be designed
to create a stronger central government in Canada than exists in the United States.
For a detailed examination of a variety of possible dividing lines employed to deal with
the distribution of powers in Canada, see P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA 241-65 (1977).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
35. Article III.
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self-government was extensively emphasized. In other words, the
influence of federalism was strongly imbued. The reason for this
attitude can be explained by the movement of the provincial
self-government. This movement arose as a result of some provinces
seeking autonomy in their domestic affairs in order to avoid the
conflicts between the north and south as well as their individual
continuous factional strife. It first appeared in the Hunan province
and spread to several other provinces. However, except for Hunan and
Chekiang, both of which drafted constitutions, others only either
announced their intent to have self-government or had constitutional
drafts. In addition, a gathering of eight civic groups which called
themselves the Conference on the State of the Nation in Shanghai in
1922 also drafted a federal constitution. 36 In fact, self-government
never was realized in any province at all, because it was used by the
local military governor to assure himself of a semi-independent
position, free from either the interference of the central government
in Peking or the encroachment of the neighboring military governors.
In 1924 military strife brought down Tsao Kun and his Constitution. A new Constitution Draft was promulgated in 1925 which
resembled the former Constitution except that the lines of the federal
system were more clearly drawn. 37
In the following three years the Peking government did not even
need to pay lip service to the drafting of a constitution in order to
legitimatize its regime. In short, within seventeen years five constitutions or constitution drafts had been sponsored by the government
after the establishment of the republic in 1911, not to mention
numerous constitutions drafted by private persons or organizations.
Despite the utterly discredited versions, the 1923 Constitution was
doubtless the best drafted because it was the product of the
Constitution Draft of the Temple of Heaven which not only represented a new spirit at the time it was drafted, but was also much
debated and was reviewed several times by the parliament. Nevertheless, constitutionalism cannot be realized merely by the promulgation
of a single paper. Since militarists controlled both the central and
local government, they almost invariably devised constitutions that
promoted their own personal interests. The real meaning of constitutionalism did not concern them at all. Thus constitution-making
during this period was simply a farce.

36. For text, see LO, supra note 31, at 181-82.
37. For text, see CHINA YEAR BOOK 1234-48 (1926).
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The preceding discussion has shown that the 1911 revolution
failed to build a new Chinese state based upon the western idea of a
constitutional parliament and cabinet. What are the reasons for this
failure? First, elements of the revolutionary party were largely
recruited from overseas Chinese, students studying abroad, members
of the new model army, and several secret societies. These groups had
no common objective beyond the overthrow of the Ching government.
Very few of them had a thorough understanding of the real spirit and
method of constitutionalism and democracy. Second, the 1911 revolution had failed to bring about far-reaching changes in social, political,
and ideological areas. The old bureaucracy and military establishments, personified by an ambitious general, were left intact. Third,
the success of the revolution was based not upon the people, but upon
the local governments of the various provinces. In other words, the
revolutionaries had not been able and indeed had seldom attempted
to mobilize mass support on a large scale either in the cities or in the
countryside.
The chaotic condition was brought to end, at least nominally, by
the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party in 1928 after the successful
Northern Expedition against the warlords. According to Dr. Sun, the
founder of the party, the first phase of national reconstruction- the
period of military operation - had been completed and the next stage
of political tutelage was to begin. Its underlying purpose was to
educate the people to exercise their political rights. Beginning in the
village and county, the Kuomintang were to organize local selfgovernment and finally elect delegates to form the National Assembly, whose duties were the adoption of the constitution and the
establishment of a government in accordance with its provisions. All
of this having been accomplished, the country would enter the last
phase - constitutional government. During this period the party was
to be entrusted with the responsibility of nursing the country until
the country was strong enough to look after itself. A necessary
corollary to this was the supremacy of the Kuomintang.
The "Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period"
clearly bears witness to this assumption. 38 Article 30 provides that:

38. For text, see PAN, supra note 30, at 247-55, app. L. The adoption of the
Provisional Constitution was the reaction to the promulgation of a Constitution Draft
(Taiyuan Draft), which was drafted by some famous figures who wished to maintain
their own forces and resisted the ascendency of Chiang Kai-Shek; they nevertheless
failed in the following civil war. See T. CH'IEN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
OF CHINA 137 (1967).
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During the period of political tutelage, the National Congress of
the Kuomintang delegates (Kuo-Min-Tang-Ch'uan-Kuo-Tai-PiaoTa-Hui) shall exercise the governing powers on behalf of the
National Assembly (Kuo-Min-Ta-Hui). During the adjournment
of the National Congress of the Kuomintang, the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang shall exercise the said
powers.

All the important offices of the government, including that of
president, were filled by persons selected and appointed by the
Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. 39 The government.
doubtless was to be under the direction and supervision of the
Kuomintang. 40 However, we must bear in mind that the party
dictatorship was never supposed to last for an indefinite period. The
preamble to the Provisional Constitution also clearly spelled this out.
The fact that the Kuomintang had to fight continuously against its
own separatist elements, Communists and Japanese, however, slowed
any progress toward the early termination of political tutelage.
Nevertheless, there was impressive progress in the area of
material construction: currency was unified, a revenue system and
budget were established, banking institutions were reformed, modern
industries were developed, and railroad and highway construction
were undertaken. 41 The most notable success during this period was in
the area of foreign affairs. Instead of resorting to unilateral abolition
of treaties imposed by foreign powers, the central government carried
on several negotiations. The Sino-American treaty, which was the
first to establish the principle of complete tariff autonomy, was signed
39. Article 72.
40. Political tutelage is often labeled undemocratic. However, the essential of a
successful democracy lies in the existence of necessary conditions. In the case of China,
not only had illiteracy been high, but also the living standards as well as the
experience in self-government were low. There was a definite need for a training period
before the commencement of a constitutional government. Professor A.N. Holcombe
made a discerning observation by stating: "It is evident that his [Dr. Sun] distinction
between the different stages of revolutionary process is sound. . . . The period of
tutelage when it shall have been securely established, will make an undoubtable
advance." A. HOLCOMBE, THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 312 (1931l.
41. For a detailed discussion of China's economy and finance during this period,
see Young, China's Fiscal Transformation, 1927·1937; Chang, Toward Modernization
of China's Currency and Banking, 1927-1937, in THE STRENUOUS DECADE:
CHINA'S NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS, 1927-1937, at 83-170 (P. Sih ed. 1970l.
Hung-Hsun Ling also gives detailed account of the Communication construction; see A
Decade of Railroad Construction, 1926-1936, at 255-88.
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on July 25, 1928.42 This was followed by treaties with other
countries. 43 By 1930 the central government was also very likely to
secure treaties with all minor foreign nations by abolishing the
extraterritorial rights of their citizens.« However, not until 1943 did
Britain and the United States lead the way to surrender of their
extraterritorial rights.4 5 Five foreign concessions among twenty-six
had been relinquished by foreign powers through the efforts of the
central government. 46 The aim of equality in the international society
was not far from being reached.
On the other hand, the Kuomintang itself should not be
exonerated for its failure to enforce effectively those tasks entrusted
to it.47 This is especially true on the local level where the members of
Kuomintang seriously impeded the development of self-government,
its central responsibility. As a result, many became impatient with
the lack of significant progress. The demand for drafting & constitution spread rapidly, receiving greater impetus after the Japanese
42. For text, see CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA 1919-1929, at
230-31 (1929); see generally Dennis, Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the
United States and China, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 829-32 (1928).
43. These treaties were concluded during the last two months in 1928. The list
includes Norway (November 12), Italy (November 27), Denmark (December 12),
Portugal (December 20), France (December 22), and Spain (December 27). For texts, see
id., at 273-38, 243-73.
44. Originally, there were nineteen countries which enjoyed the right of
extraterritoriality in China. Except for Austria-Hungary and Germany, which lost
their right as a consequence of World War I, and the Soviet Union, which voluntarily
relinquished it after the Bolshevik Revolution, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain agreed to its termination when other participating states of the Washington
Conference of 1921-1922 or the majority of states enjoying extraterritoriality would
agree to do the same. Brazil, Norway, and the Netherlands also expressed their
willingness to comply with the Chinese desire to terminate extraterritoriality; see W.
TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS: THE IMPACT OF AND REACTION
TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 254-57 (1970).
45. For the texts of these two treaties, see Y. CHEN, TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER POWERS
1929-1954, at 140-55 (1957). A comprehensive study of the origin, development and
the abolition of the extraterritoriality in China is provided by W. Fishel in THE END
OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 145-87 (1952).
46. Great Britain relinquished her concessions in the following cities: Hankow and
Kiukiang in 1927, Chinking in 1929, and Amoy in 1930; Belgium returned her
concession in Tientsin in 1929. For texts, see CARNEGIE, supra note 42, at 205-16,
and CHEN, supra note 45, at 18-20, 63-65, 1-6.
47. Even a sympathizer of the Kuomintang has to admit this inefficiency; see W.
TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 128 (1964).
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invasion of Manchuria, the northeast part of China, in 1931.
Recognizing that the popular demand was too strong to resist, the
Kuomintang began to draft a constitution by the Legislative Yuan
even though not a single province had had local self-government,
which was the prerequisite for the period of constitutional government according to Dr. Sun's teaching.
The first draft, which appeared in June 1933, wa·s solely the
product of Dr. John C.H. Wu. 48 In order to solicit comment and
criticism, it was released to the public. After examining those critical
responses, another draft known as the Preliminary Draft of the
Constitution of the Republic of China was completed and again
released. Since the public continued to react to this version, the
drafting committee had to revise the Draft. This Draft later went
through three readings and when published by the Legislative Yuan
was known as the "First Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of
China."
After receiving instructions from the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the Legislative Yuan undertook to draw up
the necessary amendments and promulgated the "Second Draft."
Again, the Kuomintang produced its commentary on the Draft and
the Legislative Yuan had to make further revisions. It was finally
promulgated by the National Government on May 5, 1936 and was
popularly known as the "Draft Constitution of Double Five."49
It seemed that a permanent constitution would soon be promulgated. Nevertheless, the election of delegates to attend the National
Assembly which would be charged with the responsibility of drafting
a final constitution encountered difficulties since some parts of the
northern provinces were then under the control of a semi-autonomous
regime which was supported by the Japanese. After full-scale war
broke out in July 7, 1937, an indefinite postponement of the
convocation of the National Assembly was inevitable.
In retrospect, we have to acknowledge that in draftsmanship this
latest version was far superior to all the earlier drafts. It was the
result of tedious work by the Legislative Yuan for a period of more
48. It is interesting to note that Dr. Wu was one of several intimates of the late
Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court. Their relationship began
when Dr. Wu sent an article about ancient Chinese law published in the Michigan Law
Review to Justice Holmes for comment. Their friendship lasted for eleven years
<1921-32). Their intimate correspondence was collected in JUSTICE HOLMES TO
DOCTOR WU.
49. For the major differences between these various drafts, see T. CH'IEN, supra
note 38, at 298-303.
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than three years. Most of all, the political theories bequeathed by Dr.
Sun Yat-sen had been strictly adhered to. 50 For example, in addition
to the five-power government which combined the typical western
doctrine of separation of powers and the two traditional Chinese
systems of the censorate and civil service examination, 5 1 Dr. Sun had
made a brilliant demarcation between the power of the people
(political power) which included election, recall, initiative, and
referendum, and the power of the government (governing power)
which performed its functions through the five Yuans. The former
would be exercised by the National Assembly, which was to be the
organ that government was responsible to. Accordingly, not only the
president and vice-president, but also th~ members of the Legislative
and Control Yuan were to be elected and subjected to recall by the
National Assembly, 52 which would be composed of delegates elected
by popular vote.
50. A detailed examination of the provisions of the Draft can be found in PAN,
supra note 30, at 64-88.
51. In the whole structure of the imperial Chinese government two institutions
were particularly noteworthy. One was the censorate, the other, the civil service
examination. It is generally agreed that the service provided by the censorate to the
traditional Chinese government was unique. Briefly, it surveyed governmental
activities and exposed violations of law and derelictions of duty by government
personnel, with the intent both to purge the administration of incompetence,
arbitrariness, and malfeasance and to stimulate the implementation of prevailing
political doctrine. See Hucker, The Traditional Chinese Censorage and the New Peking
Regime, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1041 (1951). Like the censorate, the competitive
examination system for civil service is another unique contribution made by the
Chinese. For detail, see Teng, Chinese Influence on the Western Examination, 7 HARV.
J. ASIA STUD. 267, 268-70 (1943). In a centralized government the examination
system accomplished several things: uniformity in written language was achieved;
communications between localities and the capital were strengthened; and most of all
the throne was stabilized by controlling the thought of the leading social group and
channeling it into the lines of an official ideology which emphasized the principles of
loyalty and service. On the other hand, this system had the unhealthy tendency to
stupefy the active minds of the race, particularly after the overformalization of essay
writing and the overemphasis on caligraphy and poetical composition in the Ming
dynasty. This, combined with the continuing ignorance of the importance of science
and technology, might have contributed to the lack of an active and fruitful response to
the new problems and ideas resulting from the interchange with western culture. See
W. FRANKE, THE REFORM AND ABOLITION OF THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE
EXAMINATION SYSTEM 25-27 !1960). In spite of all these defects, the main
argument for the examination was that it facilitated social mobility and insured the
government a continuing supply of new blood. Therefore, to the western practice of
dividing the government into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the
Chinese system added two more, the examination and the control. The Five Yuan
(branches) stand on equal footing and the president is above them as the head of state.
52. Article 32.
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Contrary to the common belief, the war did not necessarily stifle
the development of democracy in China. Since this was an "all out"
war against foreign aggression, the nation had to achieve unity and
solidarity in order to overcome so powerful an enemy. The People's
Political Council was brought into being. Although not all members
were elected by popular vote, they represented all of the existing
political parties including the Communists. In spite of the seemingly
undemocratic means of choosing its members and its limited functions, its work was comparatively satisfactory. Several committees
within the Council dealt with reviewing the Draft Constitution of
Double Five which had been established without producing any
concrete results.
Immediately after General Marshall came to China to serve as a
mediator between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the "Political Consultative Conference" was h~ld in Chungking from January 10
to January 30, 1946. It was composed of 29 delegates representing
different political parties and groups. A number of radical revisions
were proposed by it. Among them, the National Assembly, the
essential part of the original system of government, was to be
abolished and the president was to be elected and recalled by
representatives of the county, the provincial and central assemblies,
before popular elections were to be held; a system of ministerial
responsibility was to be adopted with the Executive Yuan corresponding to the cabinet and the Legislative Yuan corresponding to the
parliament; the Control Yuan was to be transformed into an upper
chamber, elected by the provincial assemblies and exercising the
functions of consent, impeachment, censure, etc.
Predictably, these changes were difficult for the Kuomintang to
accept. However, after reaching a compromise between the Kuomintang and other political parties - save the absent Communists - the
National Assembly was restored, but with a very limited function.
Moreover, the influence of the cabinet government was reduced by
depriving the Executive Yuan of its right to dissolve the Legislative
Yuan and by failing to provide the Legislative Yuan with the
no-confidence vote characteristic in other parliament countries. 53
53. C. LIN, CHUNG-HUA-MIN-KUO HSIEN-FA SHIH-LU (An Analytical Study
of the Constitution of the Republic of China) 116 (1975!. However, Ch'ien Tuang-sheng
maintained that no compromise had been reached and the Reviewing Committee of the
Political Consultative Conference simply followed the wish of the Kuomintang; see
CH'IEN, supra note 38, at 319. James D. Seymour concurred with this argument; see
Seymour, Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 9 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1974). A close and further examination of those
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This latest draft has served as the basis for the Constitution of
1946 and it has been and still is the fundamental law of Nationalist
China. 54
The promulgation of a constitution did not bring China into the
era of constitutionalism. On the contrary, the civil war accelerated to
an unprecedented extent. Amidst the war, the first session of the first
term of the National Assembly convened at Nanking in 1948.
Although proposals to amend the Constitution were numerous, it was
hardly conceivable that many radical amendments would be passed,
particularly since the constitution had been enacted only sixteen
months earlier and some three-fourths of the delegates were the same
persons who attended the Constituent National Assembly which had
produced it. Finally, instead of any formal amendment to the
Constitution, the "Temporary Provisions for the Duration of Mobilization to Suppress the Rebellion" [hereinafter referred to as the
Temporary Provisions] were adopted, though in fact their adoption
followed the procedures prescribed for the amendment to the Constitution.
According to these provisions, the President was permitted, for
the period in question, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council,S5
to take any emergency measure in order to prevent the state or the
people from facing immediate dangers or to cope with serious
financial or economic crises as prescribed in articles 39 and 43 of the
Constitution, without being subject to the procedural restrictions of
the Legislative Yuan. These two articles were the origin of the
President's emergency powers. The first provides that the President
may declare a state of siege but has to secure previous approval or
subsequent ratification by the Legislative Yuan, which may ask the
President to lift the state of siege by resolution. The second provides
that the President in the case of natural calamity, epidemic, or a
amendments and provisions of the Constitution later adopted by the National
Assembly reveals that almost all of the letter and spirit of the amendments were
incorporated into the Constitution. This was made at the insistence of Chiang Kai-shek
in hopes that the Communists would thus have gone back to the peace talk; see Y.
CHIANG, CHUNG-KUO CHIN-TAI-SZU CHUAN-LIEH-TIEN (The Turning Point of
Modern Chinese History) 175-76 (1976). It is important to note here that Mr. Chiang
had actively participated in the Political Consultative Conference as well as the
National Assembly and he is the member of China Democratic Socialist Party.
54. For text, see TUNG, supra note 47, at app. G.
55. The Council is composed of the premier and vice-premier of the Executive
Yuan, heads of the ministries and commissions and Minister of State with the premier
as chairman. It is responsible for discussion and finalization of statutory or budgetary
bills, and other important matters to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.
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serious financial or economic crisis may, when the Legislative Yuan
is in recess, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, issue
emergency decrees, but they have to be confirmed by the Legislative
Yuan within a month.
Given the fact that a civil war was in full swing, not only did
military efforts require strengthening, but also economic measures
were desperately needed to save the country from bankruptcy. The
extension of Presidential power was understandable. However, we
should question the necessity of exempting the restriction imposed by
article 39, particularly since the Legislative Yuan could always
subsequently confirm the declaration of state of siege; the immediate
action taken by the President to deal with any exigency could hardly
have been impeded.
The only restriction which now may be placed on the new
extensive presidential power is that under article 57 the Legislative
Yuan may by resolution ask the Executive Yuan to modify or annul
such presidential power. Nevertheless, article 57 provides that the
President can veto such a resolution, which in turn can be overruled
only with a two-thirds majority. It is scarcely conceivable that the
President could not even command a following of one-third of the
Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, the wisdom of drafting the "Temporary Provisions" was manifestly questionable and the criticisms of its
unwarranted expansion of the presidential power have force.
A series of four amendments have been attached to the "Temporary Provisions," two of which are worthy of mention here. 56 The first
amendment, which was adopted in 1960, waived the restriction placed
by the Constitution against a third-term reelection of the President. 57
The reason was obvious. The continuing leadership of President
Chiang Kai-shek was necessary to maintain the political continuity
and stability of the government. During that time he was the only
person with a significant enough reputation to be identified with all
of China and keep the economic and political transformation in
Taiwan proceeding smoothly. The last amendment, adopted in 1973,
authorized the government to conduct supplementary elections in the
areas it actually controlled. Since 1971 when it lost its seat in the
United Nations, Nationalist China has suffered a series of severe
56. Two other amendments not given in detail here relate to the enforcement of
initiative and referendum by the National Assembly and the creation of some
government agencies. For details, see Cheng, A Study on the Temporary Provisions of
the Constitution of the Republic of China, 13 CHINA CULTURE 4: 38-57 (1972).
57. Article 47.
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diplomatic setbacks. These setbacks have had repercussions in its
domestic politics. In particular, a movement toward internal political
modernization has been initiated. One of its major goals was the
solution of the problem of attrition in the membership of the national
representative groups due to age. Of the 2961 National Assembly
members elected in 1947, only 1393 were still serving in 1971; of the
759 members of the Legislative Yuan, 434 remained; and in the
Control Yuan, where the average age of members was over sixty-five
years, 58 membership declined from 180 in 1949 to 69 in April 1971.
Because it claims to be the only government of China, the Nationalist
Chinese government was reluctant to hold a general election in
Taiwan. Nevertheless, the ROC government has had to recognize the
phenomenon of political stagnation and the rising demands of its local
residents to participate in the policy-making process. As a result, in
1972, 53 new members were elected to the National Assembly, 36 to
the Legislative Yuan, and 7 to the Control Yuan. Their terms are
three (Legislative Yuan) and six years (Control Yuan and National
Assembly), respectively, according to the provisions of the Constitution.
On June 11, 1980, the Government announced the further
expansion of the number of new members for the above three bodies.
In total 204 new members will be elected in Taiwan - 76 to the
National Assembly, bringing the total to 1218, 96 to the Legislative
Yuan, bring the total to 412, and 32 to Control Yuan, bringing the
total to 74. 59 Among the three bodies, the most important one is the
Legislative Yuan. The election of 96 new members to this body would
significantly revitalize that body. Moreover, many remaining members are too old or ill to be active. As a result, less than half of the
remaining members regularly attend the meetings of the Yuan. So,
in practical terms, after the recent increase of the membership,
approximately half of the active members of the Legislative Yuan
will be elected in Taiwan. 60

58. See generally, Wei, Political Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan,
in CHINA AND THE QUESTIONS OF TAIWAN 74-111 CH. Chiu ed. 1973!.
59. Parliamentary Seats Added, 21 FREE CHINA WEEKLY 1 (No. 23, June
1980).
60. See Hungdah Chiu, The Future of Political Stability in Twaiwan, in TAIWAN:
ONE YEAR AFTER UNITED STATES-CHINA NORMALIZATION <A SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WORKSHOP> 40-41 <June 1980J.
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On the provincial and local levels, however, self-government has
been fully practiced on Taiwan since 1951. With the exception of the
governor, who is appointed by the Executive Yuan,all chief executive
officials and members of the legislative assemblies have been chosen
by direct vote of the people.
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CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Reasons for Establishing a Specialized
Constitutional Court
After reviewing the history of Chinese Constitutions, one may
ask, assuming that the current constitution may not be changed in
the near future because of the political realities, how can it adapt
itself to the changing political and economic setting? In other words,
how can the constitution continue to remain inviolable and yet not
hinder the rapid development of the country? A sound system of
constitutional interpretation is needed; in essence, this is the system
of judicial review in the constitutional context. Under this system,
judges interpret the constitution in such a way that it still serves as a
supreme living law in daily life even though it was actually drafted
years ago. Thus it can maintain its highest place in a hierarchy of
legal norms within a country by striking down those statutes which
conflict with it.
Neither the "Principles of Constitution" nor the "Nineteen
Articles" promulgated by the Ching government mentioned the
system of judicial review. The first provision for judicial review
appeared in the Constitution Draft of the Temple of Heaven of 1913.
The power of interpretation of the future Constitution belonged to the
legislature/ a conclusion drawn from the French model of government in which the legislature has full authority to interpret its own
statutes. The 1919 Constitution Draft adopted a system that entitled
only the leaders of the legislature and judiciary to compose a special
conference handling the task of interpretation. 2 Although the Constitution of 1923 still followed the principle of parliamentary supremacy
with minor revision/ it established that the Highest Court of Justice
had the authority to pass judgment on conflicts between national law
and provincial law! The 1925 Constitution Draft seemed to move a
1. Articles 112 & 113.
2. Article 101.
3. By relaxing the quorum for passing a decision from two-thirds presence and
three-fourths concurrence to two-thirds presence and concurrence provided in article
141.

4. Article 28.
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step toward the creation of a special constitutional court whose
members included a chief justice, four other justices of the Supreme
Court and four other persons nominated and elected by the legislature.5
Since the National Government was guided by the Kuomintang
during the political tutelage period, the Central Executive Committee
of the Party had the final say on those conflicts between statutes and
the "Provisional Constitution during the Period of Political Tutelage."6 A variety of devices were proposed during the draft of
"Constitution Draft of Double Five."7 It was finally decided that "the
question [ot1 whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution shall
be settled by the Control Yuan submitting the point to the Judicial
Yuan for interpretation within six months after its enforcement."8
However, it failed to decide whether the Supreme Court or another
specialized court which it would create within the Judicial Yuan was
to assume the task.
Although the American practice of judging the constitutionality
of laws by regular courts has been followed by a number of countries,
an alternative was established in Austria in 1920 with the creation of
a Constitutional Court that specializes in this function. 9 There were
several reasons for this structural change. Since the principle of stare
decisis is not a part of the civil law system, at least in theory, courts
are not generally bound even by the decisions of the highest court. 10
Thus, there may theoretically exist a conflict among courts on the
question of whether a statute is constitutional. 11 Furthermore, the
existence of a separate administrative court independent of the
regular courts which occasionally had to apply the same statutes as
5. Article 94.
6. Article 85.
7. See generally T. TSAO, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN CHINA 164-65 {1947).
8. Article 140.
9. Since the United States Supreme Court has limited its jurisdiction in the
public law area through the procedure of certiorari, the contrast between these two
systems, at least in terms of the nature of the work handled by them, may not be so
stark; see Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of
1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 {1928).
10. As a matter of fact, since one important indicator in deciding the promotion of
judges in lower courts is the rate at which their decisions are upheld by the higher
courts, they simply cannot risk ignoring the lines laid down by the decisions of superior
courts.
11. However, it is arguable that the danger of a lack of uniformity is not so great
under such a unified country as Austria in which no state court exists at all.
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the ordinary court aggravated the possible contradiction among
judicial organs. 12
Most of all, the exercise of judicial review differs in character as
well as in meaning from those functions performed by an ordinary
court. It extends into the field of politics. The constitutional judge has
to relate every clause of the constitution to political reality. In other
words, he must, more than the ordinary judge, also understand
something of the essence of politics and of those social forces which
determine political life. However, judges in civil law countries are
career judges who generally enter the judiciary soon after graduation
from the university, where their training has emphasized strict
legal-analytical studies. These civil law judges simply do not have the
opportunity to acquire practical experience. As a result, they
inevitably promote a narrow application of the letter of the law and
can hardly be expected to make any effort to question the legality of a
provision in a statute. 13 Hence in civil law countries it is highly
advisable to create a specialized constitutional court, whose members
are drawn from a variety of backgrounds outside the bench.
By explicitly providing in article 171 of the current Chinese
Constitution that "laws that are in conflict with the Constitution
shall be null and void," the principle of judicial review is firmly
established. Article 173 vests the power of constitutional interpretation in the Judicial Yuan. In addition, article 78 of chapter seven
reiterates that "the Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution
and shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and
orders." This chapter includes articles 77-82, which are equivalent to
Article III of the United States Constitution. Since the Judicial Yuan
is the highest organ of the state and is charged with civil, criminal
and administrative cases, it may appear that the American model of
judicial review was followed. The next article, however, clearly
suggests the opposite since it provides that "the Judicial Yuan shall
have a certain number of Grand Justices to take charge of matters
specified in article 78 of this Constitution, who shall be nominated
and, with the consent of the Control Yuan, appointed by the President
of the Republic." A specialized tribunal is thereby created above and

12. Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation, 4 J. POL. 183, 186 (1942).
13. The cases of Weimer Germany and Italy from 1948-1956 amply evidence the
unsuitability of the so-called "decentralized" American system in civil law countries.
For an excellent treatment on the rationale of establishing the "centralized" judicial
review, see M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 53-66 (1971).
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outside the regular court structure. Accordingly, the Chinese Constitution not only recognizes the principle of judicial review, but also
establishes a special court to pass judgment on constitutional
questions.
B. Members
The Constitution leaves the composition of the Council of Grand
Justices entirely to enabling legislation. The Organic Law of the
Judicial Yuan, adopted by the Legislative Yuan on March 31, 1947, to
become effective simultaneously with the new Constitution, further
affirms in article 3 that there shall be a Council of Grand Justices in
the Judicial Yuan, composed of seventeen such Justices. 14 The
American lawyer accustomed to a nine-member court, may consider
this number of justices too large. As a matter of fact, the United
States may be the only country having a nine-member court. 15 Again,
in contrast to an absence of any constitutional or statutory qualifications for the Supreme Court Justices of the United States,t 6 article 4
of the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan explicitly provides that only
those persons who have one of the following qualifications shall be
eligible as a Grand Justice:
1. having served as a justice of the Supreme Court for more
than ten years with a distinguished record of service;

2.

having served as a member of the Legislative Yuan for more
than nine years and having contributed significantly to its
activities;

3. having taught for more than ten years some major courses at
a university or college, and produced some specialized
writings in the field of law;
4.

having been a justice of the International Court or an author
of some authoritative books in the field of public law or
comparative law, and

14. Article 3.
15. The Constitutional Council of the Fifth French Republic consists of nine
appointed members, but in addition thereto all fonner Presidents of the Republic are
ex officio members for life. Some countries even have an even number of justices,
ranging from Ireland with six, to West Gennany with sixteen, and Switzerland with
twenty-six.
16. However, a law degree has been considered to be an unwritten prerequisite for
membership in the Supreme Court as well as other federal courts in the United States;
see H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 41 (1974).
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5. being erudite in jurisprudence and having experience and
renown in politics.
Paragraph two of the same article further stipulates that the number
of Grand Justices appointed by virtue of each of the above items shall
not exceed one third of the total number.
Whether one favors the American or Chinese method of choosing
the members of the court is a matter of personal preference. Among
those countries that established a special constitutional court, almost
all regulate the composition of the court. 17 A country without any
experience in creating the system of judicial review needs detailed
regulation to insure that the backgrounds of its court members will
be diversified; this characteristic is particularly desirable in the
formative stages of the court.
Lawyers were deliberately excluded from the above categories,
which provides further evidence that their status needs to be raised.
Because of the non-litigious character of the society and its emphasis
on informal as well as personal means of resolving disputes, the
lawyer's skill has historically been neither especially needed nor
valued. Although the prestige of the Chinese lawyer seems to be on
the rise - a result of the rapid development of a more complex society
in a recent decade - compared with its American counterpart, it still
has a long way to go. Still, there is the view of the Japanese that
lawyers are often reluctant to sit on its Supreme Court, which decides
constitutional cases incidental to regular litigation, because this
position generally is not lucrative compared to business law practice.
Although President Eisenhower deemed prior judicial experience
crucial for nomination to the United States Supreme Court, only
twenty-two among one hundred justices had ten or more years of
previous judicial experience on any lower level court before they were
appointed. Yet forty-two justices, including some who were regarded

17. E.g., three of the sixteen members of each senate ofthe West German Federal
Constitutional Court must be professional judges; fifteen Italian constitutional justices
have to be drawn from among the high bench, university professors of law and
attorneys of twenty years' standing. Although under heavy American influence, the
Court Organization Law of Japan explicitly provided that ten of the fifteen members of
its Supreme Court must have had at least ten years' experience as regular judges or a
total of twenty years' experience as summary court judges, lawyers, procurators, or law
professors (art. 41 sec. 1). In practice, the pattern of maintaining a definite share in
three categories of judges- five from the bench, five from the bar, and five from the
persons of knowledge and experience - has been followed ever since its inception.
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as the greatest, such as Marshall, Brandeis and Warren, had never
been on the bench before. 18 An oft-quoted remark made by Justice
Frankfurter applies here: "One is entitled to say without qualification
that the correlation between prior judicial experience and fitness for
the Supreme Court is zero." 19
Nevertheless, the necessity of having a certain number of justices
drawn from the judiciary should not be ignored. Unlike all of the
United States Supreme Court Justices who have had extensive legal,
though not judicial, experience in actual life before their appointment/0 the legal profession in civil law countries is separately
divided. A young law student ordinarily chooses his future occupation
as judge, procurator, lawyer, civif servant, or law professor after
graduation and generally sticks with it forever. Although it is
theoretically possible to move from one of these professions to
another, such moves are comparatively rare. It is thus possible that
someone appointed to the constitutional court may never have
practiced law to any extent or may have never attempted to take the
bar examination at all. Total unfamiliarity with the legal procedure
is conceivable. Another overriding consideration favoring the selection of persons with previous judicial experience in those countries is
that they certainly have acquired some habits of independence,
having remained at a considerable distance from actual politics. This
is an extremely precious quality for the highest court undertaking
constitutional review.
Since the trial judge is mostly concerned with the laws of
procedure and evidence, it is natural that he tends not to question the
articulated doctrines of law. This is especially true when applied to
civil law judges. Because they enter the judiciary while still quite
young and inexperienced in regard to practicalities and since their
advancement is relatively slow and based to a considerable extent
upon seniority, strong judicial personalities and judicial lawmaking
like those in America can hardly be developed. A traditional attitude
of legal dogmatism and inflexibility is the natural consequence.
Speaking of these career judges, Mauro Cappelletti and John Adams
were of the opinion that "they have been trained in the execution of
the law as it stands, and they tend to shy away from the type of

18. See the table II in ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 45-47.
19. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PENN. L.
REV. 781-795 (1957).
20. ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 52.
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policy-making decisions that are involved in judicial review." 21 In
view of the inevitable political character of the judicial review, it is
wise that a constitutional court not only be composed of jurists, but
also of statesmen. This has certainly been true of United States
Supreme Court justices, who, except for Justice George Shiras, Jr.
(1892-1903), have engaged in at least some public service at various
levels of government. 22
Another difference from the American system of judicial review
is that the term of service for the Chinese Grand Justices is fixed at
nine years. 23 Having learned from the sharp conflict between the
United States Supreme Court and President Roosevelt in the 1930's,
most justices of constitutional court justices have been subject to
reappointment after a period of time. Since 1967 all fifteen Italian
Justices hold office for nine years. 24 After 1970, service on the Federal
Constitutional Court of West Germany has been restricted to a single
twelve-year term. 25 Civil law countries have felt that life tenure
might lead to carelessness in the performance of a court member's job
or to his loss of contact with the life of the country. However, the
advantages of a limited term seem more than outweighed by the
resulting jeopardy to the judges' independence. This potential for
political abuse has been somewhat moderated as most of the Chinese
Grand Justices have been customarily re-elected. 26 In this connection,
it is noted that until recently Justices in both West Germany and
Italy were not prohibited by law from seeking re-election. 27 This is

21. Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents
and Adaption, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (1966).
22. ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 52.
23. Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan.
24. See Flanz & Figliola, Italy, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 26 (1973).
25. Before that, those drawn from the bench still enjoyed life tenure until they
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-eight; other members of the Court were
chosen for an eight-year term but were eligible for re-election.
26. Because of the lack of available information, the author cannot find out the
reason for those who failed to be nominated. However, except in two cases, all of those
Grand Justices were seventy or more years old when their original term expired. The
advanced age may have played a significant role in preventing them from seeking
re-election.
27. CONST. art. 135, para. 3 (Italy); Constitutional Court Act, art. 3 para. 4 <West
Germany). There was also a proposal to eliminate the possibility of re-election during
the debate of drafting the Law Governing the Council of Grand Justice in 1957; see
LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO <Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), 20th., 4st sess. 50-58;
5th sess. 105-6 (1957). However, it failed to be adopted.
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probably a solution to the inherent defects of the fixed tenure, though
stability and consistency may not be adequately guaranteed.
From the establishment of the Council in 1948 up to 1978 there
have been sixty-one Grand Justices. Twenty-seven belonged to the
first term, seventeen to the second term, twenty-one to the third term,
and fifteen to the current fourth term, which began on September 28,
1976. The reader must wonder about these four seemingly magic
numbers, which do not correspond to the required seventeen Grand
Justices. A brief history is needed. At the time of its inauguration,
only twelve Grand Justices had been duly appointed. The other five
candidates had not been confirmed by the Control Yuan. Moreover,
two of them also declined their nomination. After another Grand
Justice died, eight more nominations were submitted to the Control
Yuan, and all of them were confirmed. Since the civil war had already
spread throughout the country, the Grand Justices simply could not
get seriously down to work. After the National Government moved to
Taiwan, only two of them reported for duty. 28 In March 1952, seven
new members were added. With the original two appointed, they
constituted a quorum and began to function.
When their term expired in July 1958, fifteen new Grand
Justices were appointed in September. As two of them died before the
expiration of their term, new ones were added. The third term began
on October 2, 1967 also with fifteen Grand Justices. As a result of
death, withdrawal from duty, and transfer to other public service, six
men and a woman were appointed.
From the preceding historical survey we may conclude that the
Grand Justices in the first term were most numerous but least
organized. Only nine of them had really worked together for a period
of seven years. The following question naturally arises. Why did the
President in all but the first term nominate fewer Grand Justices
than the number provided? The probable answer is that these two
seats have been reserved for the members of two other minority
parties, the Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist

28. They were Hu Pao-ao and Su Shih-hsing. An inquiry was made of the
whereabouts of the Grand Justices. It was found that one had been transferred to a
cabinet post, one had resigned, four had died, and one had gone over to the Communist
regime, while the whereabouts of others were simply unknown; see CHINA HANDBOOK 81 (1953-54).
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Party, 29 and we do not know whether they have ever attempted to
provide any names for consideration to the President.
At the time of their appointment, twenty of those sixty-one
Grand Justices were justices of the Supreme Court and were thereby
under the section one authorization, and seventeen were professors of
law and were appointed according to section three. In addition,
seventeen were actively involved in politics, five were highly
regarded authors who were the second part of the fourth section
appointees and four were section two's legislators. Only those who
would qualify as Grand Justices under the first half of section four,
which provides for persons having been a justice of the International
Court, have never been appointed. 30
A superficial analysis concludes that justices, law professors, and
politicians were the major components. However, a close analysis
produces a somewhat different picture. Although there. were eight
Grand Justices in the first term belonging to section five appointees,
their numbers were reduced to six in both the second and the third
term and, most of all, only one of the current fourth term members
belongs to this group. Therefore, the influence of politicians has been
reduced drastically recently. On the other hand, forty Grand Justices
had engaged in some kind of public service in their previous career
before their appointment to the Council, although such public service
had not constituted a major part of their careers. It is worth
mentioning that not a few of them are serving in the current term.
Their impressive number supports our early contention that involvement in public service is helpful to some extent in the career
development of judges and professors.
Only one Grand Justice in the first term was selected under the
second part of the section four. Not until midway into the third term
did another Grand Justice come to the council holding the same
qualification. Three persons in the current term were nominated
under this section. Because authors of books on law are generally also
professors oflaw, the total number of such members therefore reaches
29. For detailed information about these two parties, see T. CH'IEN, THE
GOVERNMENT AND POLICIES OF CHINA, at 351-55 (1967). The former currently
has 64 representatives in the National Assembly, 12 in the Legislative Yuan and 4 in
the Control Yuan. The latter has 37 members in the National Assembly, 6 in the
Legislative Yuan, and 3 in the Control Yuan. Data provided in CHINA YEARBOOK
70, 72 (1977).
30. Two Grand Justices, Ju-ao Mai and Che-chun Hsiang, had served as judge and
prosecutor respectively in the International Military Trial Tribunal for the Far East
CIMTFE) at Tokyo after World War II, but both were nominated under section three.
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eight in the current term. This, combined with the established fact
that professors of law have steadily occupied, along with the justices
of the Supreme Court, ten or more seats within the Council in the
past terms, proves that the major source of the Council has been
greatly limited to the university and the bench. Further, the former
group has had more recent appointments to the Council than the
latter. This reflects a long-recognized practice in civil law countries to
look toward the universities in making high judicial appointments
because only the scholar is a real protagonist of the civil law
tradition. Paraphrasing the oft-quoted notion that common law is a
law of the judges, the civil law is a law of the professors.
It is also relevant to note that most countries limit the activities
of the justices of the constitutional court during their term. This
practice differs from that in the United States, which has no provision
against its members involving themselves in extra judicial functions.
A few justices in the United States have played politics while
performing judicial functions, some having even sought the Presidency.31 In most other countries, a justice is only permitted to teach
during his term. Those professors whose selection to the court has
been based on their teaching frequently continuing their former
professions during their court tenure. This inclination toward
teaching has also been exercised by jurists selected from other
categories. Usually they are well received by the universities. In
addition to the unusual prestige enjoyed by the law professor in civil
law countries, a practical consideration can also be discerned. Since
justices' terms are fixed, there exists a distinct possibility of
unemployment after the expiration of judicial tenure. Therefore, the
impetus to retain a more permanent professional post as insurance for
the future is understandable. The members of the Council of Grand
Justices are also restricted in their extra judicial work to teaching,
even though there is no express prohibition against other kinds of
activities.
After examining the qualifications for candidacy to the constitutional court, we now tackle the recruitment process. Nowhere is the
relationship between the political and judicial systems more casual
than in the selection of justices for constitutional adjudication. The
31. Mr. Justice McLean had sought a presidential nomination five times, and Mr.
Justice Hughes did become the presidential candidate in 1916. Other recent examples
were Justices Roberts' service on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Jackson's tour as
prosecutor at Nuremberg, and Chief Justice Warren's reluctant chairmanship of the
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.
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only provision of the Chinese Constitution relating to judicial
recruitment is article 79, which, like its American counterpart,
specifies simply that Grand Justices shall be nominated with the
consent of the Control Yuan.
We will not discuss the method chosen to select candidates for the
Council in its first term, in part because the Council was in a rather
unstable condition and in part because relevant material is simply
not available. During the other three terms of the Council, an
informal method was followed for the selection of candidates. First, an
advisory committee was established. It was chaired by the VicePresident and consisted of the secretary-generals of the Office of the
President, National Security Council and Kuomintang, and the
President of the Judicial Yuan. After it began its work, each member
would submit a list of candidates recommended by a variety of outside
groups or by the individual himself. Then the most important
principles of recruitment were decided. The most recent principles
included five guidelines: a candidate must be under seventy-five
when his term expires; not less thai) a third and no more than
one-half of its present members can be re-elected; except for Taiwan
and Fukien, other provinces may have no more than one Grand
Justice; there must be two women candidates; and party affiliation is
not necessary. 32 Fifteen candidates would then be produced under
these guidelines and submitted to the President for nomination.
Besides the five rejections in the first term, the candidates have
always been confirmed by the Control Yuan.
In the supplementary selection of Grand Justice.:;, occasioned by
death or departure for other reasons, no advisory committee was
needed. It was the sole responsibility of the President of the Judicial
Yuan to propose the successor and report to the President. 33 Of course,
he had to consult with other departments before he finalized the list.
The party plays a significant role in the whole recruiting process.
Not only is its secretary-general a member in the advisory committee,
but he works with the members of the Control Yuan to secure the
necessary confirmation. In view of the fact that the Kuomintang has
controlled the political power and has been the only major party in
the Republic of China for such a long period, its influence can hardly
be disputed. Although the American political parties do not occupy as
important a position as that of the Kuomintang, the Presidents of the
32. LIEN-HO-PAO <United Daily News), May 3, 1976.
33. Liu, The Function of Interpretation of Constitution Practiced by the Council of
Grand Justices, 3 HSIEN-CHENG-SHIH-TAI (Constitutional Reviewl 1:33. 41 11977l.
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United States have often made the most of their Supreme Court
selections by nominating members of their own political party.
However, it is interesting to note that nine Republican Presidents
and three Democratic Presidents have chosen at least one justice of
the opposing party. 34 In fact, except for the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, since the 1930's all the Presidents have followed the
practice. This also applies to the Chinese Council of Grand Justices.
In each of the four terms at least one member was included who did
not belong to the Kuomintang.
The principle of geographic balance has also been influential.
Twenty-one of the total thirty-five provinces have produced at least
one Grand Justice. The ratio can be compared with thirty-one out of
the fifty states in the case of the United States. 351 Since the actual
controlled area has been limited to Taiwan and several off-shore
islands along the Fukien province, natives of Taiwan have occupied
more seats than others, and this trend has been more obvious in the
most recent term. This coincides with the overall increase in the
recruitment of native Taiwanese into all branches of the government.
Often a concern for geographical balance is coupled with a desire
for religious representation in considering a nominee to the Supreme
Court. Since the Chinese traditionally tolerate different religions and
a so-called "religious war" has never occurred in Chinese history, the
de-emphasis of religion in the political process in general and in the
recruitment of Grand Justices in particular is not surprising.
Moreover, women have been in the Council since 1967, and there
even been two female Grand Justices in this term. In this respect, the
Chinese record is better than the Americans' with the heretofore all
male Supreme Court. 36
We have already seen that one possible criterion for the position
of Grand Justice in the Council is at least ten years' experience on the
bench or at a university. In the case ofmembers of the judiciary, their
promotions are strictly limited according to the career system
hierarchy. Moreover, the Council has become the top rung of judicial
career ladders. Accordingly, the average age of appointment of the
judiciary to the Council has been relatively high. The same is true of
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 58-60.
35. However, no President has apparently considered himself absolutely bound by
this factor. Its major purpose lies in political considerations.
36. The first woman Grand Justice was Chin-Ian Chiang, appointed under the first
section. In other words, she has been in the Supreme Court for over ten years.
Hsin-hsiang Fan and Ch'iang-wei Chiang are the two now serving in the Council. Both
of them were Supreme Court Judges before becoming Grand Justices.
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those appointed politicians who reach prominence through the
bureaucratic hierarchy. Maybe this can be explained in part by the
Chinese culture's emphasis on seniority and the fact that in China
age is given status. Nevertheless, on the whole, the general average
age at appointment was below sixty - 58.6. It is relevant to indicate
that this average age has been deliberately reduced from 59.1 in the
first term to the 57.4 in the current term, and even four professors in
their mid-forties have been nominated. If the trend continues, the
Council may become more active, energetic, and aggressive, all of
which is desperately needed to circumvent the Council's rigid
procedural restrictions and to raise the Council's status while
promoting constitutionalism in the Republic of China.

C. Jurisdiction
After detailing the composition of the Council of Grand Justices,
we can now proceed with the other side of the picture, the parties.
Who is best qualified to represent the interests involved in determining the validity or invalidity of the governmental act? The answer is
not a simple one and, like other aspects of the judicial review system,
the practice in the civil law countries runs counter to that of the
American. In the United States, the question of a law's constitutionality can only be placed before the court as a part of a concrete case or
controversy, and thus only the party to a law suit may raise
constitutional issues. This approach is defended on the ground that a
party who has a direct interest in the outcome is in the best position
to contest a questionable statute. It is said that under this system the
proceedings are more lively and more assiduously contested, and that
the court is less apt to overlook significant issues. 37
On the other hand, individuals may not always be able to
institute judicial review because of lack of money, time, energy, or
because they simply do not have a genuine legal interest to enter into
the legal process. It is possible that a decade or more may pass before
a plaintiff is found. Dissatisfied with the somewhat haphazard system
of incidental control, the constitutions of some civil law countries
designate a limited number of public authorities as parties who may
raise the issue of unconstitutionality.
The Chinese Constitution has no clause corresponding to article
III, section 2, paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution, which
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts specifically to a "case or
37. Grant, Judicial Control of Legislation, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 186, 198 (1954).
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controversy." Thus, legislation regulating the jurisdiction of the
Council of Grand Justices was drafted in 1957. Before its appearance,
a "Rules of Order" consisting of twenty-one articles which set forth in
detail the scope of interpretation, the quorum of the meeting, the
manner of voting, etc. had been enforced. 38 Since the Rules of Order
were initiated and adopted by the Council itself without going
through the legislative process, they were decried for a long time. The
unfriendly attitude grew into a vehement attack on the Council as a
result of Interpretation No. 76, which we will deal with in detail in
the next chapter. Opponents, especially the legislators, decided to
write a new law clarifying the jurisdiction and procedure of the
Council.
Article 3 of the Law Governing the Council of Grand Justices
(hereinafter cited as Governing Law) provides:
As to the interpretation of Constitution, the Council of Grand
Justices is authorized to exercise the following: 1. to clear up
doubts and problems arising from application of the Constitution;
2. to determine and explain whether a law is in conflict with the
Constitution; 3. to determine and explain whether the statutes
for self-government of provinces and counties and the laws and
regulations promulgated by provincial governments are in conflict with the Constitution.
Except for provincial self-governmental law, which is the only type of
statute that must be submitted by the province to the Judicial Yuan
immediately after its enactment to determine its constitutionality, 39
the remaining functions have to be exercised upon the receipt of an
application for interpretation. Both governmental organs and the
people have the right to apply for constitutional adjudication. The
inclusion of the people is significant, particularly because the "Rules
of Order" allowed only a government agency to bring an application.
Under that system, the deficiency in protecting individual civil
liberties had long been recognized. However, it was only after
considerable parliamentary debate that the individual won the right
to file a constitutional complaint directly with the Council of Grand
Justices. 40
38. CHINA HANDBOOK 82 C1951l.
39. CONST. art. 114.
40. Almost half of the debate centered on this subject; see Ll·FA-YUAN-KUANPAO !Gazette of Legislative Yuan I, 21st, 12, 14, 16th Sess.
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As the requirement of "case or controversy" need not be satisfied,
this direct review procedure should have expanded the actual scope of
constitutional review beyond that available in the United States.
However, accessibility to the Council has not been easy because of
rather strict procedural barriers. Only under the following three
conditions may a central or local governmental agency apply to the
Council: (1) when a question is encountered by it in applying a
provision of the Constitution while performing its duties; (2) when a
dispute arises between governmental agencies with regard to the
application of a provision of the Constitution in conducting their
official business; or (3) when a question is raised as to whether an
application of certain law or an administrative ordinance is in conflict
with the Constitution when it is applied. In short, standing can only
be granted after a governmental organ performs its business in
applying a provision of the Constitution or a particular statute or
ordinance. It may not raise a constitutional issue freely without
performing its duty first and this issue must be within its legitimate
jurisdiction.
According to the preceding second condition, it seems that the
Council is the sole arbiter of disputes between units of government
concerning their respective rights and duties under the Constitution.
The Council is not, however, authorized to resolve all controversies
between organs. Only when the interpretation of the Constitution is
definitely required does it enter. Even so, this is an entirely
unfamiliar system to the American jurist, even though most of the
constitutional courts in civil law countries have the same kind of
jurisdiction. The doctrine of the "political question" has not been
transferred outside the United States' boundaries. The main purpose
of this provision is to require that the government agency maintain
its continuing public duty to guard the constitutional order. Sometimes this method may have the benefit of cooling off a heated
political struggle for power by limiting it to a mere legal controversy.
On the other hand, it may involve the Council in a political
battleground which it would be best to avoid, particularly if the
political departments fulfill their own duties to search for a political
compromise within the limits of the Constitution. This system of
so-called "judicialization," which inevitably places the Council of
Grand Justices or other constitutional courts in dangerous, embarrassing and perhaps unrealistic positions to settle by judicial procedure a
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conflict of power between high constitutional organs, has been a
disputed subject, notably in West Germany.•'
The potential risk involved in the efforts to settle political
conflicts by the Council of Grand Justices has been eased to a large
extent by the article 44 of the Chinese Constitution. In the event of a
dispute among the various Yuans, article 44 authorizes the President
to call a meeting of the Presidents of the Yuans concerned for
consultation on a solution. Therefore, the various Yuans are not
required to file an application with the Council even for disputes
related to constitutional interpretation. Those disputes may still be
resolved in the political arena. Theoretically, the application of the
Constitution is prior to the legislative statute as a result of the
doctrine of the hierarchy of law. Therefore, the legal means of
resolving governmental conflicts between Yuans under the Governing
Law must give way to the political solution directly provided by the
Constitution.
However, only conflicts between Yuans are within the scope of
article 44. Does this imply that other disputes among lower levels are
to be resolved in the Council? If the answer is affirmative, the Council
would be implicated in numerous conflicts between government
agencies. However, according to article 8 of the Governing Law, the
application of a subordinate government agency to the Council may
only be made through its superior agency. This provision substantially reduces the number of government applications. Before article 8
was enacted in 1957, the same provision in the former "Rule of Order"
applied both to constitutional interpretation and to uniform interpretation of laws or ordinances, the other function of the Council. From
the legislative history of the Governing Law, however, it appears that
article 8 was intended to apply only to the function of uniform
interpretation of laws or ordinances. 42 Hence it would appear that
subordinate agencies have direct standing to apply for a ruling as to
constitutionality.
41. A. HEIDENHEIMER, THE GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY 151 (1966);
Loewenstein, JUSTICE IN GOVERNING POSTWARD GERMANY 236, 262 <R.
Litchield ed. 1953).
42. According to the arranged order of the articles, article 8 follows immediately
after the provision concerning the uniform interpretation. This might be taken as
evidence for its limited application. The major supporting evidence, however, was the
statement made by Tung Huang in the plenary session of the Legislative Yuan. He was
the major figure in the Committee of Judicial Affairs which had drafted the law that
later was accepted by the Legislative Yuan. See LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO IGazette of
the Legislative Yuan), 21st., 14th Sess. at 23.
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Nevertheless, the existing practice is for subordinate government
units to act through their superior agencies in seeking a constitutional interpretation. 43 Also, in order to maintain a sound hierarchy of
administrative supervision within the administrative system and to
manage their relatively large numbers, it may be deemed desirable to
prohibit the initiation of constitutional adjudication by subordinate
agencies.
In West Germany, this right is also not universally available to
every government agency. "Administrative agencies, government
corporations, churches, or other corporate bodies with quasi-public
status" were among the disqualified.« However, parliamentary
parties and even political parties outside parliament in West
Germany in certain circumstances have standing in the Federal
Constitutional Court. This is a rather brilliant device because a
legislator and a minority political party in general are more
aggressive than a government agency which employs people of career
service.
Although China did not adopt a system of federation, a delimitation of powers between the central and provincial governments is not easy to achieve. The Constitution has attempted to
provide a clear boundary between the central and province,45 but it is
not safe to say that disputes will never arise. Since the Governing
Law first provided that both the central and local government agency
would be qualified to apply for interpretations and that the jurisdiction of the Council of Grand Justices would include "disputes between
government agencies"46 without a specific limitation to central
agencies, the settlement of conflicts between the central and local
government originating from the division of powers between them
under the Constitution must be within the jurisdiction of the Council
Accordingly, both state and local laws may be challenged directly
before the Council by a province or a central government agency,
43. Interpretation No. 99 was the only exception. It was made by the Central Bank
of China, which is under the administrative control of the Office of the President.
Considering that the Council is under the control of Judicial Yuan and that the status
of the President is above the five Yuans, the filing of the application by the Bank itself
is not hard to understand. Nevertheless, one reason for the dissenting opinion in this
case was this procedural fault; see SZU-FA-YUAN TA-FA-KUAN HUl-l CHIEH-SHIHHUT-PIEN (The Collection of Interpretations Made by the Council of Grand Justices of
the Judicial Yuan) 182 (1977).
44. D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 105 <1976!.
45. Articles 107-111.
46. Article 4.
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respectively, whenever a province deems that a law or an act having
the force of law of the state invades the sphere of authority attributed
to it by the Constitution, or whenever, on the other hand, the central
government regards a local law as having exceeded its authority.
Oddly enough, however, the Legislative Yuan has been vested by
the Constitution with authority to settle disputes between central and
local governments. 47 The reason for such a novel arrangement has
long puzzled students of the Chinese constitution. How can a
legislative body with four hundred members, already burdened with
uncea!)ing legislative work, devote the time necessary for the solution
of these delicate problems? Before the promulgation of the Constitution, the Legislative Yuan had never been entrusted with this duty.
Although the Legislative Yuan occasionally scrutinized provincial
enactments and regulations during the period of political tutelage, it
did not maintain the authority to interpret them when it found they
were in conflict with those of the central government, but rather
submitted the point or points of issue to the Judicial Yuan 48 This
present arrangement needs to be amended.
One of the most important functions of the Council is to decide
upon the constitutionality of both local and national legislation.
Three avenues are open for referring issues of constitutionality to the
Council. First, the central or local government can ask the Council to
determine whether a national or local statute is consistent with the
Constitution, or whether a local law is consistent with other national
law. The standing of a central or local government agency in this
respect does not differ much from the above-mentioned case of
constitutional controversies. It is worth mentioning, by way of
contrast, that in West Germany one-third of the members of the
Bundestag, the lower house of parliament, also can initiate such a
procedure.
Greater significance lies in the second and third avenues. Since
the Governing Law only provided for standing for a "central or local
government agency," the different levels of the regular courts
appeared to fall within the standing requirements. However, in
practice this only meant that regular courts could certify a question
with respect to the constitutionality of a controlling statute to the
Council when such a question arose in the course of litigation and
was necessary to the resolution of the case. As early as Interpretation
No. 9, which was rendered on October 27, 1952, the Council had
declared that if there was anything in a judgment that did not
47. Article 111.
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conform to the Constitution, a party could point this out on appeal. A
party was permitted to argue that a particular statute or administrative act relied upon by the court's judgment was in violation of the
Constitution. However, the judge was not bound by the allegation; he
had complete discretion to decide whether there was any doubt on
constitutional grounds about the validity of a national or local law
governing a case.
Once a question of constitutionality is referred to the Council, are
the court proceedings suspended until the decision of the Council? In
Italy and West Germany, whose constitutional review has been
regarded as the model for the other civil law countries, the answer is
affirmative. 49 Since neither Chinese constitutional scholarship nor
actual Chinese practice has as yet provided an answer, these
European examples are highly relevant.
As each court exercises its judicial function independently, it seems unnecessary to discuss the necessity of requiring the
lower courts to go through the higher courts to certify a constitutional
question. There have been only two cases referred by a regular court
and they were either submitted by the Supreme Court or the
Administrative Court,S0 each of which is the highest organ in its
judicial hierarchy. 51 There was no indication in these applications
that the questions referred had originated in the lower courts.
Another case is relevant here because its original application was in
the district court, the bottom level of the judiciary, and it went
through all the intermediary superior courts, the Higher Court, and
the Ministry of Justice, until finally it was the Executive Yuan that
brought the application. 52 Since the data collected so far are scarce,
any conclusion is far from complete.
Since every judge in Italy and West Germany is in a position to
undertake an examination of the constitutionality of a statute in a
concrete case, the practical differences from American judges are not
so great. As the famous comparative constitutional law scholar,
Mauro Cappelletti, has remarked succinctly, "It is not the case for
Italy and Germany (as it is in the United States) that the judges are
48. For detail, see TSAO, supra note 7, at 220.
49. Cappelletti & Adams, supra note 21, at 1220-21.
50. Interpretation Nos. 47, 89.
51. This in fact resembles the Austrian practice because only the two Supreme
Courts in Austria, one for civil and penal law, the other for cases involving
administrative law, have the power to raise constitutional questions before the
Constitutional Court.
52. Interpretation No. 37.
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competent to perform the function of judicial review. However, they
all at least have the right to require the Constitutional Court to
exercise its powers of review." 53
Some American jurists may have serious doubts about this
arrangement of the Constitutional Court because they may think that
a constitutional issue cannot be decided abstractly without having the
benefit of the facts. 54 Some may also claim that as a result of the
separation of constitutional questions from specific factual situations,
the constitutional court may be forced to decide questions that would
be better postponed. 55 However, a close examination reveals that
these arguments do not always prove to be true. In practice, the strict
separation of a constitutional question from a factual setting can
hardly be achieved. It is usual for the Constitutional Court to take
note of the facts in the case. Parties to the original proceeding may be
required to file briefs and sometimes even offer oral arguments in the
proceedings before the Constitutional Court. On the other side,
according to Donald Kommers, a specialist in West Germany's
Federal Constitutional Court, the system prevailing in the civil law
nations has an advantage, that is, "the Court's opportunity to make
policy is accordingly limited by the willingness of state and federal
judges to deliver constitutional questions to the Court's keeping." 56
In addition to references from national or local government
agencies the Council of Grand Justices may also receive petitions for
relief from individuals who maintain that their constitutional rights
have been violated. The objects of such complaints may include an act
of the executive power, an administrative act, a judicial decision, or
even the statute itself. Therefore, it is possible that, after a judge
decides not to raise the question of constitutionality in the regular
suit, the individual litigant may file with the Council if he is
convinced that he has been deprived of a basic right given him by the
Constitution. This represents a great advance in the protection of
civil liberties. 57
As was the case in West Germany, the debate over granting
standing to an individual was heated. The proponents argued that
53. CAPPELLETI'I, supra note 13, at 75 C1971 I.
54. Freund, A Supreme Court in Federation, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 597,617 (19531.
55. CAPPELLETI'I, supra note 13, at 80.
56. D. Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court in the West German Political
System, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 73, 78 (J. Grossman & J.
Tanenhaus ed. 19691.
57. It is worth pointing out that both Austria and Italy until now have not allowed
individuals to file with their Constitutional Courts.
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public authorities cannot always be relied upon to protect private
rights with sufficient vigor. Only the individual who suffers loss of
liberty can be expected to defend his right with great zeal, with the
result that the issues in dispute might be better articulated and
resolved. Furthermore, such individual standing could serve as a
constant alert to public officials not to overstep their authority. The
special dignity derived from this basic freedom in the Constitution
would thus be stressed and elevated. Not a few opponents, inside and
outside the Legislative Yuan, however, argued that this procedure
would heavily burden the Council and would further worsen the
problem of prolonging litigation. The Council might become the
"super revision" court, and the administration of justice would be
dangerously disrupted. 58
In the end, success belonged to the proponents. Along with the
promulgation of the Governing Law in 1957, the right. of the
individual to sue the government on constitutional grounds became a
reality. However, several procedural limitations simultaneously were
imposed upon this individual right. Standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute or administrative act is conferred only
upon persons whose material or moral interests, as defined expressly
or implicitly in the constitution, 59 are wronged. This requirement is
similar to the "standing to litigate" prerequisite in United States
constitutional law. 60 Also, the exhaustion of previous legal remedies
before appealing to the Council is mandatory. This means that, in the
case of a petition based on a judicial decision, the petitioner must
have exhausted all regular avenues of review before bringing the case
to the Council. If the petition involves the actions of administrative
officials and if administrative remedies are available, these too must
be exhausted before resort to the Council can be successful.

58. See LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), supra note
42.
59. Articles 7 to 18 of the Constitution specifically enumerate the civil rights such
as the freedom of speech, correspondence, assembly and association, equality before the
law, etc. As article 22 spells out, "All other freedoms and rights of the people that are
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the
Constitution"; hence constitutional protection should be extended beyond those
enumerated rights and liberties provided in the Constitution.
60. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 156-92 (1953).
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D. Proceeding
After the promulgation of the Governing Law in 1957, the "Rules
of Order" ceased to exist. However, the precedent of drafting its own
internal rules has been followed by the Council and agreed to by the
Legislative Yuan. A new "Rules Concerning the Conduct of Business
by the Council of Grand Justices" [hereinafter referred to as Rules]
was created and has applied ever since. 61 All appeals to the Council
must first go to a petty bench of three Grand Justices. After
examining the arguments, the petty bench might decide to recommend refusing the application. In such a case it would make a simple
report to the Grand Bench (which includes all the Grand Justices
with the President of the Judicial Yuan ex officio) to refuse the
appeal. On the other hand, it might prepare a rather detailed
statement of the relevant facts and issues for the deliberation of the
Reviewing Bench (which differs from the Grand Bench by excluding
the President of the Judicial Yuan) when its suggestion of acceptance
is confirmed by the Grand Bench. The reason for establishing a
Reviewing Bench is to circumvent the Grand Bench which according
to the Governing Law is chaired by the President of the Judicial
Yuan or the Vice-President if the former is absent. 62 These officials do
not necessarily have the qualifications required of the Grand Justices,
even though the procedure of nomination and confirmation are the
same, and they may only preside at the meeting without the right to
argument and vote. 63 All substantive matters are reserved for the
Reviewing Bench, and the Grand Bench only serves as a rubber
stamp, a formality.
The Grand Justice on duty for the month is responsible for
calling the Reviewing Bench, which then elects one of the fellow
Grand Justices as chairman. This presents a stark contrast to the
United States Supreme Court, where any period under the leadership
of a particular Chief Justice has customarily been marked by his

61. The legality of drafting the internal rule by the Council itself was challenged
by a current member, Jui-kuan Yao, in his critical article, A Study on Some Problems
Related to the Function of the Council of Grand Justices, 3 HSIEN-CHENG-SHIH-TAI
<Constitutional Review) 3:51 (19781.
62. Governing Law, art. 15.
63. Response made by the Kuan-sheng Hsieh, President of the Judicial Yuan, to
the inquiry of the members of Judicial Affairs Committee, Control Yuan; see HSIN
SUN PAO <Newborn Daily News), May 10, 19511.
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name. 64 The Chinese arrangement of course is cumbersome and
should be revised in the future. 65
In West Germany, cases are allocated to the justices on the basis
of their particular interests and specializations except for those that
are related to a constitutional complaint initiated by the individual.
In China, the allocation of application to each petty bench is based
upon rotation, and the assignment of Grand Justices to the petty
bench is made by lot, the only condition being that each member must
belong to a different nominating category. 66 The decision to require all
the Grand Justices to handle every kind of case was received by many
of them with mixed feelings. However, since three members are
involved as a collegiate unit for a single case, the possible deficiency
of any Grand Just.ice has been significantly corrected. Furthermore,
one or more Grand Justices who have the expertise to deal with the
particular kind of case may be additionally assigned to the unit for
the purpose of drafting the opinion of the Council. 67
While the decision in the Council when dealing with the uniform
interpretation of statutes or administrative ordinances is made by a
simple majority, three-fourths of the total number of Grand Justices
are required for a quorum and at least three-fourths of them must
concur before a decision of constitutionality is made. 68 In other words,
without the attendance of three-fourths of the members, no decision
at all can be rendered. This special majority rule was a reaction to the
previous practice in which only a simple majority was sufficient for
64. Among them, Marshall, Hughes, and Warren have received the most
attention; see, e.g., J. OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF
JOHN MARSHALL (1914); J. CUNEO, JOHN MARSHALL, JUDICIAL STATESMAN
(1975l; D. DANELSKI & J. TULCHIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES fl973l; S. HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND
THE SUPREME COURT (195ll; L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY fl967l; J. WEAVER, WARREN, THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA
11974).
65. The lack of a significant role as to the chief justice also can be found in Japan

as well as West Germany; see Itoh, Judicial Decision-Making in the Japanese Supreme
Court, 3 LAW IN JAPAN 128, 151 (1969!; Kommers, supra note 56, at 81.
66. Rules, art. 5.
67. Id., art. 3.
68. Governing Law. art. 13. This can be compared with the Japanese practice in
which more than eight of the fifteen justices are needed to declare a statute
unconstitutional; see Wada, The Supreme Court of Japan as Adjudicating Agency and
its Functions, 23 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHT DER GEGENWART
537, 541 (1974). Cases involving impeachments, forfeiture of basic rights, and the
constitutionality of political parties in the West German Federal Constitutional Court
also require a two-thirds majority; see Kommers, supra note 56, at 82.
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questions of constitutionality. This was later amended so that
two-thirds of the Grand Justices residing at the seat of the central
government had to be present and a majority of the total number had
to be in agreement, 69 in order to meet the special circumstances after
1949.
In view of the serious consequences caused by a judgment of
unconstitutionality, raising the numb~r of the required majority
seems reasonable. Nevertheless, when we consider that this rule is
stringent even in comparison with the amendment procedure of the
Constitution, 70 it appears excessive and may even cause undesirable
results. It is not difficult to appreciate that the larger the majority
required, the smaller is the minority that can veto the adjudication of
the majority of the court. In other words, in order to determine
whether a statute or ordinance is constitutional, at least thirteen
members must be present and at least ten members must concur. In
view of the prevalent practice of only nominating fifteen Grand
Justices, the quorum required for the passing of the decision is
twelve. Because the current members of Grand Justices number is
fourteen, attendance of eleven members is required. 71 Accordingly,
any four Grand Justices of the Council may form a bloc to effectively
prevent the exercise of the Council's function of constitutional
interpretation. This gives minority members disproportionate bargaining leverage in constitutional deliberations and has contributed
to a large extent to the scarcity of constitutional decisions rendered
by the Council during the past twenty years. 72
The conference of the Reviewing Bench is the second step of the
decision-making process. It is normally held on every Friday morn69. Rules of Order, art. 12.
70. Article 174 of the Constitution provides two procedures: (1) Upon the proposal
of one-fifth of the total number of the National Assembly and by a resolution of
three-fourths of the delegates present at a meeting having a quorum of two-thirds of
the entire Assembly; (2) upon the proposal of one-fourth of the members of the
Legislative Yuan and by a resolution of three-fourths of the members present at a
meeting having a quorum of three-fourths of the members of the Yuan, an amendment
maybe drawn up and submitted to the National Assembly by way of referendum.
71. Professor Chien-han Chiang, chairman of the Political Science Department at
National Taiwan University, was nominated and confirmed. But given the strong
opposition during his confirmation due to his co-authoring of a book criticizing the
Control Yuan, he withdrew from the Council; CHUNG YANG JIH PAO (Central Daily
Newsl, Oct. 3, 1976.
72. See C. LIN, CHUNG-HUA-MING-KUO HSIEN-FA CHU-TIAO SHIH-YI !A
Detailed Study of Articles of the Chinese Constitution) 79-80 (1975l; Tong, The
Research on Making the Interpretation of Constitutional System of our Nation. 2
HSIEN-CHENG-SHIH-TAI !Constitutional Reviewl 4:52, 54 !1977l.
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ing. 73 Five days before it convenes, a report prepared by the
responsible petty bench has to be circulated among the Grand
Justices. 74 At the conference, members of this petty bench summarize
the case and state reasons for their recommendation. Then they
entertain questions and comments. Discussion is usually informal.
Unlike the practice of the United States Supreme Court in which the
Chief Justice always has the privilege of "speaking first" and "voting
last" and where seniority is the controlling rule of order for the other
members, there is no prescribed order regarding speaking and voting.
Since the case is discussed quite freely by the Grand Justices without
special order or limitation of time, this practice may lead to the
wasting of time and energy. When there is a large backlog of pending
cases, it becomes quite impractical. On the other hand, free and
informal discussion may contribute greatly to the polishing of the
decision and to the attainment of a greater majority.
After the underlying principle on which the decision is to be
based has been determined at the conference, the case will be referred
back to the original petty bench, which, along with one or more other
Grand Justices assigned by the Council, will write the opinion of the
Council. 76 Therefore, in this respect, the rigidity of assignment in
China also differs from the comparative flexibility in the United
States Supreme Court. 76
After the opinion is completed, it is again submitted to the
conference of the Reviewing Bench for further pruning, qualification,
deletion, and amendment until a satisfactory result is achieved. Also,
five days' prior notice is required in which to circulate the drafted
opinion before the conference. 77 During the whole process, neither the
drafting assignment nor the judicial vote may be disclosed to the
public. Also, the nature of the deliberations within the Council is kept
strictly secret. 78 This last provision is not hard to understand because
73. Interview with Grand Justice Yu po Cheng.
74. Rules, art. 6.
75. This rule also appears in the practice of the West German Federal Constitu·
tiona) Court; see KOMMERS, supra note 44, at 176, and Japanese Supreme Court; see
Wada, supra note 68, at 541.
76. If the Chief Justice is in the majority, he of course can write the opinion of the
Court himself or designate others. When he is on the minority side, it is the senior
Associate Justice on the majority who chooses either himself or assigns another
member to write the opinion. Nevertheless, there also have been some methods used in
the assignment process; see H. ABRAHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS 205-11 !1975l; D.
ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 172-87 !1976l.
77. Rules, art. 6.
78. /d., art. 12.
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the same practice applies to any country's court whether or not it
deals with a constitutional question. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once
observed, "That the Supreme Court should not be amenable to the
forces of publicity to which the Executive and the Congress are
subjected is essential to the effective functioning of the Court." 79
However, when we examine the legislative history of the
Governing Law, it may appear that the intent of the legislative Yuan
was the opposite, to maintain a public conference. The original draft
of the Governing Law in this regard contained a provision that "The
Council may hold secret meetings when it deems necessary." This
implied that public meetings should be the rule. Although this
provision was deleted in the final draft, the reason was that there was
simply no ground to justify the existence of the secret meeting. 80 The
legislative history clearly reveals the confusion on the part of the
legislative Yuan regarding the meeting of the Council and trials
conducted in regular courts. Since the Council decides its cases almost
on an objective procedure, that is, relies on the written statements of
the parties and the opinion of the concerned public agency, the
principle of public trial is not necessarily to be applied. As for its
internal deliberation, complete secrecy does, and must, exist. Otherwise, the members of the Council simply could not maintain proper
relations and harmony in the transaction of business. The confidence
of Grand Justices in their communications with one another should
be fully respected.
With regard to direct persuasion of the Council by the parties in
a case, the Council never holds an open hearing. It may, though very
rarely, request parties to come to the conference to give an oral
explanation. 81 All the cases before the Council are decided on the
basis of an examination of the papers, ie., the records of the case, the
briefs, and the research reports of the Grand Justices. The possible
purpose of an oral explanation may be to uncover additional facts that
bear upon the issues. 82
79. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PENN. L. REV. 311, 313 Cl955l.
80. LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan) 21st., 15th sess.
52 (1957).
81. This only happened once, on Interpretation No. 148, and the party only came
to the second section of the Secretariat of the Judicial Yuan, which is charged with the
administrative matters of the Council. This information is provided from an interview
with Mr. Yu-po Cheng, a current member of the Council.
82. Oral argument is also held only infrequently in the West German Federal
Constitutional Court; see KOMMERS, supra note 44, at 180. It is relatively surprising
that the Japanese Supreme Court, which followed the model of the United States
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In striking contrast to the freedom of the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court to express individual views in dissenting or
concurring opinions, the Grand Justices follow traditional continental
jurisprudence.83 Only one opinion, which presumably represents the
official consensus, is issued in each case, and the identity of the
author may not be disclosed to the public. This was done because it
was feared that the publication of dissenting opinions could impair
the prestige of the Council and create uncertainty. On the other hand,
the elimination of the dissenting opinion could result in a serious
impairment of this invaluable source of public discussion and public
debate, which are the characteristics of a democratic society. In
addition, the possibility of writing and publishing differing opinions
would give each judge a keener sense of responsibility for the decision
and also provide an opportunity to change former decisions demonstrated to be unsound, thereby contributing greatly to the development
ofjurisprudence. 84 This argument may be amply supported by the case
of the United States Supreme Court. Not a few among the most
memorable opinions of the Court initially on the dissenting side have
eventually become majority opinions. 85
Nevertheless, an undiscriminating eulogy of the practice of
issuing dissenting opinions by some foreign scholars is not totally
desirable. The appearance of a dissenting opinion often forces the
majority to take positions more extreme than were orignially
intended, but this tendency has been largely ignored. 86 Moreover, the
exercise of individual judicial opinion-writing can at times produce a
less-reasoned statement of the grounds for disagreement. On the
whole, the right to dissent on well-chosen occasions, if wisely used, no
doubt can be of great service to the profession and to the law. But
Supreme Court, also conducts oral arguments only infrequently; see Itoh, supra note 65,
at 153.
83. Only after 1971 were the justices in the Federal Constitutional Court of West
Germany allowed to express their dissenting opinions; see KOMMERS, supra note 44
at 180.
84. For a discussion of the pros and cons of the dissenting opinion, see McWhinney,
Judicial Concurrence and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opinion- Writing in Final
Appellate Tribunals, 31 CANADIAN B. REV. 595-625 (1953l; Nadelmann, The
Judicial Dissent, Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415-32 (1959l.
85. Several distinguished cases have been cited in ABRAHAM, supra note 76, at
203.
86. Mr. Justice Jackson cited the notorious Dred Scott case as a classic example in
which Chief Justice Taney's extreme statements were absent in his original draft and
were inserted only after Mr. Justice McLean, then a more than passive candidate for
the presidency, raised the issue in dissent. SeeR. JACKSON, SUPREME COURT IN
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 19 (1955l.
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there is nothing good, for either the court or the dissenters, in
dissenting per se. 81
Not until1957 did the Governing Law recognize the value of the
different opinions and reverse its previous course. Since then differing
opinions can be issued by the individual Grand Justices. 88 Since the
provision uses the term "different" generally, it appears to include
both dissenting as well as concurring opinions. However, in practice,
there have only been three concurring opinions. 89 On the other hand,
the rate of dissents has been quite impressive. Thirteen of the
nineteen cases since 1957 relating to the Constitution have borne
dissenting opinions. In a society in which consensus, harmony, and
unanimity are important values, such a high rate of dissent must be
very meaningful. Since the pressure for social harmony and for
outward unanimity is rather strong, the Grand Justices, like
individuals in an ordinary social context, customarily seek to
reconcile their different positions among themselves. Conscious that
if the majority is divided over its reasons the decision may lack
authority for other public agencies and the regular court, the Grand
Justices always attempt to agree on common grounds by sacrificing to
some degree the particularity of their opinions. The near absence of
concurring opinion may be explained by this fact.
Since January 7, 1977, the author of the dissenting opinion has
been identified to the public. 90 This is a reversal of the previous
practice of giving only the number of those dissenting and their
opinions. Of course, this amendment is a significant step toward the
study of judicial behavior of the Council. The reason for this change
was that one Grand Justice in his dissenting opinion criticized
sharply the majority opinion and was warned by some Grand Justices
not to issue it. After he willingly accepted responsibility for his
dissenting opinion by affixing his name to it, the Rules were
amended. 91
On the other hand, there is one amendment which restricts the
issuance of different opinions. The only different opinion which is
permitted is one with respect to the principle of the syllabus of
interpretation. 92 In other words, collateral issues are beyond the scope
of different opinions. This reflects the continuing threat posed by
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

ld.
Article 17.
Interpretation Nos. 115, 128, 130.
Rules, art. 7, para. 2.
Yao, supra note 61, at 57.
Rules, art. 7, para. 1.
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some narrow-minded Grand Justices within the Council and the
continued influence of the traditional unanimity doctrine.
Another restriction, however, is far more serious. According to
article 7 of the Rules, the different opinion must be submitted within
five days after the syllabus of the interpretation has been passed by
the Reviewing Bench. This is a severe restriction to the development
of a different opinion not only because the time is unreasonably
limited, but also because in practice it often renders the submission
impossible since the syllabus of the interpretation and the supporting
opinion are sometimes not reached in the same conference, even
though the Rules require that the latter shall be attached to the
former. 93 How could a different opinion be submitted without first
reviewing the supporting opinion of the case? Furthermore, the final
stage of the whole process is the Grand Bench, which is held on the
Friday fortnight. Even if the different opinion is submitt~d on the
final allowable day, there are still nine more days before the Grand
Bench convenes. There are simply no grounds for imposing such a
time restriction.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that although, theoretically,
a shift in positions between the Reviewing Bench and Grand Bench
where the final vote is conducted should not happen, as the former
should have already resolved all disputes and decided the content as
well as the supporting opinion of a case, there have been at least two
occasions in which the original conclusion reached in the Reviewing
Bench was questioned later and had to be revised in order to be
passed by the Grand Bench. 94 This indicated that post-Reviewing
Bench "line-up" switches are still possible and that different opinions
may in this context play some role in changes of votes. The extent to
which this is significant is not known.
The major purpose of the different opinion until now has been one
of clarification. Without it, decisions sometimes do not include the
ideas, the fears, or the explanations behind the Council's conclusion.
Whether the issuance of different opinions will eventually serve as
"the intelligence of a future day" 95 is yet to be established. This might
be attributed in part to the fact that only a limited period of time has
passed.
Since the judicial biographies or histories which have tremendous
value in the studies of the American Supreme Court are totally
93. Rules, art. 3, para. 2.
94. Different opinion of Interpretation Nos. 130, 137.
95. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 !1928).
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nonexistent in the Republic of China, research on the process of law
making within the Council has been severely limited. This, coupled
with the fact that, unlike the system of law clerks in the United
States Supreme Court, the Grand Justices conduct their research and .
draft opinions themselves, makes research difficult. The opinions of
former law clerks of the United States Supreme Court that often
contain enormous information for the study of the American Supreme
Court is simply lacking. 96 In addition, the self-made Rules also
explicitly direct that anything relating to the disposition of a case,
such as the assignment of the application, discussion or debate in the
conference, and any other related procedure should be kept secret. 97
These are difficult problems that must be overcome if a more in-depth
examination of the decision-making process of the Council of Grand
Justices can be achieved in the future.

96. E.g., H. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE C1974).
97. Article 12.
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CHAPTER V
PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. General Survey of the Output
Against the backdrop of these structural and procedural aspects
of the Council of Grand Justices, we now proceed to a review of its
output. Having begun its serious work in 1949, after moving with the
nationalist government to Taiwan, its workload in the area of
constitutional review has been comparatively modest. Of the 167
applications lodged with the Council up to the end of 1975, only
thirty-five have resulted in decisions. However, another sixteen
decisions relating to the uniform interpretation of statutes or
ordinances may be added to the above category because they have had
constitutional significance. The work of interpreting statutes or
ordinances has thus far occupied a large amount of the business of the
Council. Compared with the 167 applications for constitutional
decisions, there were 1145 cases in which there have been
applications for uniform interpretation. In other words, the Council
has done more in the field of maintaining the unity of laws than in
the field of constitutional review. The situation, of course, substantially diminishes the practical significance of the Council as a
constitutional organ.
Table I gives a chronological representation of cases decided and
indicates which parties initiated each application since the inception
of the Council. The Table shows that after two cases were decided on
January 6, 1949, there were no interpretations rendered until May
21, 1952 because of the chaos and political confusion in mainland
China.
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TABLE I
<INITIATION OF CASES)
Year

Applicant

Total

Executive

Legislative

Control

Assembly
!national!

Assemblies
lloca/J

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
19.71
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

1
0
0
2
6
6
3
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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0
0

0
0
0
1
4
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
0
0
3
12
7
4
1
4
2
0
2
2
0
1
1
0
3
2
0
0
2
1
0
1
0
1
0
2
2

Total

28

1

13

2

3

2

5

1

55
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After resumption of business, twenty-six constitutional
interpretations were rendered in the period between 1952 and 1955.
The number is quite impressive compared with the scarcity of
decisions in other years. The reason for this concentration might be
that there were so many pending constitutional questions that needed
to be dealt with in order to cope with the aftermath of the defeat in
the civil war. After that, although judicial review of constitutional
questions did not disappear altogether, it certainly became
infrequent. This may be due in part to the stringent procedural
requirements imposed by Governing Law and Rules. The Council's
strong pro-government leaning in the past may also have deterred the
individuals from filing constitutional grievances.
More than half of the decided cases were considered as a result of
applications by the Executive Yuan. Considering the enormous and
still expanding number of agencies subordinate to the ~xecutive
Yuan, this number is not surprising. Nevertheless, after 1972, the
more active role played by the Executive Yuan seems to have
changed. The real reason behind this change is unclear. On the one
hand, we may assume that every agency has made serious efforts to
study and resolve constitutional problems as they have arisen. And,
when conflicts involving two agencies developed, out-of-court
settlements have been preferred. On the other hand, the
constitutionality of either statutes and administrative ordinances
might not be of much concern to the public officials who applied them.
These officials rarely were concerned with whether the people's rights
or liberties were illegally invaded or limited.
Since the regular session of the National Assembly is held ninety
days prior to the expiration of each presidential term, the period in
which it can perform its prescribed duty is rather limited. Thus, it is
not surprising to find that only two cases, one even proposed jointly
with the Executive Yuan; were raised by the National Assembly. On
the other hand, legislation is the major work of the Legislative Yuan,
which may revise any statute at any time it deems necessary to do
so. The need to ask the Council of Grand Justices to decide the
constitutionality of a statute seems very remote if the Legislative
Yuan performs its legislative duty properly and scrupulously. The
result is that only one case decided by the Council was initiated by
the Legislative Yuan. 2
1. Interpretation No. 85.
2. Interpretation No. 29. It is interesting to note that this application questions
the extent of authority exercised by the National Assembly.
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It is striking that over 2 million cases reached a variety of courts
during this period, 3 yet only two cases produced applications to the
Council on the part of the ordinary courts. 4 Several reasons can be
given for this. One is that judges of these courts, who were trained
and socialized in a civil-servant-oriented establishment, have traditionally had general confidence in the constitutionality and legality of
the statutes, and, accordingly, find it hard to accept judicial review.
Another is the unfamiliarity with the procedure of application. Lower
courts always thought they were required to go through each higher
court in the hierarchy to certify their cases. Such passivity notwithstanding, applications from the regular courts have been steadily
increasing since 1970. 5
Although the "Rules of Order" (which were superseded by the
"Rules Concerning the Conduct of Business by the Council of Grand
Justices" [hereinafter referred to as "Rules"] after the promulgation
of the Governing Law) allowed a local government agency to apply
directly to the Council, the local assemblies on two occasions referred
their cases first to the local executive department, the provincial
government, and then to the Executive Yuan, the superior of the
provincial government, for the purpose of seeking constitutional
interpretations from the Council. 6 The Governing Law of 1958
explicitly provided that any central or local government agency is
entitled to file with the Council. Thereafter, three cases were
initiated directly by local assemblies. 7 Because they were decided in
close succession within a period of three months in 1957 and because
there have been no further local assembly applications for constitutional interpretation since then, their significance as affirmative
precedents was minimized considerably. However, interpretation No.
122 perhaps opened a new avenue for the local assemblies. It was

3. There have been 2,444,887 cases during 1958-75 period; see CHUNG-HUAMING-KUO TUNG-CHI-TI-YAO (The Statistical Data of the Republic of China)
780-803 (1975).
4. Nos. 47 & 89.
5. There were only four applications from the regular court before 1970, all of
them concentrated between 1952 and 1954. Since 1970, every year has seen cases in
which the courts have applied for review. Although the numbers are not large (1970: 1;
1971: 1; 1972: 2; 1973: 2; 1974: 2; 1975: 1), this shows an encouraging trend implying
that more judges realize the importance of judicial review and have attempted to use it;
see CHUNG-HUA-MING-KUO TUNG-CHI-TI-YAO (Statistical Data of the Republic of
China) 773 (1974), 811 (1975).
6. Interpretation Nos. 38 & 42.
7. Interpretation Nos. 74, 75, & 77.
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filed by the Control Yuan at the request of a local assembly, though
there was no formal administrative relation between the two bodies.
The absence of full knowledge of the procedural aspects of the related
statutes and rules contributed largely to this irregularity.
Closely related to the standing of local assemblies is the question
of whether the local government, and its executive branch, can bring
a case into the Council. Since both the Governing Law and the Rules
provide for application by a "local government agency," the local
executive branch should presumably be included. However, there has
not yet been a single case filed by a local administration. Have no
such administrations ever intended to ask for a constitutional
interpretation? A close examination reveals that four cases brought
by the Executive Yuan were begun by a local administration. 8
Another one filed by the Control Yuan was also a result of local
administration initiative. 9 Apparently, local administrations, like
local assemblies, had insufficient knowledge of their privilege to file
suit directly.
In addition to the Executive Yuan, the Control Yuan has also
maintained a high percentage of applications to the Council. Since it
has established ten committees, corresponding to the ten ministries
and commissions in the Executive Yuan, in order to check on the
work of the latter, and since it may send a corrective measure to it, 10
the constitutionality of an administrative ordinance of course is under
its purview. Although other important functions, such as impeachment and censure, are directed at the illegal conduct of public
officials, in the process of investigation the constitutionality of a
statute or administrative ordinance may also be called into question.
In addition, the fact that the Control Yuan receives complaints
directly from the people provides it with numerous opportunities to
find constitutional problems with statutes. Moreover, since it is
highly respected, being a century-old tradition that now makes it
equal to other central government agencies, its requests generally
carry more weight and are well received by the Council of Grand
Justices.

8. Interpretation Nos. 17, 24, 35, & 115.
9. Interpretation No. 20.
10. The Executive Yuan, or its ministries and commissions, is required to act and
report to the Control Yuan within two months; see article 25, the Law of Control.
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Among the 167 applications, 110 were filed by individuals. Table
II marks the increase in this category over the twenty-year period
until 1975, although the pattern of growth is not always constant.
The relative growth and consistency in the year-to-year figures
underscore the gradual importance this category of applications
occupied as an indication of the institutional stability of the Council.
It makes up a full two-thirds of all docket applications. However,
because only one application succeeded in producing a constitutional
interpretation through 1976, 11 this result doubtlessly discouraged
further applications by the people. The remaining applications were
dismissed more readily than certiorari petitions are denied by the
United States Supreme Court. 12
TABLE II
APPLICATION FILED BY INDIVIDUALS, 1950-1975

Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Number
1
0

6
2
5
0
0
0

2
1

5
4
5

Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Total

Number
6
4
7

3
6
15
14
11
0
1
0
6
110

6

Before the promulgation of the Governing Law in 1958 only
government agencies were entitled to be parties in constitutionality
proceedings; the refusal of an individual's application was an inevitable consequence. However, there were eight cases in which a
government agency filing with the Council was for an individual.'"
11. Interpretation No. 117, rendered in 1966.
12. Between 85 and 90 percent of all certiorari applications have been denied, and
few of them received reasons for the denial; see H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 177 <19751.
13. Interpretation Nos. 1, 4, 5, 30, 68, 74, 75, & 77.

A

CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF

JumciAL

REVIEw

103

Although the Governing Law explicitly grants standing to the people,
almost all applications by individuals have failed. They were
dismissed as frivolous or rejected for not meeting procedural or
jurisdictional requirements. The most common ground for rejection
was that the individual had either not exhausted regular legal
remedies or had not indicated what specific constitutional rights had
been violated. The significance of granting standing to individuals
has thus been seriously minimized by rigid procedural barriers.
However, an encouraging sign seems to have emerged since 1976,
the beginning of the current term of the Council. Four applications
filed by individuals were accepted and decided. 14 Significant in their
own right, they represent all the cases decided by the Council in 1976
and 1977. Although the decisions were unfavorable to the applicants,
the fact that the applications were accepted indicates that the
attitudes of the current Grand Justices may differ to some extent
from those of their predecessors. Among the five cases successfully
filed by individuals with the Council, the first and third were
initiated by substitutes for either the National Assembly or the
Legislative Yuan in an attempt to challenge administrative orders
preventing them from filling vacancies. 15 The interests they intended
to protect were limited to a special area and thus were not shared by
the general public. However, the second, fourth, and fifth cases were
effected by ordinary people; 16 the subject matter addressed by the
latter two was the constitutionality of judicial precedents rather than
a statute or administrative ordinance. This represented a rather more
liberal attitude toward the rigid procedural requirement imposed by
the Governing Law, which had stated that only a law or ordinance
could be questioned in the case of an individual's application. This
positive change may again make the Chinese people more willing to
go to the Council when they feel that their constitutional rights are
being violated.
Table III gives the government agency's or the individual's
grounds for seeking a constitutional interpretation. About half of the
applications involved "doubts and problems concerning the Constitution." In other words, clarification of the meaning of words or
sentences in the Constitution has been the major concern of the
Council. Judging the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances,
which one usually consideres the Council's more important function,
14. Interpretation Nos. 148, 150, 153, & 154.
15. Interpretation Nos. 117 & 150.
16. Interpretation Nos. 148, 153, & 154.
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has been at issue in only six cases, and these were either filed by the
Control Yuan or by an individual. The paucity of these cases clearly
implies that attention paid by the executive branch to the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances is inadequate. Therefore, without
granting standing to the individual, the protection of an individual's
constitutional rights would be virtually meaningless. The performance of the Control Yuan is particularly admirable, and it hopefully
will continue vigorously to proclaim the theme of protecting human
rights.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

TABLE III
NUMBER
rounds. of proceeding
Doubts and problems concerning the constitution ...................... 26
Conflicts between central government organs .............................. 2
Constitutionality of statutes ..... .... ..... ....... ....... ..... ..... .......... .. ... .... 3
Constitutionality of ordinances ..................................................... 3
Others ............................................................................................. 22

The early fear that channeling into a judicial forum conflicts
between government agencies which were fundamentally political in
character would jeopardize the sound development of the democracy
has proved to be groundless. Only two cases belong to this categoryY
Conflicts among the five Yuans usually are resolved by negotiation in
a conference conducted by the President. 18 Almost all other conflicts
have been settled before coming to the Council. It thus seems that
government agencies have not found the Council a convenient or
necessary forum in which to resolve conflicts among themselves. Only
as a last resort is application to the Council considered.
Conflicts between central and local government agencies are
conspicuously absent from Table III. This may be due to the fact that
the Kuomintang controls both the central and local governments. It
also may be due to the fact that local territory has always been under
the very close supervision of central officials, and any conflict that
arises would be resolved quickly. Furthermore, the local government's ignorance of the procedure for bringing an application directly
to the Council has contributed significantly to their submissiveness.
17. Interpretation Nos. 3 & 76. The decision of No. 76 did cause some political
criticism. It declared that the combination of the Legislative, Control Yuans and
National Assembly amounted to a parliament in the western countries. Some members
of the Legislative Yuan, thinking that only their organ qualified for this match,
criticized this decision vehemently.
18. See Chapter III, at 125-26.
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A meaningful examination of judicial review in any particular
country cannot be made merely on the basis of constitutional and
other legislative provisions. It has to delve into the detailed work of
the responsible court - in the case of the Republic of China, the
Council of Grand Justices. Since the system of judicial review
originated historically in the United States, a comparison of some
selected Chinese decisions with their American counterparts will
afford the reader a better understanding of the actual function of the
Council and of the practical effects of its work.
The court's decision in a civil law country is extremely brief and
abstract. It generally begins with a reference to the applicable code
provisions. This is followed by a short statement of facts, and then by
a conclusion of fact and law. A full analysis of either the facts or the
law is rarely found, which makes a detailed comparison with the
American judicial decision very difficult. The interpretations rendered by the Council of Grand Justices are no exception. Still, the
extremely abstract quality of those decisions was mitigated somewhat
after the majority opinions of the Council, as well as any separate
opinions, were presented to the public after 1958. The separate
opinions have been particularly useful, because they often provide a
detailed study of the facts and law and sometimes reveal valuable
information about the internal functioning of the Council.

B. Selected Decisions
1. Ex Post Facto Doctrine
Of the thirty-nine constitutional interpretations, three have
related to the ex post facto principle. According to article two of the
Criminal Code, "an act is punishable only if expressly so provided by
the law in force at the time of its commission." In addition, the same
article further provides that if the laws at the time of the trial are
different, the law most favorable to the offender shall apply.
Nevertheless, the application of this principle has been limited to
ordinary criminals as a result of these three interpretations. Those
criminals who commit a crime of a political nature will be prosecuted
with the heavier punishments specified in the Statute for Punishment
of Rebellion, even though it was promulgated after their acts were
committed. Not only will such criminals be more severely punished, 19
19. For example, article 100!1) of the Criminal Code provides that a person who
"undertakes to destroy the national polity, seize state territory, change the Constitution by illegal means or overthrow the government" may be punished with imprisonment for not less than seven years. But article 2( 1 l of the Statute for Punishment of
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but they will also be tried by a military court as the result of the state
of siege declared over the whole territory of the Republic of China on
May 20, 1949.20
The term "state of siege" is used rather than "martial rule." The
difference lies essentially in the divergent attitudes between a
common and civil law system toward the origin of this emergency
measure. The former emphasizes the suspension of the rule of law,
whereas the latter seems to regard the emergency as an effective
threat against public safety and order. In short, the criterion in
deciding the extent of seriousness influenced by the emergency is
different in these two systems. As a result, the prerequisite for
imposing martial rule in the United States is either that the civilian
courts are closed or they can no longer perform their function
properly. 21 This condition does not apply to a state of siege, under
which the civilian courts may still function and only those crimes
against national security, the constitution, and the public safety and
order are under the jurisdiction of military courts. The civil and
military powers within the government work side by side in a spirit of
cooperation and do not have to be substituted one for the other as in
the case of a common law country. 22 Another major difference should
not be ignored. The executive and/or the legislature in civil law
countries has the final word as to whether an emergency situation
Rebellion makes capital punishment mandatory for the same offense. Although
according to article 100(2) of the Criminal Code, a person who "prepares or conspires to
commit the above offense" is punishable with imprisonment for not less than six
months and not more than five years, article 2(3l of the Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion proscribes for the same offense a penalty of imprisonment for not less than 10
years.
20. This proclamation automatically carried into operation the whole body of
Martial Law. Article 8 specifically provides that during the period of enforcement of
Martial Law the military organ may try, by itself, certain offenses including those
against the internal and external security of the state and those against public order
and public safety.
21. Traditionally, the fact that civil courts are open has precluded the use of
martial law. However, the doctrine has undergone a revision, because the nature of
modern war has changed; it is still possible for the civil courts to open even in the
actual fighting zone, and whether the function of the courts is obstructed should be the
real criterion. See Warren, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes
of Civilians to Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 AM. L. REV. 195, 201 (1919!. Robert
Rankin also cited a list of supporting articles on this point; see R. RANKIN, WHEN
CIVIL LAW FAILS 181-84 (1939).
22. For details, see C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 86-87
<1948).
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has arisen; the courts assume this function under the common law.
"Politically speaking, this means that a political body, an admittedly
partisan organ, has the ultimate authority in continental jurisdictions whereas a non-partisan authority, which presumably tries to be
non-partisan, has the last word in Anglo-American jurisdiction."23
All these features of the state of siege have appeared in the
Republic of China since 1949. The President has the power to initiate
the state of siege, although such power is subject to confirmation by
the Legislative Yuan. The latter by resolution may ask the President
to terminate the state of siege. The regular court provides no check
upon the declaration of the state of siege either at the time of the
proclamation or after the disturbing conditions have been allayed.
The structure and functions of government and the way of life of the
people are left almost unaffected by the state of siege. Citizens who
mind their own business may hardly know that a state o( siege has
been declared. Moreover, non-military personnel are subject to a
military trial only if they commit one of three types of crimes:
sedition and espionage; theft or unauthorized sale or purchase of
military equipment and supplies; or stealing or damaging public
communication equipment and facilities. These restrictions upon the
enforcement of military trial are expressly provided in article 2
known as the "Measures Governing the Classification of Cases to be
Tried by the Military Judicial Organs Themselves and Those Which
are to be Turned Over to the Courts in the Region of Taiwan during
the Period of State of Siege."24 Significantly, the scope of the military
judicial organs' involvement has gradually been reduced with a series
of revisions in 1954 and in April and September of 1967.25 A fair
consideration of the state of siege in the Republic of China should
never fail to take account of these special "Measures."
It is understandable that a military court has been assigned to
impose heavier punishments for crimes of sedition or espionage since
the threat of war from the People's Republic of China has never
ceased. Furthermore, subversives were always being sent to Taiwan
23. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY
240 (1941l.
24. There would be more than one hundred kinds of crime to be tried by military
courts if the government strictly followed the provisions of Martial Law.
25. For a fairly detailed investigation of the causes of these revisions, see I. Wang,
The Delimitation of Criminal Jurisdiction among Military and Civilian Judicial Organs
in the Region of Taiwan during the Last Twenty Years, in FA-LIN-YUEH-KAN
ERH-SHIH-CHOU-NIEN CHI-NIEN-LUN-WAN-CHI (Symposium in Honor of Twentieth Anniversary of China Law Monthly) 423-37 (8. Yu ed. 1970).
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to undermine its strength in the hope that it would fall under the
control of the Chinese Communists. No government in a similar
mortal struggle ever dealt less severely with rebels. 26 The right of
self-preservation of any country is paramount. Nevertheless, the
necessity of refusing application of the ex post facto doctrine in cases
covered by the Statute for Punishment of Rebellions is another
question which needs to be carefully examined.
In both Interpretation 68 and 80 the military courts decided that
the defendants joined the Communist Party only for a short period
and disassociated themselves from it by either severing their
connection or even by joining the Nationalist army. Furthermore, the
defendants were also cleared from having any kind of relationship
with the Communist Party since 1949 when the Nationalist Government resettled itself in Taiwan. The facts in the case resulting in
Interpretation 129 went further. Defendants were punished for their
membership in the Communist Children Regiment when they were
only thirteen years old. The punishment is hardly acceptable in light
of article 18 of the Criminal Code, which provides: "An act committed
by a person who has not completed the fourteenth year of his age is
not punishable."
A consistent issue in these three Interpretations was the
continuous nature of the crimes. For those people who had once joined
the Communist Party, regardless of the duration of their membership
and regardless of their age when they joined, there were only two
grounds for exemption from later criminal prosecution: either by
surrendering themselves to the authorities or by possessing other
facts proving that they had definitely disassociated themselves from
any subversive organizations supported by the Communists. These
two criteria have not been given equal weight. The record clearly
shows that inactivity for ten or more years does not constitute
convincing proof of disassociation from the Communist Party. Even
joining the Nationalist army was not enough. What other more
significant action could one take to prove he no longer works for the
Communists? There thus seems to have been only one viable
alternative available to those defendants, namely, to give themselves
26. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus at the outbreak of the
Civil War, and his action was later approved by both the Congress and the Supreme
Court. During the first World War, various treason laws such as the Espionage Act of
1917, the Sedition Law of 1918, and provisions in the Selective Service Act and the
Trading with the Enemy Act were promulgated. For these statutes, see 12 STAT. 326,
40 STAT. 217, 553, 76, 411.
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up to the law if they wished to be assured that they would not be
punished in the future.
The Statute of Punishment of Rebellion does not require that
those surrendering defendants be exempted from punishment; rather
it gives the prosecutor full discretion to prosecute or not. During the
trial the judge also may, in his discretion, reduce or remit the
punishment based on the relevant facts of a particular case. Since
surrendering oneself to the authorities does not necessarily ensure a
favorable result, a person once involved with the Communist Party
may be reluctant to expose himself to the government. If the
involvement was rather minor and of short duration - in other
words, if the individual neither engag.ed in any active role nor
contributed substantially to the Communist Party - then any past
criminal conduct may be treated leniently. It is natural that such an
individual simply wants to forget about these unfortunate incidents
and tend to his present life. The danger he or others like him might
pose to the present government is negligible as he has had no relation
at all with the Communists for decades. In addition, the possible
harm done during his past, short involvement can hardly be
ascertained. The defendants in Interpretation No. 129 could hardly
have been expected to have had actual knowledge about the nature of
Communism when they joined at thirteen years of age. It is quite
possible that theirs was merely a group action with other children,
ordered either by their parents or teachers. The question of voluntary
participation may also be applied to the other two Interpretations in
light of those defendants' involvement for a short period of time and
their later inactivity.
Accordingly, the doctrine under which middle-aged people may
still be sent to prison for political indiscretions committed during
their tender years - a doctrine upheld by the Council of Grand
Justices - has its inherent risks and for practical purposes is
unnecessary. Its effect as a deterrent to the spread of subversive
actions of the Communist Party is open to serious challenge.
On the other hand, the threat of government prosecution in the
indefinite future against those persons may give them no alternative
but continual cooperation with the Communist Party. Because the
consequences of being punished by the Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion may prove to be very severe, other kinds of criminals may
also use this threat as a form of blackmail to seek an individual's
cooperation when his past record is revealed to them.
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The opinion of the Council was vehemently attacked by a
dissenting opinion in the case of Interpretation No. 129. 27 Its
argument mainly lies in the exemption of criminal culpability for
individuals under fourteen years of age. Whether the ex post facto
doctrine should be applied to the political case was not mentioned at
all.
One objection to retroactive laws is that they fail to provide fair
warning. Only if an individual is warned that his contemplated acts
are punishable can society expect him to refrain from acting. A
related objection is that such laws frustrate a reliance upon existing
law. The essential unfairness of retrospective legislation has long
been recognized. Retroactivity was condemned in both the Corpus
Juris of Justinian and the canon law, and such condemnation formed
the basis of the principle phrased in modern European law in the
words nulla poena sine lege. 26 The feeling was so strong that two
future justices of the American Supreme Court29 among the Framers
even went further by proposing that the prohibition against ex post
facto laws was unnecessary: "there was no lawyer, no civilian who
would not say that ex post facto laws are void in and of themselves." 30
Moreover, it is believed that the ex post facto clause of the United
States Constitution embraces all retrospective laws or laws governing
or controlling past transactions, whether they are of civil or a
criminal nature."31 However, the Supreme Court soon construed the
constitutional language in a much more restricted sense. In the 1798
case of Calder v. Bull/ 2 the high bench established that the ex post
facto clause only reached laws that are criminal in nature. Although
this restrictive application was challenged at times, 33 it has been
followed by practically all of the courts.
27. When both the Nos. 68 and 80 were decided, different opinions were not
allowed to be published. Therefore, there is no way to know if different opinions were
ever raised in conference.
28. SeeM. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 425 <1927l.
29. They were Oliver Ellsworth and James Wilson.
30. Brant, The Madison Heritage, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 13, 32 <E. Cahn ed.
1963).
31. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 1339 <189ll; Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REV. 315
<1922); Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex post-Facto
Laws, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 539 <1947). But there is some evidence to suggest that "the
terms 'ex post facto' related to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently
restrain the states from retrospective laws in civil cases." Quoted in E. DUMBAULD,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 194 n964l.
32. 3 Dall. 386 (1789).
33. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380 (1829l; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213
<1827).
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An answer to the question of whether a particular statute
involves criminal or penal matters so as to fall within the ban against
ex post facto laws has never been easy. Test oaths prescribed after the
Civil War, whereby office holders, teachers, or preachers, were
required to swear that they had not participated in the revolt, were
held invalid as an attempt to punish those individuals for past
offenses. 34 However, statutes authorizing the deportation of a resident
alien because of his prior membership in the Communist Party have
been construed as involving a civil remedy and not a criminal
punishment. The highest tribunal in a leading 1924 case, Mahler v.
Ebby/5 held that deportation was neither a criminal proceeding nor
punishment; it was simply a refusal of government to harbor persons
it does not want, no matter how harsh the consequence may be for the
individual concerned.
The reasoning has been criticized throughout the history of the
United States. James Madison attacked it in speaking of the first
Alien and Sedition Act proposed in the United States:
if a banishment of the sort described be not a punishment, and
among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine
a doom to which the name can be applied. 36
Others, such as Justices Brewer, Brandeis, Black, and Douglas, have
also been unable to accept the views of different majorities of the
Supreme Court. Justice Brandeis expressed it most succinctly when
he said that deportation may deprive a man "of all that makes life
worth living."37 Justice Douglas also spoke of it as "punishment in the
practical sense."38 Although the majority of the Supreme Court was
still unwilling to depart from the rule that deportation is not penal,39
it is apparent that the Court thought it was a bad rule when the
severity of deportation was fully considered. Thus, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, admitted: "And since the intrinsic
34. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (18671; ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333
(1867).
35. 264 u.s. 32.
36. As quoted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Field, Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.,
149 u.s. 698, 759 (1893).
37. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (19221.
38. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (19521.
39. In a 1953 decision, the high bench said: "It would be an unjustifiable reversal
to overturn a view of the Constitution so deeply rooted and so consistently adhered to."
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1953).
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consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it
might fairly be said also that the ex post facto clause even though
applicable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to deportation."40
Since the regulation of an alien's entry and presence has been
traditionally vested in the Congress, other branches of government
deferred strongly to this policy. This may explain why the protection
given aliens by the Constitution has not been guarded by the courts
with the vigor and clarity that a citizen might expect. As for the
ordinary American citizen, punishment based solely on his or her
membership once in the Communist Party has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. In Scales v. U.S.:' Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for
the majority stated that only that person who was an "active"
member of a subversive group with knowledge of its illegal advocacy
and had a specific intent to bring about a violent overthrow of the
government may be punished. In other words, merely "a nominal,
passive, inactive or purely technical" membership cannot be deemed
sufficient to convict. 42
The element of active membership was arrived at on the grounds
that (1) the penalty imposed by the statute was too heavy for
Congress to have intended to punish mere passive members and (2)
Congress would have imposed an objective standard of membership as
fixed by the law itself, rather than allow it to vary with the standards
of membership as subjectively viewed by the organization. 43 By
rejecting the defendant's contention of first amendment guarantees,
the Court found that a sufficient and significant form of aid and
encouragement to the illegal acts in the required elements of active
membership in addition to knowledge of illegal advocacy and specific
intent were sufficient to permit the imposition of a criminal sanction.
It is apparent that what the Court has done is to define the
Internal Security Act of 1950 in such a way as to avoid more difficult
problems of constitutionality. It would seem that conviction for the
mere act of becoming a member in such an organization might raise
the constitutional problem under the First Amendment. However, the
40. ld.
41. 367 u.s. 203 (1961).
42. Id., at 220.
43. Id., at 222. It is also helpful to avoid conflict with the Internal Security Act of
1950 § 4(0, 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1958), which provides: "Neither the holding
of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute
per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or of any other
criminal statute."

A

CoMPARATIVE STUDY oF JumciAL REVIEw

113

distinction between active and nominal membership may be not at all
clear. "Active" can indicate a degree of activity ranging from fulltime
work on the organization or on behalf of it, to attending meetings, or
merely paying dues. The government stated in its brief that:
Even though the activity be expanded along lines not otherwise
illegal, . . . active support of any kind aids the organization in
achieving its own illegal purpose. The solicitation of membership,
the contribution of financial assistance, or the handling of public
relations all help the organization and therefore indirectly
promote its objectives. . . . Any activity which contributes to the
ultimate success of the undertaking bears its share of responsibility for that outcome. 44
As the importance of a government's self-preservation is fully
recognized, use of certain means to control the advocates of violent
overthrow is clearly justifiable. The Chinese Communists occupying
the mainland since 1949 have never abandoned the ultimate goal of
bringing Taiwan within the domain of the mainland. Regardless of the
fact that the term it used has changed from "liberate" to "unify," the
posibility of mainland China's employing armed force to achieve its
aim has been real. Before the mainland acquires the capability to
launch a fatal attack on Taiwan, she will not hesitate to take any
actions which can create internal problems of which she may take
advantage. Taught by the painful lesson of losing the mainland and
facing a continuing threat of infiltration and subversion from an
oppressive Communist China, the Republic of China in Taiwan has
every reason to believe that Communism is a real menace to its
security, and that some extraordinary actions could be justified under
this special condition. It is clear that laws must be strong and
effective to enable the government to protect iself from the dangerous
Communist Party. At the same time, we must be careful lest, in an
effort to safeguard the government and its principles, we do not
blindly destroy them. It is necessary to pass laws and to render
judgments which do not "take on the character of ex post facto laws,
but which are nevertheless strong enough to accomplish the purpose
of self-preservation.
In addition, it is clear that the decision on membership of the
Communist Party will probably have a negligible effect as a
44. Quoted in Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 115
<196ll.
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deterrent. Most of those people who might otherwise bear the effects
of the decision are idealists, and an idea cannot be suppressed simply
by legislation or judgment. Such people will join the Communist
Party and remain in it unless and until their illusions concerning it
are shattered. Only education, not the force of government, can
accomplish this. On the other hand, to those ex-Communists who
have rejected Communism for a number of years and who now lead an
honorable and worthy life, the present Interpretations make no
provision for forgiveness; such people may now lose their jobs, their
friends, their homes, and maybe even their wives and children simply
because they once were members of the Communist Party, whether or
not they knew of its illegal purpose when they joined. By these
Interpretations a person can express no political opinions without
spending the rest of his life in dread of punishment. He can join no
organization of any type, no matter how harmless or legal at the time
of joining, without being forever afraid that some day in the far
distant future, past membership in that organization will be grounds
for prosecution.
According to the dissenting opinion of Interpretation No. 129,
after more than ten conferences, the Grand Justices had originally
decided upon the following criterion: there had to be proof of the
ex-Communist's knowledge that the Party had an evil purpose or of
his agreement with any such purpose that it might have had and
proof that he joined the Party voluntarily.45 This reasoning was
finally rejected. It reflects, however, a more balanced argument and
should serve as the direction to be followed in the future.
2. Freedom of the Press
According to the Publication Law, the administrative agency
may impose an "injunction" or withdraw a license from a particular
publication when a violation occurs. In addition, it may issue a
warning, levy a fine, confiscate, and take other measures. 46 This
administrative injunction may last no longer than one year and has
to be confirmed first by the Government Information Office of the
Executive Yuan.47 The Information Department of the Taiwan
Provincial Government or Taipei Special Municipality has full
discretion for other less serious administrative penalties. Since every
45. See SZU-FA-YUAN TA-FA-KUAN HUl-l CHIEH-SHIH-HUI-PIEN <The Collection of Interpretations Made by the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan)
316 (1977).
46. Art. 36.
47. Art. 403(3).

A

CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF

JumciAL

REVIEW

115

new magazine and newspaper has to be registered at its local
government and confirmed by the provincial or Taipei special
municipality government before its issuance, the responsibility of
enforcing the Publication Law naturally falls to those agencies. The
license is issued by the Government Information Office of the
Executive Yuan upon confirmation. Thus, only this highest government agency is entitled to withdraw the license of a publication.
Among the grounds for issuing an administrative injunction are
those crimes which incite a person to commit offenses against the
internal or external security of the state48 ; interference with public
functions, voting, or public order'9 ; and offenses against morals or
religion. 50 Except for those violations relating to the national security,
others have to be rated as serious enough to warrant administrative
action. 61 There are only two conditions in which the license may be
withdrawn: if someone commits a crime against national security and
is thus sentenced, and it can be shown that his criminal act was
influenced by a publication, or; if the major content of the publication
is punishable for offending against morals and its publishers have
already received three administrative injunctions but continue the
violation. 62
Considering the possible undersirable result of empowering an
administrative agency to restrict the freedom of the press which is
guaranteed explicitly by the Chinese Constitution/3 the Control Yuan
asked the Council of Grand Justices to interpret these related
provisions of the Publication Law. The Council avoided the central
question of whether they are in conflict with the freedom of press or
48. Offenses against the internal security of the state are the crimes stated in
article 100(1) of the Criminal Code which appeared in note 19. Offenses against the
external security of the state include those of a person who "communicates with a
foreign state or its agent with intent that such state or another state begin war with
the Republic of China"; "communicates with a foreign state or its agent with intent to
subject territory of the Republic of China to such state or another state"; "discloses or
delivers a document, plan, information, or other thing of a secret nature concerning the
defense of the Republic of China" to a foreign country and others; see art. 103-15, the
Criminal Code.
49. Criminal Code, art. 135-41 for the offenses of interference with public
function; art. 142-48 for the offenses of interference with voting; and art. 149-60 for
the offenses of interference with public order.
50. Offenses against morals were provided for in art. 221-36 of the Criminal Code.
Art. 246 is the provision concerning the offenses against religion.
51. Art. 40(3)(4!, Publication Law.
52. Art. 41.
53. Art. 11 provides: "The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing,
and publication."
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not; instead, it skillfully laid the constitutional groundwork for the
administrative injunction and for the withdrawal of a license. The
"necessity conditions" contained in article 23 of the Constitution
were cited to give sanction to these administrative actions. This
article provides that: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the
preceding articles [including freedom of the press] shall not be
restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent
infringement upon the freedom of other persons; to avert an
imminent crisis; to maintain social order; or to advance the public
welfare." As for the method of restricting the freedom of the press, the
Council simply indicated there is no limitation provided in the
Constitution. Furthermore, access to the Administrative Court also is
granted for possible infringement of the peoples' right, and this
protection is considered adequate by the Council.
Chapter 2 (articles 7-24) of the Chinese Constitution sets forth an
impressive array of constitutional rights, freedoms, and ideals.
Article eight guarantees personal freedom 54 ; article ten deals with the
freedom of travel and settling residency; article eleven guarantees
freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication; article fourteen
establishes freedom of assembly and association; article sixteen
grants the rights of presenting petition, lodging complaints, or
instituting legal proceedings. All of these guarantees are, however,
explicitly counterbalanced by the possible restrictions under specific
54. It provides: "Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in the
case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained
otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or
punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be
resisted. When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a
crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing inform the said person
and his designated relative or friend of the grounds for his arrest of detention, and
shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial. The said person, or
any other person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served within 24
hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said person for trial. The
court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor shall it
order the organ concerned to make an investigation and report first. The organ
concerned shall not refuse to execute, or delay in executing, the writ of the court for the
surrender of the said person for trial. When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained
by any organ, he or any other person may petition the court for an investigation. The
court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investigate the action
of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance with law." This is the
most lengthy provision in the Constitution. Its detailed prescription reflects the heavy
emphasis which its drafters placed upon it.
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necessary conditions provided in article 23 as mentioned above. 65
There can be no doubt that the Chinese Constitution was based on
respect for the individual. But one must bear in mind that this
emphasis need not imply nor does it manifest itself in the term of
individualism as understood in the United States. "Almost all modern
nations at least pay lip service to guarantees of human rights. But
there are significant differences in what people mean by freedom in
different cultural, political and academic worlds and in the ways they
integrate freedom and consciousness of rights with law and public
interest consciousness. These cultural factors, in turn, affect enforcement policy and judicial thought and behavior patterns."56
Traditionally, as we mentioned in Chapter II, the Chinese people
have stressed social concerns, rather than individualism. 57 This
remains true today. "Opposition to the public good or to group
consensus in favor of assertion of individuality is viewed as unprincipled and reprehensible egotism. Freedom traditionally, and also
literally, meant the freedom to behave as one pleased without
considering others and was thus abhorred by the general public."58
This conception of freedom continues to affect the contemporary
Chinese perception of the relationship between the values of law and
the individual. The fulfillment of one's duties according to one's place
in the status hierarchy under Confucian teaching, rather than the
recognition of the rights and fulfillment of the goals of the individual
person, was pervasive and imperative. Indeed, there was no word for
a "right" existing in the Chinese language until the intercourse with
55. The imposition of legal restraints upon the constitutional rights of the
individual is not limited to the Chinese Constitution. Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany, art. 2, provides: "Everyone shall have the right to the free
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or
offend against the constitutional order or the moral code." For other similar
restrictions, see art. 5(2), art. 9(2), art. 18. Article 12 of the Constitution of Japan
provides: "The freedom and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall
be maintained by the constant endeavour of the people, who shall refrain from any
abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them
for public welfare." As for the enumerated civil rights, their exercise may also be
limited for the public welfare. For example, art. 22 provides: "Every person shall have
freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent
that it does not interfere with the public welfare."
56. Been, The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of Expression in Japan, in
the CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 209-210 <D. Henderson, ed. 1968).
57. At 35-38.
58. Been, Freedom of expression in Japan with Comparative Reference to the
United States, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 99, 101 <R. Claude ed. 1976).
What he said about the Japanese culture on this point also applies to Chinese culture.
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the West in the late nineteenth century. "In such a context,
self-realization is achieved by fulfilling duties to others with a
correlative expectation that others will do likewise. This mutual
awareness is of diffuse, interpersonal responsibilities, rather than of
clearly and narrowly defined duties, as in American law."59 Even
though the West recognizes the notion of "duty," it does so in a
somewhat negative way; "to do something because it is a duty is often
thought to indicate that the action is not done freely, but because one
has to."60
Under this traditional influence it is not surprising to find that
even though all the constitutionally guaranteed rights were enumerated together, these rights are still not as significant as the four
specific necessary conditions in article 23. Surely this provides a safe
shield for the government from attacks made by civil rights groups. 61
Almost without exception, any specific restrictive statute would be
held constitutional if it were challenged in the Council of Grand
Justices. It is, of course, admitted that the Council should not, under
the guise of judicial review, usurp legislative power and that,
accordingly, in some areas it should not examine a legislative choice
of means. There is, however, a vast difference between the latter type
of judicial self-restraint and the abstention from judicial review that
has characterized the Council of Grand Justices.
It is recognized that one of the basic principles of the Western
idea of the rule of law is that one whose legal rights have been
violated by an administrative action may challenge the legality of
that action in a court of justice. But the Chinese Constitution
explicitly distinguishes administrative actions from civil and criminal
suits, and an Administrative Court has thus been established. 62
The Republic of China is not the first country with a separate
administrative court; this separation originated in France. Before the
revolution, France had an unhappy history of judicial interference
59. ld., at 102.
60. Id., at 104.
61. The public welfare clauses in the Japanese Constitution have often been
utilized by the Japanese Supreme Court as the counterbalancing weight on the scale
against the specific constitutional freedom at issue, and their use is concluded by
Professor Masami Ito as a "panacea for curing the alleged unconstitutionality of the
law." See The Rule of Law: Constitutional Development in LAW IN JAPAN 205,
229-30 <A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
62. Article 77 provides: "The Judicial Yuan . . . shall have charge of civil,
criminal, and administrative cases. . . ." The Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan
further elaborated this by providing in art. 7: "Judicial Yuan shall establish Supreme
Court, Administrative Court. . . "
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with administrative process in general and the obstruction of
necessary administrative reforms in particular. Judges attempted to
conserve their own privileges and prerogatives. This succeeded in
fixing in the French mind a deep-rooted antipathy for judicial
expansion and a strict interpretation of the theory of separation of
powers. This resulted in the establishment of a specialized administrative court independent of the regular judicial hierarchy and
possessed of the exclusive power of adjudication with respect to
administrative acts. 63 Several other European countries including
Germany, Italy, and Austria, have adopted a similar system since
that time. In short, this separation has prevailed in civil law
countries. As the judicial system of the Republic of China was heavily
influenced by the pre-war Japanese system, which in turn was
modeled after the German, it is not surprising that an independent
administrative court was established.
In addition to the existence of such attitudes as revulsion and
distrust on the part of the administrators toward the judiciary, there
also are some fundamental differences between administrative and
regular civil or criminal adjudication. The nature of administrative
adjudication is such that it cannot be separated from the public power
of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the exercise of administrative
power sometimes involves broad discretion. Hence, situations may
arise when it becomes necessary to bend private interests in favor of
public interest. When such a necessity arises, it is not always
apparent to regular judges. Therefore, it is claimed that administrative suits should be heard by those who are intimately versed in
matters of administration. 64
Since administrative agencies carrying out measures by virtue of
their official function were under the authority of the Constitution
and the law, lawyers from civil law countries further argued that the
agency's executive efficacy would be penalized as a result of
subordination to judicial functionaries, especially if administrative
63. For detail, see B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE
COMMON LAW WORLD 1-18 (1954). As for the desirability of introducing certain
French standards of administrative control in the United States, see Cake, The French
Conseil d'Etat - An Essay on Administrative Jurisprudence, 24 AD. L. REV. 315-24
(1972). Indeed, the Task Force of the Second Hoover Commission in the United States
urgently suggested some form of administrative court system for the United States
federal government; see H. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 269.
64. When the United States recognized the merit of the administrative court
system, the Court of Claims was established in 1855 and the Tort Claims Act of 1946
was passed which, under certain circumstances, made the government responsible for
the actions of its servant being tried in a specialized court.
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measures were placed under the control of a judiciary charged with
the duty of deciding whether a particular administrative action was
legal or illegal, proper or improper. 65
A characteristic of the Chinese tradition also contributes to the
adoption of a separate administrative court system. Historically,
when citizens pressed for relief from infringement of their rights by
public officials, or when they sought to restore their rights or to
defend their interests, almost the only recourse open to them was to
draw up a petition. Through the system of memorials, the people's
requests were heard and decided by a responsible public agency or by
its superior through internal administrative supervision. This process
provided an opportunity for the administrative agency to correct its
mistake and thus avoided the possibility of embarrassment resulting
from a public trial. In fact, since both administrative and judicial
functions were exercised by local magistrates alone, it was simply
impossible to bring suit against the government in court. This initial
internal proceeding today has been formally incorporated into a
.statute. Before presenting a suit to the Administrative Court, one
generally has to make an administrative appeal and re-appeal to the
competent higher authorities. 66
There is no doubt that through this procedure the burden of the
Administrative Court has significantly been reduced. However, it
may also be attended with some undesirable results. Under this
system the challenged administrative act is reviewed by the very
administrative agency which issued the particular administrative act,
or by its supervising administrative authority. In either case, the
reviewing agency can hardly be expected to make an unbiased
decision. 57 Moreover, the appeals andre-appeals are generally handled
65. See B. ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE
OF JAPAN 120-21 (1978).
66. In addition to appeals grounded in a dissatisfaction with the decision of
re-appeal, a person is also entitled to bring action to the Administrative Court if the
competent authority hearing his re-appeal fails to make a decision within three months
after the institution. This is significant in view of the prevalent problem of case delay
in the court; see Art. 1 (1), The Law of Administrative Proceedings. A similar procedure
also exists in West Germany. A prospective plaintiff has to follow a "remonstrance"
procedure, or ·an "appeal" (Widerspruchl to the administration before applying to an
administrative court, and this takes place before higher administrative authorities; see
Z. NEDJATI & J. TRICE, ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 46 (1978).
67. Taking the period of 1970-1973 for example, the percentage of dismissed
appeals initiated by people was always above 70 percent. The percentage even goes
higher than 80 percent in the re-appeal decision. These data were provided by the
Committee of the Review of the Administrative Appeal in the Executive Yuan.
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by ordinary administrative officials who have not necessarily had
proper legal training, and regular trial procedure is not carefully
followed. The people are not assured the right to be heard, although
the reviewing agency might conduct an oral trial in its own
discretion.
The Administrative Court also has some defects. First, although
security of tenure was provided for judicial judges directly in the
Chinese Constitution, there was no similar provision for Administrative Court judges, who were covered only by statute. Consequently,
the position of an administrative judge could be altered merely by
changing the law. Second, since only one Administrative Court has
been established, it has the function of hearing an administrative suit
only once. Individuals' rights can hardly be expected to receive
adequate protection. Third, since the creation of the Administrative
Court was influenced by a strong bureaucratic tradition (this
assumption can be substantiated by the cases of Germany and
pre-war Japan), the administrative judges were favorably disposed
toward the executive and not inclined to protect the rights of the
people. In other words, the Administrative Court, as it turned out,
frequently served as a part of the bureaucracy that explained,
defended and justified the legality of administrative dispositions to
the people. Accordingly, its underlying purpose, that of providing
relief from the exercise of administrative power which infringed upon
the rights and liberties of the people, has been largely ignored by the
Administrative Court. This may be evidenced by the fact that the rate
of dismissal has never been below 80 percent since 1959.68 The
bureaucratic mentality of judges of the Administrative Court is the
major factor underlying the proliferation of like members. The ratio
of persons with administrative background often surpassed those with
judicial background. Moreover, in terms of career advancement, it is
suggested that the assignment of judicial officers or high-ranking
administrative officials to the Administrative Court has generally not
been looked upon with favor. Therefore, the caliber of the Administrative Court cannot be compared favorably to that of the Supreme
Court.
Since the major function of the Administrative Court is in
practice to justify the legitimacy and lawfulness of the administrative
authority's initiatives rather than to assure citizens' rights, the
responsibility imposed upon it to protect those constitutional civil
68. See Chen, The Administrative Adjudication over the Past Twenty Years, in
FA-LIN-YUEH-KAN ERH-SHIH-CHOU-NIEN CHI-NIEN LUN-VAN-CHI, supra note
25, at 415, 416.
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rights can hardly be expected to have been met. The remedy for this
inadequacy lies not in the abolition of the system of administrative
adjuciation and the transferring of its jurisdiction to a regular court,
as in the case of the United States, but in the meaningful
improvement of its structure and procedure. If all those who handled
the administrative cases had sufficient legal training in addition to
their administrative experience and if the procedures were conducted
with more judicial flavor, such as the extensive use of oral argument
and amending the single-instance system in favor of a two-instance
system in the Administrative Court, the output might possibly be
different.
About two years before the Interpretation No. 105 made by the
Counsel of Grand Justices, the United States Supreme Court first
held that, by virtue of the first amendment itself, courts are the only
body competent to decide whether an administrative action is
constitutional. Central to this case was whether a judicial or
administrative determination on the restriction of the freedom of the
press was desirable. The facts of the case, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day, 69 can be summarized as follows: a publisher of magazines
consisting principally of photographs of nude and semi-nude males
and intended for homosexuals brought an action for injunctive relief
against the Postmaster General who had ruled that the magazines in
question were non-mailable under the Comstock Act. 70 The district
court gave summary judgment for the Postmaster General, and the
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the magazines were
obscene and contained advertisements for obscene materials.
In a six-to-one decision, the Supreme Court set aside the post
office's action. There was, however, no opinion of the Court. Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas, concluded that the administrative procedure through which
the publications were declared nonmailable was not authorized by
Congress, 71 and a contrary conclusion would raise, inter alia, the
69. 370 u.s. 478 (1962).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958), which provides: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance . . . [and an
advertisement of such matter] is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be
conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier. . . . "
The statute goes on to prescribe criminal penalties for violation. The statute's popular
name derives from Anthony Comstock, the Victorian reformer who was mainly
responsible for ita passage in 1873.
71. Several scholars supported this rationale even before the case was decided. See,
e.g., Paul, The Post Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44 (1961); Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some
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substantial constitutional question of "whether Congress, if it can
authorize exclusion of mail, can provide that obscenity be determined
in the first instance in any form except court," 72 without violating the
First Amendment.
The obvious implication of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion is that,
in order for the Postmaster General to ban an article from the mails,
it would be necessary for there to be an action in court against the
publication in question, and only upon a judicial determination of
obscenity could an administrative restriction be imposed. Apparently,
this also holds true for any other administrative agency. In addition,
since we can find nothing in the rationale of Manual Enterprise to
suggest that its principle is confined to the area of obscenity, political
speech should be treated similarly. As a matter of fact, the necessity
for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater in this area.
The preference for judicial evaluation rests in the inherent
institutional differences between courts and administrative agencies
no matter how judicial the administrative proceedings may be. There
are several reasons for this attitude. First, the security of tenure, in
principle at least, frees judges from direct political pressure. Judicial
insulation encourages impartial decision-making. An administrative
agency is rarely insulated as the court. Second, the role of the
administrator is not that of the impartial adjudicator, but of the
expert- a role which necessarily gives an administrative agency a
narrow and restricted viewpoint. On the other hand, courts have a
broader perspective resulting from their general jurisdiction. They
deal daily with a wide variety of situations; their broad experience
helps eliminate the deficiencies that come from single-mindedness. 73
Third, an adversary proceeding in the court sharply reduces the
chances of an erroneous injunction. At such a proceeding the judge
will not only receive a more accurate description of the relevant facts,
but his attention will also be directed to the relevant legal principles.
Manual Enterprises has further significance. The plaintiff, before
litigating in the lower federal court, had already been given an
evidentiary hearing before the Judicial Officer of the Post Office
Department. It might be claimed that this internal administrative
supervision almost amounted to the appeal procedure in the Chinese
administrative process. After that, the differences begin. In contrast
Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PENN. L. REV. 214 (1957!; Zuckerman,
Obscenity: In the Mails, 33 SO. CAL. L. REV. 171 C1960l.
72. 370 U.S. at 497-98.
73. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-23
(1970).
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to the American practice in which the plaintiff may have as many as
three opportunities to argue his case before a comparatively impartial
regular court, the Chinese plaintiff can only present his complaint to
a higher administrative agency and finally to the Administrative
Court, which always reflects a strong pro-government attitude. The
protection provided under the American system is far more complete
than that under the Chinese. Of course, the dissatisfied plaintiff in
China still can as a last resort file his case with the Council of Grand
Justices. But his chance of success is not very bright in view of the
Council's rigid procedure as well as the extreme conservatism
evidenced by its record.
In addition to the constitutionality of the administrative procedure involved in Interpretation No. 105, the administrative temporary injunction and withdrawal of license employed by the Chinese
government to regulate the business of publication has additional
significance. Both were used to prevent a magazine's further publication because of previous performance. Do they amount to "prior
restraint" of the freedom of the press? Or do they merely constitute
subsequent punishment? What is the real difference between them? Is
the freedom of the press absolute? If not, under what condition may a
"prior restraint" be imposed without violating the Constitution?
These questions are analyzed in the following paragraphs.
It is well settled that one necessary condition of the democratic
process is the free interchange of ideas. The right to communicate
ideas is as important in a democracy as any other civil right whether the communication taking place is in spoken or written form.
"Democratic government," wrote Bryce, "rests upon and requires the
exercise of a well-informed and sensible opinion by the great bulk of
the citizens."74 This can be further evidenced by the fact that a
censored press has always been the hallmark of the despot. On the
other hand, one cannot help asking if this freedom is absolute. If not,
what limits are to be placed on publications?
There are, in general, two ways in which governments may deny
freedom of the press. One is by prior legal limitations which prohibit
or otherwise effectively restrain speaking or publication. A system of
prior limitations is essentially a system of censorship, by license or
otherwise, that operates before the fact. The other method is by legal
proceedings that punish persons for speech or a publication which is
alleged to violate statutory standards. In short, this is the distinction
between censorship of speech and punishment for the abuse of speech.
74. I.J. BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 109 <19211.
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These two methods have commonly been referred to as "prior
restraint" and "subsequent punishment."
Because some characteristics of prior restraint make it more
dangerous to freedom of the press than subsequent punishment, the
practice of prior restraint has always been viewed unfavorably. As
Thomas J. Emerson indicated, "under a system of subsequent
punishment, the communication has already been made before the
government takes action; it thus takes its place, for whatever it may
be worth, in the market place of ideas. Under a system of prior
restraint, the communication, if banned, never reaches the market
place at all." 75 In other words, in both cases the social interest in the
advancement of truth is involved; subsequent punishment affords an
opportunity to distinguish between that which contributes to the
policy of open communication and that which in no way contributes to
it. The imposition of prior restraint necessarily shuts out the true as
well as the false. Because prior restraint is purported to be done
indiscriminately and is not limited to particular cases which are the
subject of· complaint, the possibility of abuse is much greater
and the area affected also will be more extensive. Furthermore, it is
easier to impose prior restraint, for it requires only an administrative
decision which can often be made behind a screen of informality and
partial concealment, whereas subsequent punishment is a timeconsuming, expensive, and public process involving compliance with
the protective safeguards of criminal prosecution. Last, but not least,
the danger posed by prior restraint is that the force contained within
this system may drive it toward unintelligent, overzealous, and often
absurd administration. The ability and personality of those persons in
charge of administering prior restraint may be best summarized in
the words of Milton:
If he be of such worth as behooves him, there can not be a more

tedious and unpleasing journey-work, a greater loss of time
levied upon his need, than to make the perpetual reader of
unchosen books and pamphlets . . . . we may easily foresee what
kind of licensers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant
imperious, and remiss, or basely pecuniary. 76
Moreover, the nature of the administrators' work is to find something
to suppress; they cannot be expected to act as disinterested judges.
75. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 648, 657 !1955).
76. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 20-21 (E. Rhys ed. 1927).
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Their careers depend upon the record they make. It thus is quite
natural that they view anything with a high degree of suspicion. This
unhealthy attitude is certainly not conducive to protecting the
freedom of the press.
Although the danger of prior restraint has generally been
recognized, the rule against it did not develop in the West until the
seventeenth century. 77 Prior to that time the Crown in England
exercised the prerogative of licensing the press. Seditious and
heretical books were prohibited, and licenses were required for
printers, importers of books, and booksellers. The number of master
printers was limited, and they were licensed and bonded. 78 In 1695 the
last enactment providing for official censorship of the press carne to
an end. Although the licensing law has not since been renewed, the
law against seditious libel and blasphemy remained unaffected and
has been applied as a basis for subsequent punishrnent. 79 Because the
American colonies were established during the period when England
practiced the licensing system, it is not surprising to learn that
Americans adopted the main features of the English censorship
system in their early history. However, these laws were abolished
completely in the first half of the eighteenth century. 80
The press's freedom from licensing then carne to assume the
status of common law or natural right. Blackstone stated concisely in
1791 that
The Uberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay
77. For an historical development of this licensing law, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 360 (1924). It is interesting to note, however, that
the popular feeling against the curtailment of a free press was not generated by a
realization of the importance of the freedom of press. It was generated by "the petty
grievances, the exactions, the jobs, the commercial restrictions, the domiciliary visits
which were incidental to it" and which resulted in the struggle for the freedom of press.
4 T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 13 (1879).
78. For details, see G. PATTERSON, FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS 17-51
(1939); Holdsworth, Press, Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 29
YALE L.J. 841 (1920).
79. See Harvey Kelley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Statutory Regulation of
Libels on Government, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 453, 454-62 !1941); Shientag, From Seditious
Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11 BROOKLYN L. REV. 125 !1942>.
80. PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 104-15; Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the
Press, 2 MINN. L. REV. 239, 247 (1918).
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what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of
his own temerity. 81 (Emphasis added).
This theory was also adopted by the United States, which incorporated it into the first amendment. However, this concept of freedom of
press evidently implied the possibility of subsequent punishment of
publications, which generated some concern among scholars. It has
been termed too narrow in that it offered no protection from a
reckless criminal prosecution instituted against a harmless publication. As one writer said, "a death penalty for writing about socialism
would be as effective suppression as censorship."82 Accordingly, for the
sake of greater certainty, some have gone further by favoring a
licensing system; under such a system a publisher could be informed
in advance of what is permitted and what is forbidden, thus obviating
the danger of criminal or similar sanctions in the event that his
interpretation of the law is erroneous. 83 Nevertheless, when we
consider the public interest in the long run, this argument that
prefers prior restraint to subsequent punishment is obviously undesirable.
The danger of allowing excessive subsequent punishment to
endanger freedom of the press has clearly been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. In Schenck v. U.S., 84 the Court
somewhat modified Blackstone's definition by declaring that "It may
well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is
not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may
have been the main purpose . . . . "85
Although the doctrine that no previous restraint of publication
can be imposed under the first amendment existed for a long time, it
was not until1931 that the Supreme Court vigorously and effectively
enunciated and gave substantive meaning to what had been hitherto
merely a concept. The statute before the Court in Near v, Minnesota, 86
the so-called Minnesota Gag Law,S7 provided that

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

B.L. COMM. 151-52.
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1942).
See Emerson, supra note 75, at 659.
249 u.s. 47 (1919).
ld., at 51.
283 u.s. 697 (1931).
MINN. STAT. {Mason, 1927) §§ 10103-1 to 10123-3.
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Any person who . . . shall be engaged in the business of
regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating,
having in possession, selling or giving away (a) an obscene, lewd
and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, or (b) a
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or
other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of
such nuisance may be enjoined. . . ."
The articles published by the appellant, a newly established weekly
paper called The Saturday Press, charged that a Jewish gangster was
in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis,
and that law enforcement officers and agencies were not energetically
performing their duties. The charges were made in a crude and
distasteful manner. The state court, after finding that the publications constituted a "nuisance" within the statute, first temporarily
restrained the defendants from further publishing and later perpetually enjoined them from issuing "any publication whatsoever which
is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by
law."88
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority, analyzed
the operation and effect of the statute and concluded that it
effectively amounted to censorship. He pointed out, "The statute
provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for violation of
the court's order, but for suppression and injunction, that is, for
restraint upon publication."89 Adopting Blackstone's theory that this
freedom of the press means "principally, although not exclusively,
immunity from previous restraints or censorship," Justice Hughes
recognized that he who abused the right was responsible criminally
for the public and civilly for the private wrong. "The fact that
the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the
press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.
Subsequent punishment for such abuse as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege."90
The four dissenting Supreme Court Justices, speaking through
Mr. Justice Butler, characterized the decision as giving to the
freedom of the press "a meaning and a scope not heretofore
recognized." It was contended that there was no authorization of
administrative control in advance, but only prescription of an
88. 283 U.S. at 706.
89. Id., at 712.
90. ld., at 720.
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equitable remedy, enjoining the continuance of a business. Since the
publisher was held liable and punished only when he continually
committed some prior misconducts, the statute, theoretically, could
hardly be said to set up prior restraint instead of subsequent
punishment.
This aspect of Near v. Minnesota appears also in the Chinese
system as articulated in its Publication Law. An administrative
temporary injunction and the withdrawal of a license have historically been applied only after a questionable publication had appeared.
Issuance of such orders was thus based on the past performance of a
particular newspaper or periodical. However, when we consider the
actual operation of these procedures and their resulting effect on the
press, they must be labeled as serious prior restraints. Punishment
was summarily dispensed by administrative officials without any
other of the protections provided in ordinary criminal cases. The
situation is better in the United States, because a judge assumes the
responsibility. But even in the United States there is no jury trial and
other procedural safeguards are also absent. Therefore, it is natural
that "under such circumstances any publisher seeking to avoid prison
would, in sheer self-protection, have to clear in advance any doubtful
matter with the official w,elding such direct, immediate, and
inimpeded power to sentence. The judge would, in effect, become a
censor. "91
The importance lies in the fact that, though there is no restraint
before the publication is issued, there are prior restraints as to future
issues. Such restraints are not directed at a particular wrongful
passage. but at the entire life of the newspaper or periodical. They
tend to suppress protected as well as unprotected speech. Thus, the
severity in the traditional concept of prior restraint also appears in
the case of subsequent restraints. Accordingly, the power to enjoin
subsequent issues of a periodical because of misconduct in previous
issues in effect becomes a prior restraint of the sort forbidden by the
First Amendment in the United States.
Although freedom from prior restraint through censorship now is
part of the freedom of the press, this general principle of freedom may
have to give way in the United States in certain special circumstances. In some exceptional cases, prior restraint would have been
recognized. Plato emphasized the need of protecting the masses from
unpleasant truths and the "immoral" lies of poets. 92 In American
91. Emerson, supra note 75, at 654.
92. See Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 GEO. L.J. 30 (1965).
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constitutional history, Mr. Chief Justice White wrote in 1918: "It
suffices to say that, however complete is the right of the press to state
public things and discuss them, the right, as every other right enjoyed
in human society, is subject to the restraints which separate right
from wrongdoing." 93 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota
also pointed out that the protection even as to prior restraint is not
absolutely unlimited. 94 Obscenity, the security of the community from
incitements to acts of violence, the overthrow of the government by
force, and certain other obstructions and publications during time of
war were listed as instances where prior restraint could be imposed. 95
These four exceptional situations are almost comparable to those
enum·erated offences that warrant the imposition of prior restraint
provided in article 32 of the Chinese Publication Law.
When comparing the Chinese practice with that of the United
States, we must bear in mind that until 1949, China had been a
country without the concept of freedom of the press, similar to
England before 1695 and the United States before the First Amendment in 1781. In 213 B.C. the so-called "First Emperor of the Chin
Dynasty," Shi Hwang-ti, burned nearly all the books in China in
order to wipe out old ideas and old loyalties. When crude wooden
blocks were invented for reproducing manuscripts in China about 868
A.D., six hundred years before Gutenberg, the Chinese dynasties
captured the press and used it for their own purpose. The most
notorious case happened in the Ching dynasty, the last dynasty in
Chinese history. It determined to rewrite a "good" history, created an
index of "bad" history books, and murdered seventy historians for
compiling an honest non-Manchu story of the past. One of the most
ruthless literary inquisitions occurred in 1776, the year the Declaration of Independence was created in the United States. A Chinese
emperor, Chien-lung, staged a national literary bonfire. 96 Accordingly, the freedom of the press was a recent doctrine introduced by
westerners along with other democratic ideas into China. The period
of its taking root and further growth has been so short that it is
difficult to reap its fruit. The consciousness of this constitutional right
has been developed neither among the public officers nor among the
people.
93. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 24 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1918).
94. 283 U.S. at 716.
95. ld.
96. See generally, Y. LIN, A HISTORY OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION
IN CHINA (1936).
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Another fact that should not be ignored is that the Republic of
China at Taiwan has always declared itself to be at war against the
People's Republic of China. In addition to the futile invasion on
October 25, 1949, there have been two extensive artillery barrages on
Quemoy, an offshore island off the mainland, in 1958 and 1960,
respectively. Until recently Communist China conducted even-day
firings on this and other nearby islands. Although there have been
several peaceful offers by the Chinese Communists to unify Taiwan
with the mainland, the use of force never has been excluded.
Therefore, the possibility of violence has tainted all the peaceful
gestures of the People's Republic. In view of the geographical
proximity to the mainland and of the fact that, by their own
admission, the Communists have sent saboteurs and other agents to
Taiwan97 (it is understandable that entering a relatively open society
in Taiwan is much easier than vice versa) to aid in a Communi~t
takeover, the government of the Republic of China can justify its
imposition of some restraints upon the freedom of the press even
though it is not engaged in an actual war. After all, self-preservation
is as much the first law of the nature of governments as it is of the
nature of individuals. 98 Destruction of a government might result in
the loss by its citizens of all individual rights and liberties. Since the
Chinese Communists have always been considered the epitome of
political despotism, the Taiwan government remains ever cautious,
viewing the unification of China with its untoward results to be
conceivable. 99 Therefore, the strict distinction between war and peace
has been blurred in Taiwan. After all, the older definition of armed
97. After the so-called re-opening of China in 1971, the Chinese Communist Party
and the State Council respectively established "The Taiwan Office" and "The Taiwan
Unit," and branch offices were also formed in coastal Fukin and Kwangtung Provinces
as well as in Hong Kong and at the PRC's Embassy in Japan. The main plausible
purpose for these units is to speed efforts to topple the ROC government and bring
Taiwan back under Communist control. See Chen, Pekings' Attitude Toward Taiwan,
17 ASIAN SURVEY 903-18 (1977).
98. Along with the American participation in World War I came the Espionage
Acts of 1917 and 1918. However, they have elicited much criticism. For texts, see 40
Stat. 217, 553. For a detailed analysis of the background of these statutes and the cases
under their influence, see E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
AMERICA 44-68 (1963); CHAFEE, supra note 82, at 36-107.
99. Tibet is a vivid precedent. After granting local autonomy and promising not to
alter the existing political system in 1951, Communist China cracked down ruthlessly
on the resistance movement only eight years later; some even referred this suppression
as a crime of genocide. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, TIBET
AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 10-63 (1960).

132

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES

invasion has become obsolete in an age of jet bombers and nuclear
bombs. It may be too late to restrict people's freedom for the
protection of national security after a full-scale war has broken out.
Because the Republic of China is confronting not an internal
democratic movement of socialists and pacifists who believe in social
change by persua~ion, but a tightly organized external power which
has no intention of confining its efforts to a democratic process, some
utterances have to be suppressed. However, action must be in
proportion to the emergency. Also, it cannot be denied that there are
strong incentives for administrative officials to suppress views in
order to cover up mistakes or discourage hostile inquiries. Therefore,
while recognizing the necessity of imposing some kind of prior
restraint upon the freedom of the press, a strong and independent
system of judicial review has to be established as a brake on the
possible excessiveness of the administrative authority.
3. Immunity of Legislative Speech
The Council of Grand Justices rendered an important decision
dealing with the immunity or privilege of a legislator's speech in
1967. It read as follows: "There was no provision in the Constitution
to safeguard the speech made by local councilmen at their session.
The Interpretation No. 3735 rendered by Judicial Yuan did not
contravene the Constitution." The Constitution specifically provided
the protection of freedom of speech for members of the National
Assembly, 100 Legislative,!Ol and Control Yuans. 102 But all of these
bodies are national agencies. The reason for the omission of local
bodies has not been spelled out. A tragedy occurred in 194 7 and
resulted in Interpretation No. 3735 made by the Judicial Yuan (the
Council of Grand Justices had not been established at that time). It
was begun by a rejected proposal of a councilman in Sui County,
Hupei Province, to a woman teacher. Bearing a grudge against her,
he uttered in the county council that she was an unlicensed prostitute
in order to discredit her. Angered and ashamed by this groundless
accusation, the woman teacher committed suicide and left a posthumous letter stating the true facts as well as hoping that the
100. Article 32: "No delegate to the National Assembly shall be held responsible
outside the Assembly for opinions expressed or votes cast at a meeting of the
Assembly."
101. Article 73: "No member of the Legislative Yuan shall be held responsible
outside the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes cast in the Yuan."
102. Article 101: "No member of the Control Yuan shall be held responsible outside
the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes cast in the Yuan."
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councilman responsible would be put on trial for slander. Based on
the application from the Hupei provincial government, the Judicial
Yuan decided in Interpretation No. 3735 that the challenged
statements must bear a relation to legislative matters before the
meeting; otherWise the speaker could be held liable for libel or
slander.
Since the Interpretation was issued before the promulgation of
the current Constitution and since both the current Organic Laws of
the Provincial Assembly and County Council have provided explicitly
that "No member shall be held responsible outside for opinions or
votes cast at session," 103 a problem arises in determining the precise
scope of this legislative immunity at the local level. The facts
surrounding the present decision of the Council of Grand Justices are
somewhat similar to those of Interpretation No. 3735. A councilman
in the Taitung County Council interpellated the county government
about the fact that a personnel official-in the Taitung Health Bureau
had coerced a woman subordinate for an appointment. The accused
person filed suit against the councilman for libel. The Control Yuan
received the petition from the Taitung County Council and referred it
to the Council of Grand Justices for a decision.
The doctrine of legislative immunity had its origin in the
Parliament's struggle for supremacy over the King of England during
the 16th and 17th centures. 104 Members of Parliament often found
themselves confined to the Tower of London for what they had said in
Parliament. After one king was beheaded and another was exiled to
France, the privileges of speech or debate were guaranteed for
members of Parliament in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which
provided: "That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates of Proceedings in
Parliament, ought not be impeached or questioned in any Court or
Place out of Parliament." 105 Although the existence of the parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech and debate was never again
103. Article 33 of the Organic Law of Taiwan Provincial Assembly; article 40 of the
Organic Law of County Council in Taiwan Province.
104. For detailed historical background, see E. MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES,
PROCEDURES AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 67-115 (1976); Z. CHAFEE, THREE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 6-83 <1956); Cella, The Doctrine of
Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a
Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1968);
Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1113, 1120-44 (1973); Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech -Its
Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PENN. L. REV. 960 (1951).
105. CHAFEE, id., at 7.
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seriously questioned in England, its proper scope and application
were issues in numerous cases that followed. In the case of Stockdale
v. Hansard, the English court set forth a classic description of the
scope of the parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech and debate
as it had developed:
By consequence, whatever is done within the walls of either
assembly must pass without question in any other place. For
speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any
other person, or hazardous to the public peace, that member
enjoys complete impunity .106
This frequently quoted dictum was reinforced by the deicision in Ex
Parte Wason. 101 As Mr. Justice Lush of the Court of Queen's Bench
stated: "I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow it to be
doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of
either House cannot be inquired into by criminal proceedings with
respect to anything. they may do or say in the House."' 08 Accordingly,
it is safe to conclude that the immunity conferred by this privilege
against libel and slander is absolute without any qualification in
England.
Since this principle was so firmly rooted, the drafters of the
American Constitution adopted it in article I, section 6, without much
debate. 109 The language contained in thi's clause restricts the
privilege to "any Speech or Debate in either House," which, taken
literally, would appear only to immunize those statements made on
the floor of the Congress. However, the immunity of legislators has
not been confined by the courts to acts performed on the floor of the
chamber concerned. James Wilson, a member of the Convention's
Committee on Style, represented the prevailing view that
in order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick
to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of

106. 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 <Q.B. 1839).
107. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869).
108. /d., at 577.
109. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966); Reinstein & Silverglate,
supra note 104, at 1138-40.
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every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty will occasion offence." 110 (Emphasis added)
The first and leading American decision interpreting the privilege is Coffin v. Coffin.m In this case, Chief Justice Parsons of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court construed the defendant legislator's
defamatory statements, which were made in a private conversation
about matters not then before the House, as outside the legislative
function. The defendant was therefore not entitled to the defense of
privilege. Justice Parsons, however, declared unequivocally a rather
broad doctrine of legislative immunity:
I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or
haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to
the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting
from the nature, and in the execution of the office. 112
The first speech or debate clause case to reach the Supreme Court
was Kilbourn v. Thompson in 1881. 113 The defendant sued several
members of the House of Representatives and the House Sergeant at
Arms for his imprisonment resulting from his refusal to produce
certain documents before a congressional investigation committee.
Citing Coffin as the most authoritative case, the Court enunciated the
scope of the privilege as extending "to things generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it," 114 even declaring that ordering Kilbourn's imprisonment
had exceeded the authority of the House. 115
It would seem, then, from the Court's definition of the scope, that
the speech or debate privilege had been given a somewhat expansive
reading. However, its scope was further extended into an absolute one
in the first half of the century by the American court. In 1931,
Cochran v. Couzens 116 was decided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and the Supreme Court declined to take
review. 117 It held that defamatory words uttered by a United States
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
4 Mass. 1 (1808).
Id., at 27.
103 u.s. 168 (1880).
ld., at 204.
ld., at 189.
42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
282 u.s. 874 (1930).
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Senator on the floor of the Senate in the course of a speech, but not in
the course of debate, whose subject matter did not concern any matter
under inquiry by the Senate, were nevertheless absolutely privileged
under article I, Section 6 of the Constitution and could not be made
the basis for an action of slander in any court. The Court of Appeals
stated:
It is manifest that the framers of the Constitution were of the
view that it would best serve the interests of all the people if
members of the House and Senate were permitted unlimited
freedom in speeches and debates. us (Emphasis added)

Because the issue before the Chinese Council of Grand Justices
related to a local legislative body, it is important to explore its
counterpart in the United States. All but seven state constitutions
provide immunity for state legislators similar to that of article I,
section 6.u9 Absolute privilege has not applied solely at the federal
level; courts have held it applicable both to the state 12() and local
legislatures. 121 In a 1951 decision, Tenney v. Brandhove( 22 the
Supreme Court first considered the clause in the context of a suit filed
against state legislators. The plaintiff, who was summoned as a
witness before a state legislative committee, brought suit for damages
against the members of the committee charging that the defendants
were conducting the hearing to harass the plaintiff and deprive him
of his freedom of speech. At issue was whether the legislative
protection afforded a member of the California legislature constituted
defense to a suit brought under the Civil Rights statute. 123
The Court held that an immunity much like that explicitly given
to Congressmen by the Constitution also existed implicitly for state
legislators. 124 The Court was even more specific in establishing certain
prohibited grounds for imposing liability upon legislators: "The claim
118. 42 F.2d at 784.
119. See G. BLAffi, AMERICAN LEGISLATURES 138 (1967).
120. Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J. Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (1948).
121. Larson v. Doner, 32 Ill. App. 2d 471, 78 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1961). However, some
early cases suggested that a qualified immunity existed in some local legislative bodies
below the state legislature, such as city councils, boards of supervisors, etc.; Greenwood
v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449 (1889); Henry v. Moberly, 6 Ind. App. 490 (1892), and others.
See generally, Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive
Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1910).
122. 341 u.s. 367 (1951).
123. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970).
124. 341 U.S. at 372-75.
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of an unworthy purpose does not destory the privilege." 125 Therefore,
one can go further and state that the privilege in question is an
absolute one, which shields the legislator from liability for damage
done by his acts and statements, made or done in his official capacity,
even though they are knowingly wrong or false and motivated by
personal malice on his part. Although since 1972 in three almost
consecutive cases, United States v. Brewster/ 26 Gravel v. United
States/ 21 and Doe v. McMillan,t 28 the Supreme Court substantially
limited the scope of the legislative privilege as it was previously
thought to exist, the integrity of the absolute immunity of congressional speech within both Houses from libel or slander seem not yet to
have been directly challenged or curtailed by the Court. 129 The
precedents that established absolute privilege in state and local
legislatures are also intact.
The justification for giving legislators absolute immunity from
libel or slander actions is essentially the fear that honest speech
might become the basis of liability. Exaggeration or vehemence of
language may furnish evidence of ill will whose appearance suffices
to prove malice sufficient to support an action. Moreover, a jury may
find that an absence of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of a
statement, however genuine that belief may have been, satisfies the
requirement of malice. 130 Thus, broad definitions of malice and the
difficulty of controlling juries necessitate an absolute immunity from
libel and slander actions.
On the other hand, still recognizing that the underlying reason
for so drastic and rigid a rule is the overbalancing of the individual
injury by the public necessity, it would be preferable that some legal
125. Id., at 377.
126. 408 u.s. 501 (1972).
127. 408 u.s. 606 (1972).
128. 412 u.s. 306 (1973).
129. Under these cases, many activities normally performed by Congressmen were
excluded from protection: members of Congress can no longer independently acquire
information about the activity of the executive branch, nor report such information to
their constituents without risking criminal prosecution. Not only the legislators, but
also many commentators vehemently denounced the Supreme Court for its decisions;
see Ervin, The Grauel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence,
59 VA. L. REV. 175-95 (1973); Cleveland, Legislative Immunity and the Role of the
Presentative, 14 N.H.B.J. 139-55 (1973); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of
Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8
SUFFOLK L. REV. 1020-95 (1974); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 104, at
1148-71.
130. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 453 (1956).
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recourse be available to the individual when a congressman wrongfully sullies his reputation.
Since the fundamental purpose for legislative immunity was to
allow the legislator to discharge freely his responsibilities to his
constituents without fear of executive interference or accountability
before a possibly hostile judiciary, it was not intended for the personal
benefit of the legislator. The privilege exists to protect the interest of
citizens in good legislation. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated,
"legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the
public good." 131 Of course, telling lies on the floor of the Congress does
not promote the interest of the citizen, but the loss of the privilege
would, it is argued, paralyze the legislature. 132 Therefore, a compromise should be sought to protect the exercise of the legislative
function on the one hand and personal interest on the other.
Moreover, the privilege serves as an additional safeguard to assure
separation of powers and the coequal status of Congress. In construing the doctrine of legislative immunity and in defining its scope,
the courts must reconcile the control of the aberrant conduct of
individual legislators with the appropriate measure of respect that
should be accorded a coordinate branch of the government. 133
As the basic purpose of the freedom of legislative activity is the
interest of good government, it can hardly be argued that statements
which the legislator had reason to believe not to be true are conducive
to the proper conduct of legislative business. It seems inconsistent
with justice that we insist that no man be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law and that just compensation shall
be awarded for private property taken for public use, but then permit
a man's often regarded most precious property, his good reputation, to
be taken from him wrongfully without allowing him one iota of legal
redress. Furthermore, it is admitted that slander by a legislator
carries more opprobrium than slander by an ordinary citizen. 134 To
consider every malicious slander uttered by a citizen who is a
131. Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
132. The overriding importance of this privilege is stated by Story, who asserted
that the "other legislative privilege would be unimportant or ineffectual without the
great and vital privilege of freedom of speech or debate." See Note, "They shall not be
Questioned. . . ." 3 STAN. L. REV. 486, 489-90 (1957!.
133. Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 77 YALE
L.J. 366, 385-86 (1967).
134. See Oppenheim, Congressional Free Speech, 8 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, n. 3
(1955-1956).
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representative as within his privilege because it was uttered within
the walls of the legislative chamber, would render the legislature a
sanctuary for calumny.
Most scholars argue that the privilege of legislative immunity
which is a bar to a legislator's civil or criminal action in a given case
does not mean necessarily that he will not be punished for his
transgressions, because, at least in the United States, the legislature
has the power to reprimand or expel misbehaving members. 135
Although the power to punish members is broad, congressional
self-discipline for misconduct has been rare and, as a practical matter,
cannot be relied upon to vindicate those injured by legislative
malfeasance. Congress in this aspect has been notoriously slow and
exceedingly reluctant to apply its own palliatives to instances of
legislative slander. It is said that Congress has only tried eighteen
times to purge itself of its "unhealthy" elements and most of them
involved Southern Congressmen during the days immediately preced:
ing the Civil War. 136 Since the legislative body has not been too much
concerned over ordinary vituperation, it is not surprising to find that
there are almost no cases of either a Senator or Representative being
actually disciplined for saying anything about anybody. 137 As late as
1954, the Senate did condemn one of its members for insulting
language about fellow members. But the charges against the same
Senator for grossly insulting a general in the United States Army
failed to pass the Congress. This clearly indicated that an outsider
receives less protection via legislative self-discipline than does the
legislature's members. 138
Moreover, the suitability of the legislature's making such a
determination is highly questionable. The late Dean Roscoe Pound,
after carefully researching and evaluating what he called "examples
of legislative justice," concluded: "it may be said without hesitation
that in action it exhibits all the bad features of justice without law." 139
The absence of procedural safeguards and appellate review makes a
135. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 5. See generally, Cella, supra note 104, at 37-41.
136. Oppenheim, supra note 134, at 27.
137. See CHAFEE, supra note 104, at 88-89.
138. The only successful case punishing a member for words doing injury to a
non-member is the case of Theodore Bilbo; see Smelser, Legislative Investigation: The
Problem in Historical Perspective 29 NOTRE DAME LAW 163, 190 (1954).
139. He illustrated the following features: (1) was unequal, uncertain, and
capricious; (2) was often influenced by personal solicitation, lobbying, and even
corruption; (3) has always been highly susceptible to the influence of passion and
prejudice; (4) has often been affected by the preponderance of purely partisan or
political motives as grounds for decision; and (5) has been disfigured very generally by
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trial by the legislature itself a more effective method of harassment
than prosecution by the executive in a judicial forum. 140 Of course, it
is conceivable that its undesirable nature becomes more obvious when
the constitutional rights of a private citizen, not its own member,
have been affected.
Since the judiciary in any country, particularly in the United
States, has always borne the institutional responsibility for protecting individuals against unconstitutional violations of their rights by
all branches of the government, judicial review of unconstitutional
legislative action should not be foreclosed whether that action takes
the form of a statute or the conduct of an individual congressman. 141
The historical development of the speech or debate privilege also
evidences that it was developed toward protection against executivemotivated actions rather than private action. Nor does the latter
generally represent so great an intrusion upon legislative function. 142
Therefore, the Court's attitude toward private action, on the one
hand, and executive-motivated action, on the other, could be different.
In this context, it is an unwarranted, simplistic view that all
cases of libel or slander must be unredressed merely because the
defendant is a legislator and accordingly that a petition from the
private citizen who seeks to guard his privacy, his good name, and his
cherished rights from the reckless advance of his legislators must be
ignored. With the legislature at today's level of development, the
original purpose of this legislative immunity securing the precarious
situation of elective assemblies in the face of a powerful executive
branch (often combined with the judiciary) is hardly compelling. The
reason that it still exists is not to favor members in their private
capacity, but to ensure the smooth running and complete independence of the legislature. Therefore, it should be related primarily to the
exercise of legislative duties.
In the classic case, Coffin v. Coffin, 143 mentioned before, the
Massachusetts Court clearly laid out the groundwork for a less
generous view of immunity: "When a representative is not acting as a
member of the house, he is not entitled to any privileges about his
fellow-citizens; nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed
the practice of participation in argument and decision by many who may not have
heard all the evidence and participation in the decision. See Pound, Justice According
to Law, Part II, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-12 (1914).
140. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 520 (1972).
141. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 104, at 1175.
142. Id., at 1172-73.
143. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
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on the same ground, on which his constituents stand." 144 Accordingly,
an action against a state legislator on the grounds that his challenged
statement bore no relation to legislative matters before the chamber
and thus did not pass the test of official conduct or official duty was
upheld.
The Supreme Court also defined the scope of the speech or debate
privilege in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 145 mentioned previously, as
extending only "to things generally done in a session of the House by
one of its members in relation to the business before it." 146 (Emphasis
added.) Only with the case of Cochran v. Couzens 141 was the protection
of privilege exteqded by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to its utmost by closing the door to any challenge based on
relevancy or pertinency.
This approach has been used by other democratic countries.
Article 26 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic provides:
"No member of Parliament may be prosecuted, sought, arrested,
detained or tried as a result of the opinions or votes expressed by him
in the exercise of his function." 148 The Italian Constitution has a
similar provision: "Members of Parliament may not be proceeded
against for opinions expressed or votes given in the exercise of their
duties." 149 The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany goes
even further by imposing a clear restriction upon legislative privilege: "A deputy may not at any time be prosecuted or subjected to
disciplinary action or otherwise called to account outside the Bundestag for a vote cast or a statement made by him in the Bundestag or
any of its committees. This shall not apply to defamatory insults." 150
This was designed to prevent the misuse of parliamentary immunity
as often happened in the Weimer Republic. However, a majority vote
that the deputy involved should stand trial has to be secured from the
B undestag. 151
Certainly the independence of the legislature would not be
impaired by a requirement that when a legislator slanders an
individual, his statement must in some way be related to and justified
by his legislative role. It is unreasonable to argue that legislative
144. ld., at 28.
145. 103 u.s. 168 (1880).
146. ld., at 204.
147. 42 F.2d 783 (1930).
148. See generally, D. PICKLES, THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC 89 (1960).
149. Art. 68.
150. Art. 46.
151. SeeR. NEUMANN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL
REPUBLIC 127-28 (1966).
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privilege should inhere in a legislator even when he is not acting as a
legislator or not engaged in activities related to his legislative duties.
The purpose of the application of a relevancy test, with liability
depending upon the relationship between actions and a valid
legislative purpose, would require legislators to proceed with greater
caution when individual rights are at stake without impairing the
independence of the legislature.
Therefore, the decision of the Council of Grand Justices not to
place the legislative immunity of the local legislator on an absolute
basis can hardly be seriously challenged. We first note that statements made outside the chamber of the local legislature are not
protected by immunity according to the related Organic Laws. 152 Only
those statements made in the session are protected. Interposing a
relevance test as a condition precedent to the exercise of legislative
privilege was the real significance of this decision. Of course,
determining whether a statement is connected with the business of
the legislature may not be easy, since the difference between related
and unrelated is hard to define. A statement may appear unrelated
superficially, but may nevertheless be indirectly related to the subject
matter of the session. Therefore, a broad construction of the scope or'
legislative acts covered by the privilege should be followed. It is not
warranted to hold a restrictive view that only in a matter technically
before the legislature can the assertion of privilege come into play.
"To make any legislative language or conduct before or after a matter
under direct and immediate consideration on the floor unprivileged is
to close off from immunity a wide area of legitimate, defensible, and
necessary legislative activity." 153
Although the decision of the Council of Grand Justices was
justified, the Control Yuan, which had asked for this interpretation
for the Taitung County Council, reacted angrily; it was contrary to its
expectation. A section of five members of the control Yuan was thus
formed to study the materials relating to the legislative privilege of
speech. They even went so far as to call on Kuan-shen Hsieh, the
President of the Judicial Yuan. The opinions of both sides were so
divided that no compromise was possible. 154 As a matter of fact, the
president was not a member of the Council, nor did he have the right
to vote during the conference. His influence is rather limited as we
152. See note 103 and the accompanying text.
153. Cella, supra note 104, at 30.
154. For details, see Chou, The Division of the Control Power and Judicial Power, 19
CHENG-CHIH PING-LUN (China Political Review) 10, 11 <1967).

A

CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF JuDICIAL REVIEW

143

mentioned before. 155 Based on the recommendation of the section, the
Control Yuan reached a resolution calling for the Council of Grand
Justices to reconsider its previous decision. 156 Since the Council has
full discretion in reviewing the application for decision, it was obvious
that it was not persuaded, because it never entertained this question
again.
Eleven years later in December 1978, this question again became
headline news. Following unprecedented gains in the local election on
November 19, 1977, several prominent anti-Kuomintang candidates
successfully made their way to the Taiwan Provincial Assembly'57 as
well as the county executive and equivalent mayoral positions.'58
During an educational interpellation on June 5, 1978, Yueh-chiao Su
Huing, a newly elected but long-time anti-Kuomintang assemblywoman, used some harsh language, such as "lousy," "incapacitation,"
"mental abnormality" against Kuo-chen Feng, Principal of tht:l
Provincial Taichung College of Nursing, about the punishments
suffered by two offshore students in that school. Another assemblywoman, An Chiang, immediately intervened by defending and
encouraging Principal Feng. Su Huing then denounced Chiang as a
"tramp." Although Su Huing apologized to Chiang for using abusive
language, the latter did not accept the apology. After six months both
Chiang and Feng brought action against Su Huing.' 59
Since this dispute has not yet been legally resolved, comments
before the court reaches its decision must be cautious. However, based
on the principle approved by the Council and the attitude of broad
construction towards the legislative privilege of freedom of speech, it
155. See Chapter IV at 88-89.
156. See CHIEN-CHA-YUAN KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Control Yuan), no. 636,
at 6845 (1967).
157. Though the central government has always been cautious not to allow the
Provincial Assembly out of its control, the latter, nevertheless, has broad legislative
power; see Cooper, Political Development in Taiwan, in CHINA AND THE QUESTION
OF TAIWAN 46 (H. Chiu ed. 1979). Its purpose is to polish the stagnant image existing
in the Legislative Yuan resulting from the withholding of re-election for over such a
long period.
158. Among the seventy-seven members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, twenty
are non-Kuomintang (the so-called Independent Person) people. Four of twenty county
magistrates' positions and city mayors also fell into their hands. Although the
percentage of their occupation (20-25%) did not constitute a serious threat to the
Kuomintang rule, it is significant because the Kuomintang nominees have always
controlled over ninety percent of the seats in local elections since 1949. For a detailed
analysis, see Jacobs, Taiwan 1978, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 20-24 (1979).
159. The whole story was narrated in Cheng, A Suit Between Three Women,
SHIH-PAO-CHOU-KAN (China Sunday Time), Jan. 28, 1979.
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seems safe to conclude that Su Huing's speech should receive
sympathetic consideration from the court. 160 Although her language
was improper, even abusive to some people, it was uttered incidentally in the course of debate which related to a matter then before the
Provincial Assembly. It is quite natural that some people tend to be
emotional and have difficulty in controlling their temper. This is an
ethical and personal matter. Following the result of the previous case
ofYu-chiao Huang is highly advisable in this connection. Huang, also
a non-Kuomintang freshwoman in the Provincial Assembly, scolded
the Speaker, Houn-van Ts'ai, over a procedural matter on November
22, 1978 calling him an "s.o.b." A political compromise was reached
and Huang was disciplined by the Assembly itself. Therefore, the
legal procedure is not the only alternative in the case of disputation
between legislators. After all, since local elections are regularly
held/ 61 and the press is free to criticize the behavior of legislators,
there is always the final assessment of the voters. If the public feels
that a legislator has abused his privilege to an intolerable extent, his
or her re-election may be sacrificed; a recall is also possible even
before the expiration of the election term.

C. The Effect of Unconstitutionality
We now turn to the final phase of our analysis, which concerns
the different effects of judicial review under the American and
Chinese systems. After seven years' deliberation, the Council of
Grand Justices on August 15, 1960 rendered Interpretation No. 86,
holding that both the high courts and district courts shall be under
the supervision of the Judicial Yuan. Because of the then-current
judicial structure only the Supreme Court was under the jurisdiction
of the Judicial Yuan, and these two lower courts were components of
the Ministry of Justice, which in turn was a part of the Executive

160. On the basis that Su Ruing had proposed to make an apology to Feng and
Chiang and that she had shown a cooperative as well as repentant attitude during the
trial, she received a four month prison sentence for the crimes of public insult and
insulting a public official pursuant to arts. 140, 309 of the Criminal Code. However, the
sentence may be commuted to a fine at the rate of NT.27 ($.75) for each day of
imprisonment (art. 41 of Criminal Code), China Times, January 19, 1980. The fine was
considered not to be a burden for her. The sentence has been further reduced to two
months when the case concluded. LIEN-HO-PAO (United Daily), July 24, 1980.
161. The term for an assemblyman is four years. In addition, it should be noted that
since the voter turnout is generally high for local elections, political participation is
rather intense and enthusiastic among local residents. The undemocratic practice often
attached to the Republic of China by some foreigners is far from true in this respect.
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Yuan. 162 Since the arrangement not only impaired the integrity of the
judicial system but also made judges in the lower courts susceptible to
possible political influence, criticism of it was vigorous. The decision
of the Council doubtless was a clear answer to this abnormality in the
judicial system and required related statutes to be amended accordingly. Recognizing that its effect was far-reaching, these concerned
governmental departments immediately organized a task force to
undertake the work of amendment, but they produced nothing and,
surprisingly, the old system still remains in operation almost twenty
years later. Since this was the first (in fact, the only) case declaring
statutes unconstitutional in the Republic of China, several questions
need to be answered. Does the decision bind all future litigants or
only those immediately before the Council? Is the newly defined
constitutional structure to be applied retroactively or prospectively? If
the answer is the latter, when does it become effective, the day of the
promulgation of decision or some fixed days later? Will the nature of
a case, for example whether it is civil or criminal, affect the decision?
The theory of constitutional litigation in the United States,
namely, that constitutional issues are dealt with only insofar as they
are relevant to the disposition of a concrete case or controversy,
determines also the effect of adjudication upon a statute that is
invalid. This basic nature of constitutional litigation makes it clear
that review of the constitutionality of a statute takes place only when
judgment in a concrete case occurs. No statute becomes the object
of review aside from a real case. Since a constitutional
issue arises only when it is relevant to the disposition of a case
between opposing parties, the result of the finding that a statute is
valid or invalid gives rise to no special form of decree relating to the
statute itself. In other words, the constitutionality concerns itself only
with the parties to the case but not with the statute itself. Therefore,
according to the classic theory of American constitutional law, a court
in finding invalidity does not repeal or annul the statute but simply
refuses to take the statute into account. The statute remains on the
books and may in effect be reviewed later if the decision finding it

162. The Ministry of Justice has shifted back and forth several times between the
Judicial and Executive Yuan. Originally, it belonged to the Judicial Yuan. A change
took place in January 1932 when it was placed under the jurisdiction of the Executive
Yuan. From October 1934 onwards, it reverted back to the Judicial Yuan. In December
1942, it was again placed under the Executive Yuan. The Ministry of Justice is
comprised of four divisions, a secretariat, and a number of committees. For details, see
CHINA YEARBOOK 102-3 (1977).
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invalid is later overruled or if other elements enter later to validate
the statute.
The Chinese system is based on quite the opposite theory, which
is modeled on Austria's Constitutional Court. Under this system, the
decision of the Council invalidates the statute not only for the
concrete case but generally for all future cases. In other words, when
a statute is judged to be unconstitutional, it is invalidated for
everyone just as if it had been abrogated by a subsequent statute.
Articles 171 and 172 of the Chinese Constitution expressly provide
that unconstitutional acts (statutes as well as administrative ordinances) shall be null and void. The theory of general nullity is clearly
adhered to in respect of the effect. In short, when a statute is declared
invalid, the decision makes it impossible for that law to be enforced
thereafter. It becomes dead, inoperative for all purposes everywhere.
Superficially, these two systems are diametrically opposite each
other. However, these theoretical views do not govern in practice.
When the court adjudicates a statute's constitutionality, it obviously
has decided more than the constitutional issue presented by the
parties to the suit and in .reality has determined the issue of
constitutionality in such a manner that the decision would be binding
should the issue afterwards arise in other cases between entirely
different parties. Because of the force of the principle of stare decisis,
the invalidation of a statute by the Supreme Court of the United
States not only binds the judicial tribunal that ruled on the
constitutionality but also binds the other courts, and all other
branches of the government. 163
A further question may be raised about the retroactive effect of
an unconstitutional statute as to past actions of individuals and of
administrative and judicial officers in reliance on the statute. This is
the area where a somewhat more substantial difference between the
common and civil law systems can be found. Basically, there have
existed two opposing theories, the retroactive and prospective. The
former has been characterized as the Blackstonian theory. According
to it, a judge's duty is not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain
and expound the old one." 164 The court's function, therefore, is to find

163. SeeR. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 295-96
(1941).
164. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1769). Another famous statement made by Blackstone on the next page is as follows: "For if it be found that the

former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence
was bad law, but that it was not law." (Emphasis in original).
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the law as it existed when the controversy ai'ose and to declare it as
being the controlling principle in the case. In this context, by
invalidating a statute as unconstitutional, the court does not annul
but merely declares the preexisting nullity of the unconstitutional
statute. In short, the statute has been void ab initio. 165 The latter has
been characterized as the Austinian theory. 166 Arguing that law is
constantly evolving, John Austin maintained that judges do more
than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling in with
judicial interpretation of the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or
common law terms. 167 Implicit in the Austinian approach is the
admission that when a case is overruled, the earlier decision was, of
necessity, wrongly decided. All the decisions are valid law until
overruled, and all cases decided on the basis of an overruled decision
are not to be disturbed. Retroactivity is abandoned in favor of
prospectivity.
The United States is an outstanding example of the application of
the ex tunc (retroactivity) doctrine. The Supreme Court in Norton v.
Shelby County declared unequivocally that "an unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as though it
had never been passed." 168 Mr. Justice Holmes was one jurist among
those who supported this principle. In 1910, he wrote, "I know of no
authority in the court to say that in general state decisions shall
make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years." 169
Such pronouncements and their frequent reiteration throughout
the years by many courts would lead one to believe that they express
a universally accepted rule of law. A study of the decisions, however,
readily discloses that some courts adopted a different rule where
effect of the unconstitutionality only begins at the time the statute is

165. For this theory, see 0. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE 3-4 (1935).
166. In addition to John Austin, Jeremy Bentham also attacked Blackstone
severely; see J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 546 (1962). Even
one of Blackstone's editors, William G. Hammond, indicated that "no . . . passage of
Blackstone has been the object of more criticism and even ridicule than this." See W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 213 (W. Hammond ed. 1890).
167. For his criticism of Blackstone's retroactive theory, see J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 2:634, 1:36 (1885).
168. 118 u.s. 425, 442 (1886).
169. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
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invalidated. A retreat from traditional retroactive application began
with the legislative divorce 170 and municipal bond 171 cases where the
injustice of complete retroactivity is obvious. 172 Chicot County Drainage District u. Baxter State Bank was the leading case. 173 The Supreme
Court said:
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
. . . These questions are among the most difficult of those which
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified. 174
These departures clearly reflect the inherent defects of the
principle of retroactivity. If a statute is pronounced unconstitutional
from its inception, it should therefore always have been disregarded.
Such a conclusion would throw everything into confusion. It may
have existed for a considerable time and have become the legal basis
for numerous transactions; it simply cannot be reversed without great
hardship to individuals and danger to the legal and social stability of
the community. It is recognized that retroactive overruling has been
unfair to persons who justifiably relied upon previous judicial
decisions. As Mr. Justice Cardozo, the major opponent of the
principle, stated, it "frustrates the reasonable expectations of wellintentioned men." 176 Another major demerit is that the Blackstonian
theory has done much to stifle progress in the law. If the courts
understand that new rules would have full retroactive impact on all
prior decisions despite possible extensive reliance on the old rule and
burdens on the administration of justice, they would be inhibited from

170. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848).
171. Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175; see Thayer, The Case of
Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1891); Reed, The Rule in Gelpecke v.
Dubuque, 9 AM. L. REV. 381 (1875).
172. For details, see Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 916-21 (1962).
173. 308 u.s. 371 (1940).
174. ld., at 374.
175. Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 PRO. N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS'N, 263,294 (Jan. 22, 1932); see also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-49 (1921).
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announcing new rules, thereby perpetuating the life of obsolescent
legal rules. 176
In the criminal procedure area, there have been a series of cases
where the acceptance of the technique of the opposite theory,
prospective overruling, has been in evidence since 1965.m Although
the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the scope of the constitutional commands which govern criminal decisions, it has sought to
limit the effects of those new constitutional decisions by embracing
the practice of prospective decision-making. Beginning with Linkletter v. Walker/ 78 the Supreme Court held that the rule enunciated in
Mapp v. Ohio/ 79 which excludes illegally seized evidence from state
criminal trials, would not be applied retroactively to convictions that
had become final before the date of the Mapp decision. In Johnson v.
New Jersey/ 80 the convictions of two prisoners based upon confessions
which would have been invalid under Escobedo v. Illinois 181 and
Miranda v. Arizona 182 standards were still upheld by the Supreme
Court, because their trial began before the date of those decisions.
This was a shift from a finality of conviction rule to a trial date rule.
However, it did not end here, and a further limit on the impact of
newly articulated constitutional principles was imposed in Stovall v.
Denno. 183 Stovall held that the right to counsel rule at post-indictment
confrontations for identification purposes, which was derived from
United States v. Wade 184 and Gilbert v. California/ 85 applied only to
confrontations which took place after the Wade and Gilbert decisions.
Again the Court shifted from a trial date rule to the date of the

176. See generally, Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REV.
199, 213-14, 218 (1940); Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law - A Problem in
Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REV. 30, 47-56 (1939); Comment, 16 CIN. L. REV.
71, 72 {1942).
177. However, the seed of change was planted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20, as early as in 1956. See P.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 189-90
{1970).
178. 381 u.s. 618 (1965).
179. 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
180. 384 u.s. 719 (1966).
181. 378 u.s. 478 (1964).
182. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
183. 388 u.s. 293 (1967).
184. 388 u.s. 218 {1967).
185. 388 u.s. 263 (1967).

150

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

alleged violation as the criterion for determining who may take
advantage of those new procedural protections. 186
The violation date rule has become the prevailing standard. The
Supreme Court applied it to a number of cases which expanded
procedural rights and improved the method of conducting trials. 187
However, the new restriction imposed upon the traditional retroactive
effect also has its weaknesses. Most of all, it creates situations where
some "similarly situated defendants" have the benefit of the new
decision while those benefits are denied to others. 186 Employing the
violation date rule will even result in different standards for the
protection of constitutional rights being applied to defendants tried at
the same time in the same courthouse for the same offense. Although
the Supreme Court maintained that the parties involved are chance
beneficiaries at an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles
of decision-making, 189 it is, according to some commentators, a
significant departure from the demand of equal justice that similarly
situated individuals be treated similarly. 190 Furthermore, this new
rule puts a premium on delayed or protracted criminal prosecution as
any court quickly bringing cases into a legal proceeding hinders a
prisoner's chance of success in the future. 191 This clearly conflicts with
the constitutional mandate of giving an accused the right to a speedy
trial. 192
In addition to the timing employed to limit the retroactive effects
of unconstitutional overruling, the Court has produced the following
conceptual framework within which the determination of retroactivity will be made in those above-mentioned cases 193 :
186. For details, see Johnson, Forward, The Supreme Court of California, 1967-68,
56 CAL. L. REV. 1612 (1968).
187. E.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1967); Williams v. United States,
401 u.s. 646 (1971).
188. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969).
189. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
190. See, e.g., Rossum, New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court and the
Problem of Retroactivity, 23 EMORY L.J. 381, 404 (1974); Comment, Partial
Retroactivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 239 (1970).
191. The case of Linkletter is the best evidence of this situation. Linkletter's offense
had been committed nine months after Mrs. Mapp's offense occurred. Since his
Louisiana conviction became final a year before Mapp was decided by the Court,
Linkletter became a victim of the new rule as a result of Louisiana's speedy handling of
its caseload.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
193. There has been generated a substantial amount of commentary resulting from
these cases; see Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling,
51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965); Haddad, Retroactivity Should be Rethought: A Call for the
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The certain guiding resolution or the question implicates (a) the
purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards; (c)
the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards. 194
Among these three criteria, the purpose to be served by the new
rule is the foremost consideration. The Court analyzes the purpose of
a new rule in terms of two aspects of procedural process. The first
aspect is that of ensuring the reliability of the guilt-determining
process. The second aspect is that of ensuring respect for the dignity
and integrity of the individual. If the primary purpose of the new rule
is to remedy some aspect of the criminal trial which "substantially
impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions
about the accuracy of guilty verdict in past trials," 195 the Court will
give the rule full retroactive effect. Belonging to this category were
the requirement that counsel be furnished at the trial, 196 the time
when the accused is asked to plead, 197 the rule requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, 198 the double jeopardy rule, 199 and the ruling
concerning the death penalty. 200 Conversely, if the purpose of the new
rule is to halt illegal procedures which in themselves have no bearing
on the reliability of the truth-determining process at the trial, the
retroactive effect will not be applied since a new trial could not erase
the violation to the individual defendant's right which had already
occurred. The purpose to be served in this case is merely to protect the
privacy of the individual or to improve police standards. In other
End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 427 (1969); Mishkin,
The Supreme Court 1964 Term -Forward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Ostrager, Retroactivity
and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289
(1973); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Comment, Linkletter, Shott and the
Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MICH. L. REV. 832 (1966).
194. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1969).
195. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
196. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). It has been followed without
exception in every later case to reach the Court; Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972);
Berry v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 29 (1973).
197. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968).
198. Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972).
199. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
200. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813
(1972); Walker v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 936 (1972).
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words, when individual dignity and integrity are involved, the
retroactive application is not necessarily justified. This group includes search through electronic surveillance201 or in connection with
an unlawful arrest, 202 police questioning leading to a confession, 203 or
the use of incriminating reports filed by the accused. 204 Only when the
purpose of the rule does not clearly favor either retroactivity or
prospectivity will the Court apply a balancing test in which the
second and third criteria come into play. The necessity and desirability of the new rule will be balanced against the extent to which courts
and law enforcement officers have justifiably relied on the old rule,
and the extent of the burden which would be imposed on the
administration of justice by retroactive application. 206
What is most notable when considering these cases in which
retroactivity was an issue is that retroactive application is by no
means a matter of course. Rather, the trend is toward prospective
application. It seems apparent that the Court feels there are not
many areas of constitutionally guaranteed rights remaining that so
affect the truthfulness of the fact-finding process that retroactive
application is required. Two cases may be cited here. The ruling that
serious state criminal trials must be decided by jury was made wholly
prospective, 206 and the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing was
denied retroactive application. 207 Both seem to have involved the
constitutional protections essential to a fair trial.
The merits of prospective application were first recognized in the
1920 Austrian Constitution, which provided that the judgment of
annulment of an unconstitutional statute became effective on the day
of publication of this decree. 208 Therefore, this statute was thought to
have been valid until it was pronounced unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court. In other words, the unconstitutional statute
was not null or void, but merely voidable. Accordingly, the legal effect
which the law had produced was valid. However, the legal result of
the application of this theory was that the decision of the Constitutional Court should not have any effect upon the vary case pending
before it. Recognizing this absurdity, the Austrians made a signifi201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972).
Art. 140(3).
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cant modification in 1929 adding an exception by granting retroactive
effect only on the very case over which the issue of constitutionality
had arisen. 209
The remarkable feature of the Austrian system is that its
Constitutional Court can, if it deems necessary, prolong the validity
of the statute for some duration of time. It has the discretionary
power to order that the statute be annulled on a fixed date
subsequent to the publication of its judgment. The period of
prolongation is limited to no more than six months in the case of an
administrative ordinance210 and one year for a statute. 211 Since the
legislature will be able to enact a statute which is in harmony with
the Constitution and which takes the place of the one that was
abolished during this period, the advantage of avoiding a legal
vacuum is obvious. 212
The benefit of the Austrian practice of postponing the effective
date of an unconstitutional ruling was clearly recognized in West
Germany and Italy. Both countries have developed techniques to
accomplish the same result without formally declaring that the
relevant statute is actually unconstitutional. The period following
which an enactment will be unconstitutional is not necessarily
limited to six months or one year. 213 The so-called "admonitory
decision" is the practice that the Constitutional Courts in these two
countries follow. Instead of declaring a statute unconstitutional, the
Courts of these countries let it be known that unless the legislature
takes action to repeal or amend it in the near future, the statute will
209. As a writer of the Austrian Constitution, Hans Kelsen, admitted, "this
retroactive force . . . was a technical necessity because without it the authorities
charged with the application of the law {that is, the judges of the Supreme Court and of
the Administrative Court respectively) would not have had an immediate and
consequently sufficiently cogent interest to cause the intervention of the Constitutional
Court. . . . It is necessary to encourage them to present these requests by attributing
in case of annulment a retroactive effect." See Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation, 4
J. POL. 183, 196 {1942).
210. Art. 139{2).
211. Art. 140. Turkey and Yugoslavia have similar provision, with only a six
month period for both ordinance and statute; see art. 152(2) of the Turkish Constitution
and art. 245 & 246 of the Yugoslav Constitution.
212. In view of the limited period of time, the criticism that the decision on the
timing was not the interpretation of a constitutional norm, but a political decision,
should not be taken seriously; see Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative
Survey of Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250, 284 (1966).
213. It is said that West Germany indeed considered emulating the Austrian
system literally, but finally abandoned this idea, see Rupp-Brunneck, The Federal
Constitutional Court, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 387, 395 {1972).
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become unconstitutional. 214 In practice, almost every appeal has had a
fruitful result. Soon after the decision or at least within the stated
time, the relevant legislative bodies will have repealed or amended
the questionable provisions or will have replaced it with a new one
conforming to the Constitution. 215 Some have denounced this novel
function as interference with the legislative branch by the Constitutional Courts on the basis of political considerations. 216 In view of the
nature of judicial review which empowers the court to safeguard the
inviolability of the Constitution against all powers, including the
legislative branch, and of the fact that decisions as to whether a
statute is constitutional may often have far-reaching political
importance, the criticism is ill-founded.
Since the Chinese Constitution has not provided an effective date
for an overruling on grounds of unconstitutionality by the Council of
Grand Justices, we must wait to see what answer practice will
provide. As for the choice of retroactive or prospective effect, Chinese
students of its Constitution almost unanimously support the latter
mainly in consideration of the legal order and of the faith people
place in it. 217 The advantage of these three European civil law
countries' practice of prolonging the validity of an unconstitutional
statute was acknowledged by some of them and at least by one
well-known constitutional scholar, C.T. Lin, a three-term Grand
Justice, who strongly suggested following the Austrian practice. 218
214. It is noteworthy that Italian courts have devised several methods of achieving
this objective. They include a recommendation, a kind of peremptory exhortation
sometimes inserted in opinions; a binding suggestion, suggesting the criteria to which
a future law must conform if it is not to be void for unconstitutionality; and the
suspension of publication of a judgment. For details, see Vigoriti, Italy: The
Constitutional Court, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 404, 406-11 (1972).
215. Several important instances in West Germany have been illustrated in
Rupp-Brunneck, supra note 213, at 392-99. As for the Italian cases, see id., at 408-11.
216. Rupp-Brunneck, id., at 400.
217. See Kuan, Several Questions about the Exercise of Power of Judicial Review, 41
FA-LIU-PIN-LUN (China Law Review) 8:3-8 (1975); Lin, A Problem in the Application
of the Organic Law of the Council of Grand Justices, 10 FA-LIN-YUAN-KAN (China
Law Monthly) 2:3-5 (1959); Shih, How to Interpretate the Constitution, 17 FA-HSUEHTSUNG-KAN <China Law Journal) 15-16 (1960).
218. See C. LIN, CHUNG-HUA-MING-KUO HSIEH-FA CHU-TIAO-SHIH-YI (A
Detailed Study of Articles of the Chinese Constitution) 81-82 (1975). Quoting the
suggestion made by Lin, another student of constitutional law, C. Gen, implied his
support in The Study of System of Judicial Review in Our Country, 5 KUO-LI-CHENGCID-TA-HSUEH HSUEH-PAO (National Chengchi University Journal) 271, 304-5
(1962). Perhaps due to the lack of information, nobody pays any attention to the
admonitory function of the Constitutional Courts in Italy and West Germany.
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Because this system not only avoids the undesirable confusion of
sudden interruption of the continuing legal order, a result of an
unconstitutional decision, but also offers both breathing space and
freedom to maneuver, its adoption should be given serious consideration. It is also important that the Council should declare the statute
in question inoperative during the period of legislative deliberation,
regardless of whether it was formally declared unconstitutional, and
should suspend its effective date for a limited period as in the
Austrian practice or direct a strong appeal to the legislature to
correct it as in Italy and West Germany. Otherwise, it seems unjust
that a statute should still be applied after its constitutionality had
been placed in serious doubt by the competent authority.
Because judicial review in the Republic of China has not yet been
firmly established and recognized, the Council of Grand Justices is in
a position to play a leading role in shaping the proper function of this
crucial system. Therefore, in pronouncing a statute unconstitutional,
it should go further by fixing a date for such a pronouncement to be
in effect, rather than vaguely stating that "the statute in question
should be amended to conform with the Constitution" as in the case of
Interpretation No. 86. Otherwise, an undesirable result could follow
when the legislature and executive branches delayed, intentionally or
unintentionally, their required amendment work. In such a case the
Council would merely stand still, unable to resort to anything.
Not only for those countries who have adopted the prospective
principle, but also for the Americans and Germans who have followed
the retroactive theory, the question of the prior validity of an
unconstitutional statute is a thorny one in practice. As indicated
earlier, Austria departed from the pure ex nunc maxim by giving the
concrete case which gave rise to the request for the unconstitutional
ruling; so too have the United States and West Germany. The
modifications made during the last decade by the Supreme Court in
the area of criminal procedure are significant enough to have
warranted a comparatively detailed examination in preceding paragraphs. West Germany also made efforts to solve the problems
stemming from retroactivity as follows. If a statute involves a civil
case, it shall remain in effect despite the invalidation of the now
unconstitutional statute; but if the judgment has not yet been
enforced, it cannot now be enforced. In cases where the judgment has
been enforced by the executive or the party has already voluntarily
paid, there is no restitution claim permitted. In short, what has been
enforced stays enforced, and what has not been paid cannot be
collected. But the picture is entirely different in a criminal case. A
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final criminal sentence based on a voided statute is always open to
review. 219 Anyone convicted under a statute that has now been held
unconstitutional, regardless of when the conviction became effective,
has a right to a new trial, presumably even if he has long since been
released from jail after having completed his sentence. Because of the
great interest of the individual and society in personal liberty and
freedom in the criminal case, the different treatment of retroactivity
in regard to criminal laws is warranted. In this respect, retroactivity
is rather absolute in West Germany as compared with the gradual
restrictions imposed by the United States Supreme Court.
The necessity of allowing retroactivity as to the very case which
generated the request for considering the constitutionality of a
statute has not been fully appreciated in the Republic of China. When
the Legislative Yuan was deliberating over the Organic Law of the
Council of Grand Justices, the opinion of the Committee of Judicial
Affairs, which is responsible for the legislative draft, was that the
original case should benefit from this unconstitutional overruling and
the Law of Civil and Criminal Procedure should be amended
accordingly. 220
However, this proposal was killed on the floor for a variety of
reasons. Some based their opposition on the principle of ex post facto.
Others suggested that this would create a trial of a fourth level and
thus disrupt the legal structure. The most significant attack on this
required amendment procedure was based on its conflict with the
underlying nature of retrial in both civil and criminal procedure.
Only by finding new evidence or discovering new facts which had not
been taken into account in the original final judgment could the
action of retrial be instituted according to the Law of Civil
Procedure221 and Criminal Procedure. 222 Since the decision of whether
a statute is unconstitutional is related to the review of the
constitutionality of a statute, it is thus an abstract legal interpretation and has nothing to do with factual setting. Although this
attitude represented the narrow outlook of the legislators, it pre-

219. Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court, § 79, cited in Cappelletti &
Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation, European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1223, n.47 0966).
220. See LI·FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), 21st, lOth
sess. 51 (1958).
221. Art. 496.
222. Art. 420.
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vailed in the course of debate and finally prevented the passing of the
desirable amendment. 223
The adoption of pure prospectivity doubtless diminishes the
incentive to apply for a consideration of constitutionality since the
party itself cannot expect to realize any benefit from the unconstitutional overruling. This may have contributed to the scarcity of
applications to the Council in the past.

223. See LI-FA-YUAN-KUAN-PAO (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), 21st, 13th
seas. 12-13; 14th seas. 10-11; 16th sess. 52-61 (1958).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Our review of the record of the Council of Grand Justices has
clearly shown that its role in the Chinese political system has been
one of restraint. It has some visibility and prestige, but neither is
especially high. Its relatively low visibility may be desirable,
however. Employing a strategy of restraint in its early period has laid
a firm foundation for its later development. Since the system of
judicial review ·is a political institution transplanted in a foreign
context, it definitely needs time to take root. It is wise to be cautious
in the beginning, for excessive exercise of this novel judicial power
might well result in its destruction.
This may partially explained why the Council of Grand Justice
has generally taken a position of flexible application of the Constitution in the light of special circumstances created by the Government
of Republic of China's removal to Taiwan in 1949, thus serving the
legitimizing function of judicial reviews suggested by Justice
Cardozo.' However, in a few cases, it did try to exercise its function of
checking the power of the executive and the legislative branch of the
government.
Admittedly, American judicial history has amply shown that the
legislature, composed of the people's representatives, has made not a
few oppressive enactments under which people have suffered. It has
also recorded how the judicial branch has protected individual rights,
the rights of minority groups in particular, more than the other
coordinate branches of the government through the system of judicial
review. Therefore, in the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
courts are generally pictured as a buffer and redeemer for the citizen
in his eternal battle against the state.

1. Perhaps it was Mr. Justice Cardozo who initially theorized the legitimizing
functions of judicial review; see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 102-3 (1921). Two Yale law professors, Charles Black and Alexander
Bickel, were the most prominent supporters of this argument; see C. BLACK, THE
PEOPLE AND THE COURT 223 (1960); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 29 (1962). This function also appeared in the Constitutional Courts of West
Germany and italy; see Kommers, Judicifll Review in Italy and West Germany, 20
JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTUCHEN RECHT DER GEGENWART 111, 131 !1971).
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Since it began to function fully in 1952, the Council of Grand
Justices has only once declared in a decision that some statutes are
unconstitutionaJ.2 It goes without saying that this extremely low
figure of unconstitutionality surprises some people in view of the
rapid extension of the boundaries of governmental activities in recent
years. Politicians in the government are inclined to say that the
reason why the Council has refrained from declaring laws unconstitutional is simply that the legislature and executive organs in the
government have been scrupulous of the people's fundamental
liberties. They further maintain that many appeals have obviously
relied on flimsy arguments and have been mainly made for delaying
purposes. However, we submit from the preceding discussion that the
Council has not been in the forefront of the fight for the realization of
civil liberties in the Republic of China. While the Council has
generally paid lip service to the Principle of Chapter II (Rights and
Duties of the People) of the Constitution, it has not struck any
resounding blows for their effective implementation. 3 Does this mean
that total responsibility should fall on the Council? How is this
attitude of self-restraint on the part of the Council to be explained?
Perhaps the answer lies partly in the weight of tradition. Before
the establishment of the Council of Grand Justices, no court had the
power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute or an administrative ordinance. Also, the tradition of civil law which emphasizes the
highly technical and conceptual approach has always permeated the
2. Interpretation No. 86, rendered on August 15, 1960. This record can be
compared with that of Japan. Not until 1973 did the Supreme Court of Japan make the
first clear decision of unconstitutionality (Patricide Case), though it did on two
borderline cases hold governmental actions unconstitutional in 1953 (Sadagami v.
Japan) and 1962 (Nadamura v. Japan). This case has further significance since it also
overturned the 1950 judgment upholding its constitutionality. Of course, the number of
decisions invalidating le~slative acts cannot be the only criterion to test an· efficient
exereise of judicial review. Even in the United States, where the exercise of judicial
review has been considered successful, the Supreme Court invalidated acts of Congress
only twice during its first seventy-five years of existence. Moreover, among the one
thousand cases involving unconstitutional decisions, nine hundred were state statutes
and only about one hundred federal statutes have been invalidated for unconstitutionality. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 280 (1975). This clearly
buttresses the oft-quoted Holmes dictum: "I do not think the United States would come
to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think that the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several states." See 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 Cl920).
3. It is interesting to note that Professor Nathanson arrived at the same
conclusion about the Supreme Court of Japan, Human Rights in Japan through the
Looking Glass of the Supreme Court Opinwns, 11 HOWARD L. J. 318, 323 (1965).
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judiciary. In this context, the reluctance to undertake unaccustomed
socio-political examinations appropriate to constitutional adjudication
is quite understandable. As a result, the Council has often confined
itself to taking judicial notice of the stated object of statutes and has
refrained from scrutinizing them in detail, preferring an interpretation which will support the constitutionality of an act, if more than
one interpretation is posible. In addition, the succeeding appointments of Grand Justices by the same Kuomintang which has been in
power for these thirty years has also made the decision that a statue
or an administrative order is unconstitutional only remotely possible.
Several remedies are suggested here. Lawyers should be recruited for membership in the Council. The qualifications for a Grand
Justice enumerated in the Governing Law do not include experience
of practicing law. This absence doubtlessly reflects the low status of
lawyers and the legal profession in traditional Chinese society. A
lawyer had customarily been called a "litigation trickster" or
"litigation stirrer" - a name hardly likely to uphold the lawyer's
social standing or to inspire bright young persons to join the
profession. Although this picture has gradually altered as a result of
recent industrialization and urbanization that produced enormous
changes in Taiwan's social life and her law and which have in turn
increased the demand for legal counseling, the lawyer still has a long
way to go. Reserving a fixed number of seats in the Council for
lawyers would definitely contribute significantly to their own efforts
to raise their status. After all, lawyers are legal experts who are
presumed to devote many years to the protection of the rights of the
people. It is thus absolutely necessary to have them in the Council as
Grand Justices who bear the responsibility of protecting human
rights. However, as compensation for the sometimes great financial
sacrifice of lawyers, the salary of the Grand Justices should be
reasonably adjusted and, more importantly, the symbolic significance
of the Council should be further strengthened in order to make
appointment worthwhile despite the possible sacrifice it entails.
The Council's other function is to unify the conflicting interpretations of statutes or administrative orders made by government
agencies that do not necessarily relate to the Constitution. This has
become the major work of the Council; judicial review directly related
to the Constitution has been relegated to a position of secondary
importance. Since no such function has been assigned in other
countries' Constitutional Courts, the wisdom for retaining it in the
Council is open to question. Its sole function should be limited to the
task of interpretations directly related to the Constitution.
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Other problems are of a technical and procedural nature. Since
the required quorum for passing an unconstitutional decision is
extremely high, a disproportionate weight is attached to the minority's veto power; this severely impedes the proper exercise of judicial
review. The number required for a quorum and for concurrence
should be relaxed somewhat. In view of the far-reaching consequence
of an unconstitutional decision, a simple majority would not be
sufficient and the two-thirds standard seems a desirable compromise.
The condition imposed by the Council itself which states that only
after the principles or syllabus of the case have been decided (which
do not necessarily accompany the supporting opinion~) can a different
opinion be submitted within five days also needs to be reconsidered.
Not only is the period unreasonably short, but it is unlikely that a
sensible and justifiable concurring or dissenting argument can be
reached before reviewing the full text of the majority's supporting
opinion. The effect of unconstitutionality should also be extended
retroactively to the concrete case which raised the question of .
constitutionality. Otherwise, without the incentive of personal benefit, it is unlikely that anyone would bring an application to the
Council.
However, we have to admit that the success of the system of
judicial review cannot merely depend upon the Council itself. The
Council cannot do what the society itself must do and fails to do. In
other words, the ability of the Grand Justices to influence the course
of constitutional development depends largely on the political and
legal environment in which judicial review operates.
Not only the general public but also public officials lack sufficient
knowledge about the function and the procedure of the Council of
Grand Justices. This may have been the major impediment to the
sound development of a system of judicial review in past generations.
Several explanations can be given.
The system of judicial review is absolutely novel to the traditional Chinese conception of law and government. The doctrine of rule of
law which underlies this system is also foreign to it. Throughout their
history, the people governed not so much by formal law as by a sense
of morality and reason. Morality, not justice, was considered the end
of government. The law was considered merely a tool for the
enforcement of morality. In short, law was subordinate to morality.
Hence, we can hardly expect the Chinese to have developed an
adequate tradition of respect for law. As the basic purpose of judicial
review is to keep government functions within their constitutional
limit, the absence of a respect for law on the part of those who govern
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makes this goal difficult to achieve and at the same time increases
the possibility of public apathy on the part of the governed whenever
their constitutional rights are violated.
The Chinese preference for mediation in various extra-legal
bodies rather than the formal legal procedure to settle disputes also
contributes to the absence of a consciousness of their legal rights. In
the process of mediation, not only have custom and morality been the
guiding principles, but also each side has been urged to make certain
concessions. Thus, parties' rights often have been compromised in
order to reach an harmonious result.
Another factor which has prevented the development of judicial
review in the Republic of China is the traditional and peculiar
relation between the Chinese rulers and the Chinese people. Generally, the Chinese were not bothered by the government so long as their
legal share of taxes was paid and, on the other hand, they did not care
much about the ruler as long as he did not intolerably misuse his
power. Whenever any ruler overstepped his authority, he could be
ousted by the people on the familiar ground that he lost the mandate
from Heaven. But the people never attempted to change their
governmental system by revolution until the twentieth century. In
other words, their interest was exclusively centered on the personal
character of the ruler who held the reins of authority. As a result,
when they overthrew a ruler, they never wished to govern themselves! Not only did national politics seem very remote to the
Chinese people, but even the work of local government did not
interest them, though they may have had some experience in family
matters or even village social affairs. This attitude of indifference to
politics carries weight among the Chinese of today who still desire not
to govern themselves but rather to be well-governed. Therefore, when
any new institution is forced on them, it comes as something
4. A famous Chinese politician and academic observed:
Lincoln's definition of democratic government "of the people, by the people, and for
the people" is in part within the thinking of Chinese philosophers. "Of the people,
and for the people," are essential to their thought. But "by the people," is a thought
left untouched. That is, they believed throughout in the principles that the country
is the common possession of the people, and the politics exist solely for the sake of
their common advantage. But they neither studied the method nor even seem to
have accepted the theory that government must be "by the people." And therein
lies the fundamental weakness of China's political thinking. There is no point in
speaking of the people as the foundation of the country, and then denying them all
powers of participation in politics.
See C. LIANG, HISTORY OF CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT DURING THE
EARLY TSIN PERIOD 10 (1930).
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unfamiliar and artificial. It does not naturally and promptly engage
popular interest and sympathy but is regarded with indifference.
Since judicial review was imported - no trace of this system
having been found in Chinese tradition - a period of transition and
adaptation is understandably necessary. We have to bear in mind that
the present status of the American judiciary and its competence in
the exercise of the power of judicial review is based upon a long
history of 176 years. The Council of Grand Justices, with only 28
years of history, is still relatively inexperienced in exercising the
delicate duty of judicial review. It is unreasonable to expect the
Council of Grand Justices to have attained as noble a status in the
Chinese political process within such a short period as that of the
United States Supreme Court in the American political process in
view of the totally different conditions which have influenced their
respective development. Not only were a fully developed legal
literature of common law and a people brought up on belief in the law
and its courts absent in the Republic of China, but also her legal
education and organized bar association have needed improvement
for years.
Moreover, the exigencies created by the continuing threat from
the other side of the Taiwan Strait have also narrowed the boundaries
of judicial policy-making by the Council. It is understandable that the
right of self-preservation of the Republic of China has always been
given precedence. In fact, when we consider the fact that Taiwan is a
small island with a large and dense population, we have to admit that
any disturbance - economic, social, or political - will spread
rapidly, and it becomes imperative for the government to nip all
problems in the bud before they become unmanageable. At times,
overreaction to danger is a common national response. The violation
of human rights of American citizens of Japanese ancenstry during
World War II can be cited as a clear example.
However, the political environment is undergoing change as the
Republic of China enters its third decade of existence in Taiwan.
Although the declared political ideology and the framework of the
government have changed little since 1949, pragmatism has been
emphasized and a change in substance which is taking the form of
internal reforms is occurring. The failure of the Republic of China on
the mainland obviously taught those now residing in Taiwan a
painful lesson and made them realize that reform was desperately
necessary. This trend spread more speedily after 1972 when Chingkuo Ciang assumed the premiership. In subtle ways he has revolutio~ized politics in Taiwan by functionally adjusting it to both internal
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and external problems. More young people are recruited into the
government, and the government itself has been made more honest
and responsive to the public. Most of all, corruption which has always
been attached to the government of Nationalist China has become
less prevalent. 6
Without this efficient political reform, the impressive record of
Taiwan's economic growth simply could not have been achieved. On
the other hand, the rapid economic growth also has had an
undeniable impact upon the political development. People are the
major beneficiaries when the function of government is made more
efficient and free from corruption and red tape in order to maintain
economic growth. Moreover, the fruit of economic growth has not been
limited to businessmen alone. The economic disparity often accompanying rapid economic growth in other developing countries did not
appear in Taiwan. 6 Her equitable income distribution has obvious
significance: It broke the barriers between different social groups,
whether they existed for a long time or have emerged out of the
economic development.
The rising standard of living in Taiwan has also facilitated a
rapid expansion in education. It is estimated that from 1954 to 1974
the percentage of the population in secondary schools increased
almost five times and the percentage in institutions of higher
learning has increased nearly twelve times. At present, more than
one-fourth of the population in the Republic of China are students more than in England. 7 But success in raising living standards and
providing greater educational opportunities may pose some problems
for the government. When food and reasonably secure jobs can be
taken for granted, other needs make themselves felt. The high
literacy rate also makes the average Chinese able to be better
informed about his political institutions. In addition, the selfgovernment practiced in local governments has habituated the people
to the idea that government is a matter to be discussed, and that its
operation is subject to the criticism of the governed. Under these

5. For an excellent examination, see R. CLOUGH, ISLAND CHINA 33-68
(1978).
6. See Chinn, Distributional Equality and Economic Growth: The Case of Taiwan,
26 ECON. DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 65-79 <1977). It was even said
that there is now a more equal distribution of income in Taiwan than in either the U.S.
or Japan; N.Y. Times, April 12, 1977.
7. Appleton, The Social and Political Impact of Education in Taiwan, 6 ASIAN
SURVEY 703-20 <1976l.
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circumstances, the conditions required for more complete democracy
have been met, and indeed the demand for more open and democratic
political institutions on the national level was voiced. One major
target was in the judicial area, which included the termination of the
state of siege and the transfer of higher and district courts back to the
Judicial Yuan according to Interpretation No. 86. 8
The government at first did not pay enough attention to this new
trend. After unceasingly monopolizing political power without any
serious internal challenge for thirty years, it has accustomed itself to
the status quo. However, a series of diplomatic setbacks since 1971
has weakened the authority of the government and the ruling party.
After decades of political stability, economic prosperity, and international recognition, the survival of the government of the Republic of
China as a politically autonomous entity was threatened. Facing an
unfavorable international condition, the government considered it
imperative to make further thorough reforms in order to accommodate internal demands and improve its image abroad. A series of
political reforms has been put into effect. 9 However, none of them
have directly related to the judicial system in general and judicial
review in particular.
The diplomatic deterioration reached its climax on December 15,
1978 when the United States abruptly severed diplomatic relations
with Taiwan. Immediately after this unfortunate incident, several
task forces were established to undertake the responsibility of
studying further political reforms. One of the major suggestions of
these task forces was the implementation of the Interpretation no. 86
rendered nineteen years ago by the Council of Grand Justices, to
transfer both higher and district courts back to the jurisdiction of the
Judicial Yuan. After few months deliberation, the government
formally announced that the high and district courts will be
transferred back to the Judicial Yuan within a year. 10
8. However, the potential influence of those favoring a more complete democracy
upon contemporary politics should not be overstated. Businessmen, for example, are
concerned mainly with the efficiency and responsiveness of government rather than
political ideology and principles. The public in general is influenced by traditional
cultural factors in which some authoritarian practices are not regarded as undemocratic where individualism is considered less necessary, sometimes even undesirable. For
details, see Cooper, Political Development in Taiwan, in CHINA AND THE QUESTION
OF TAIWAN 76, 55, 72, 73 (H. Chiu ed. 1979). This attitude is also shared by
contemporary young students in Taiwan. See CLOUGH, supra note 5, at 58.
9. Cooper, supra note 8, at 66-69.
10. CHUNG-YANG.JIH-PAO <Central Daily News) April 5, 1979.
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This judicial reform undoubtedly is welcome news; after almost
two decades' delay, the government has finally realized its duty to
implement the decision of the Council and has firmly established the
principle that government, like the people, also has an obligation to
obey the law. Notwithstanding the lateness of its implementation, it
is still a desirable improvement from the standpoint of judicial
independence. It is definitely beneficial not only for the people but
also for the government itself. Through genuine reform efforts a new
image of the government emerges and its power in fact is further
consolidated in the long run. After all, the rule of law cannot be
achieved instantly. It is a process of evolution which may take several
generations as in the western experience, and the important question
to ask about the Republic of China, therefore, is not whether it is
under the doctrine of the rule of law but whether it is moving toward
that goal.
Finding that the government under internal and external
pressure is committing itself to the rule of law, we also detect
increasing evidence of growing popular awareness of the system of
judicial review. Although often not well-informed, and generally not
enthusiastic, some people do value their right to file a constitutional
application with the Council, among other reasons, as affording them
an opportunity to protest against a government violation. The
decisions rendered by the Council since 1976 are all the result of
individuals' applications. Therefore, one of the major services which
the Council has performed so far has been to play a limited role in
educating a largely lethargic public on the importance of their
constitutional rights. For the traditional non-litigiously minded
Chinese, this educational role makes a major contribution to the final
realization of the rule of law.
On the other hand, evidence also indicates a willingness and
readiness on the part of the Council of Grand Justices to review the
constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. So, it too
realizes that the political and social environment is changing and a
new attitude about the function of judicial review is necessary.
In summation, we can safely predict that the outlook for
establishing an effective judicial review in Taiwan is favorable, since
through all these years of diplomatic setbacks, both the government
as well as the people fully realize that only through continuing
political reforms can they reap the rewards of economic growth. The
best defense in a long struggle against totalitarian advances is a
determined effort toward democracy. The existence and the further
development of judicial review is an important index that shows the
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willingness of those who govern and are governed to submit to a
government based on law. This is universally accepted as the final
goal of any modernized democratic country.

SELECTED BmLIOGRAPHY

169

BffiLIOGRAPHY
Chinese Sources
I. Public Documents
Chien-Cha-Yuan Kuan-Pao (Gazette of the Control Yuan) No. 636
(1967).
Li-Fa-Yuan-Kuan-Pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan) 20th, 4st
sess. 50-58; 5th sess. 105-6; 21st, 12th, 14th, 16th sess.
Szu-Fa-Yuan Ta-Fa-Kuan Hui-1 Chieh-Shih-Hut-Pien) The Collection of Interpretations made by the Council of Grand Justices of
the Judicial Yuan), 1977.

IT. Books and Periodical Articles
Chen Kuo-Ch'eng, The Administrative Adjudication Over the Past
Twenty Years in Fa-Lin-Yueh-Kan Erh-Shih-Chou-Nien Chi-NienLun-Van-Chi (Symposium in Honor of Twentieth Anniversary of
China Law Monthly) 415-421 (S. Tu. ed. 1970).
Gen chih-jen, The Study of System of Judicial Review in our Country,
5 Kuo-Li Cheng-Chi-Ta-Hsueh Hsueh-Pao (National Chengchi
University Journal) 271-314 (1962).
Kuan Ou Several Questions About the Exercise of Power of Judicial
Review 41 Fa-Liu-Pin-Lun (China Law Review) 8:3-8 (1975).
Le Chien-Lun Chung-Kuo Chin-Pai-Nien Cheng-Chin-Shih (Political
History of China in the Last Hundred Years), 1942.
Li Chun, The Kung-Ssu-Lu of 1904 and Modernization of China
Company Law 10, 11 Dheng Chi L. Rev. 171-222, 163-209 (1974).
Lin Chi-Tung, Chung-Hua-Ming-Kuo Hsien-Fa Chu-Tiao Shih-Yi (A
Detailed Study of Articles of the Chinese Constitution), 1975.
- - - - - - - - - Chung-Hua-Ming-Kuo Hsien-Fa Shih-Lu (An
Analytical Study of the Constitution of the Republic of China),
1975.
- - - - - - - - - · A Problem in the Application of the Organic
Law of the Council of Grand Justices, 10 Fa-Lin-Yuan-Kan (China
Law Monthly) 2:3-5 (1959).
Shih Shang-K'uan, How to Interpret the Constitution, 17 Fa-HsuehTsung-Kan (China Law Journal) 13-16 (1960).
Tong Shih-fang, The Research on Making the Interpretation of the
Constitutional System of Our Nation, 2 Hsien-Cheng-Shih-Tai
(Constitutional Review) 4:52-56 (1977).
Wang 1-Ch'eng The Delimitation of Criminal Jurisdiction Among
Military and Civilian Judicial Organs in the Region of Taiwan

170

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

During the Last Twenty Years in Fa-Lin-Yueh-Kan Erh-ShihChou-Nien Chi-Nien-Lun-Wan-Chi (Symposium in Honor of the
Twentieth Anniversary of Law Monthly) 423-37 (S. Yu ed. 1970).
Yao, Jui-kuang, A Study on Some Problems Related to the Function of
the Council of Grand Justices, 3 Hsien-Cheng-Shih-Tai (Constitutional Review) 3:51-60 (1978).

English Sources
I. Books
Abraham, Henry Julian, Justices and Presidents. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974.
- - - - - - - - - The Judicial Process (3rd ed.), New York:
Oxford University Press, 1977.
Austin, John, Lectures on Jurisprudence (5th ed.), London: J.
Murray, 1885.
Beard, Charles Austin, The Supreme Court and the Constitution.
New York: MacMillian, 1912.
Bickel, Alexander M., The Least Dangerous Branch. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962.
Black, Charles Lund, The People and the Court. New York:
Macmillian 1960.
Blair, GeorgeS., American Legislatures. New York: Harper & Row,
1967.
Bodde, D. & Morris, C. Law in Imperial China, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1967.
Bryce, James, Modem Democracies. New York: Macmillian, 1921.
Cappelletti, Mauro, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
Cardozo, Benjamin Nathan, The Nature of the Judicial Process. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1919-1929. Washington, 1929.
Chafee, Zechariah, Free Speech in the United States. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942.
- - - - - - - - - Three Human Rights in the Constitution of
1787. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1956.
Chang, Ching-Li, The Chinese Gentry. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1955.
Chen, Ying-Ching, Treatise and Agreements between the Republic of
China and Other Powers 1929-1954. Washington: Sino-American
Pub. Service, 1957.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

171

Ch'ien, Tung-Shing, The Government and Politics of China, Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1967.
China and the Taiwan Issue. New York:
Praeger, 1979.
The China Yearbook, 1912, 1914, 1916, 1925, 1926, 1951, 1953-54,
1977.
Chiu, Hung Dah ed., China and the Questions of Taiwan. New York:
Praeger, 1973.
China and the Taiwan Issue. New York:
Praeger, 1979.
Chii, T'ung-Tsu, Local Government in China and the Ch'ing, 1962.
- - - - - - - - - Law and Society in Traditional China. Paris:
Mouton, 1961.
Clough, Ralph N., Island China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.
Corwin, Edward Samuel, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1914.
- - - - - - - - - The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955.
Dicey, Albert Venn, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution
(lOth ed.), London: Macmillian, 1959.
Dumbauld, Edward, The Constitution of the United States. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964.
Duyvendark, Jan Julius Lodewijk, The Book of Lord Shang. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1928.
Escarra, Jean, Chinese Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. Tientsin: La Librairie Francaise, 1926.
Le Droit Chinois. Seattle: University of
Washington, 1936.
Field, Oliver Peter, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute.
Minneapolis: the Universtity of Minnesota Press, 1935.
Fishel, Westley, The End of Extraterritoriality in China. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1952.
Franke, Wolfgag, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional
Chinese Examination System. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1960.
Friedrich, Carl Joachim, Constititional Government and Democracy.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1941.
- - - - - - - - - The Impact of American Constitutionalism
Abroad. Boston: Boston University Press, 1967.
Fung, Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (D. Bodde ed.),
New York: Macmillian, 1948.

172

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN &ruoiEs SERIEs

Haines, Charles Grove, the American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy
(2d ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932.
- - - - - - - - - T h e Revival of Natural Law Concepts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1930.
Hart, Henry Jr., and Wechsler, Herbert, The Federal Courts and the
Federal System. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1953.
Henderson, Dan Fenno, Conciliation and Japanese Law, Tokugawa
and Modern. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965.
Hertslet, Edward, Hertslet's China Treaties. London: Harrison and
Sons, 1908.
Hogg, Peter, Constitutional Law of Canada. Toronto: Carswell, 1977.
Holdsworth, William Searle, History of the English Law. London:
Methuene Co., 1924.
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Collected Legal Papers. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920.
Houn, Fu-Wun, Central Government of China 1912-1928. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1957.
--.,........------:-.--,...Chinese Political Tradition. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965.
.
Hsiao, Kung-Ch'uan, Rural China. Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1960.
Hsieh, Pao-Chao, The Government of China (1644-1911). Baltimore,
1923.
Hu, Hsien-Chin, The Common Descent Group in China and Its
Functions. New York: Viking, 1948.
Hedon, Edward Gerard, Freedom of Speech and Press in America.
Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963.
Hudson, Geoffrey Francis, Europe and China. London: E. Arnold &
Co., 1931.
Hughes, Charles, The Supreme Court of the United States. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1928.
International Commission of Jurists, Tibet and the Chinese People's
Republic. Geneva, 1960.
Ito, Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of
Japan. Westport, Conn.: Greewood Press, 1978.
Jackson, Robert Houghwout, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy.
New York: A.A. Knopf, 1941.
Supreme Court in the American System of
Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.
Jennings, William Ivor, The Law and the Constitution. London:
University of London Press, 1959.

SELECTED BmuoGRAPHY

173

Johnson, Wallace Stephen, The T'ang Code. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Keeton, George Williams, The Development of Extra-Territoriality in
China. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922.
Kommers, Donald, Judicial Politics in West Germany. Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976.
Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington, The Status of Aliens in China. New York:
Columbia University, 1912.
Kurland, Phillip B., Politics, The Constitution, and the Warren
Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Langbein, John H., Comparative Criminal Procedure: Germany. St.
Paul: West, 1977.
Legge, James, Chinese Classics. New York: Hurst, 1870.
Levy, Leonard Williams, Judgments. Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1972.
Liang, Ch'z-Ch'ao, History of Chinese Political Thought During the
Early Tsin Period. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930.
Liao, Wen-Kuei, The Complete Works 1>f Han· ·Fei· Tzu. London:· A.
Probsthain, 1959.
Lin, Yu-Tang, a History of the Press and Public Opinion in China.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1936.
Liu, Hui-Chen, The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules, Locust Valley,
N.Y.: J.J. Augstin Incorporated, 1959.
Liu, Shih Shun, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1925.
May, Erskine, The Law, Privileges, Procedures and Usage of
Parliament (19th ed. 1976).
Mcilwain, Charles Howard, Constitutionalism of Ancient and Modem. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947.
Meadows, Thomas Taylor, The Chinese and their Rebellions. Stanford: Academic Reprints, 1953.
Merryman, John Henry, The Civil Law Tradition. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1969.
Morse, Hosea Ballou, International Relations of the Chinese Empire.
London: Longmans Green and Co., 1910.
Nedjati, Zaim M., and J.E. Trice, English and Continental Systems of
Administrative Law. New York: North-Holland Pub. 1978.
Neumann, Robert G., The Government of the German Federal
Republic. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
Pan, Wei-Tung, The Chinese Constitution. Washington: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1945.

174

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN &rumEs SERIES

Parker, Edward Harper, China: Her History, Diplomacy and Commerce (2d ed.). London: J. Murray, 1917.
Patterson, Giles Jared, Free Speech and a Free Press. Boston: Little
Brown and Company, 1939.
Quigley, Harold S., and John E. Turner, The New Japan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956.
Radin, Max, Handbook of Roman Law. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1927.
Rankin, Robert Stanley, When Civil Law Fails. Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1939.
Rohde, David W., and Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court DecisionMaking. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976.
Rossiter, Clinton Lawrence, Constitutional Dictatorship. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948.
Sheehan, A.V., Criminal Procedure in Scotland and France. Edinburgh: H.M. Stationery Office, 1975.
Sih, Paul Kwang Tsien ed., The Strenuous Decade: China's NationBuilding Efforts 1927-1937. Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John's University
Press, 1970.
Tsao, Wen-Yen, The Constitutional Structure of Modem China.
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1947.
Tung, William L., China and the Foreign Powers. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceane Publications, 1970.
- - - - - - - - - The Political Institutions of Modem China.
The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964.
Tyau, Min-Ch'ien Tuk Zung, China's New Constitutional and International Problems. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1920.
Van Der Sprenkel, Sybille, Legal Institutions in Manchu China.
London: Athlone Press, 1962.
Von Mehren, Arthur Taylor ed., Law in Japan. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1963.
Warren, Charles, Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court.
Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1935.
- - - - - - - - - T h e Supreme Court in United States History.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1937.
Whitney, Courtney, MacArthur: His Rendzevous with History. New
York: Knopf, 1956.
Wigmore, John Henry, A Panorama of the World's Legal System.
Washington, D.C.: Washington Law Company, 1936.
Wilkinson, Harvey, Serving Justice. New York: Charterhouse, 1974.
Williams, Samuel Wells, the Middle Kingdom II. New York: C.
Scribner's Sons, 1904.

SELECTED

BmuoGRAPHY

175

Willoughby, Westel Woodbury, Constitutional Government in China.
Washington: The Endowment, 1922.
- - - - - - - - - Foreign Rights and Interests, Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1927.
Yang, Mou-Ch'un, A Chinese Village. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.
Yen, Rankling Lugine, A Survey of Constitutional Development in
China. New York: AMS Press, 1968.

ll. Periodical Articles
Appleton, Sheldon, The Social and Political Impact of Education in
Taiwan, 6 Asian Survey 703-720 (1976).
Beard, Charles A., The Supreme Court- Usurper or Grantee? 27 Pol.
Sci. Q. 1-35 (1912).
Beer, Lawrence W., Freedom of Expression in Japan with Comparative Reference to the United States, in Comparative Human Rights
99-126 (R. Claude ed. 1976).
- - - - - - - - - The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of
Expression in Japan, in The Constitution of Japan 205-238 (D.
Henderson ed. (1968)).
Bickel, Alexander M., The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 40-79 (1961).
Bishop, Crawford Morrison, American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
China, 20 Am. J. Int'l L. 281-299 (1926).
- - - - - - - - - Extraterritoriality in China and its Abolition,
5 Chinese Soc. & Pol. Sci. Rev. 3:173 (1920).
Brant, Irving, The Madison Heritage, in the Great Rights 13-39 (E.
Cahn ed. 1963).
Butcher, Barton, The Emperor's Attempt to Reform the Chinese
Government in the Summer of 1898, 43 Pol. Sci. Q. 544-565 (1928).
Buxbaum, David C., Some Aspects of Civil Procedure and Practice at
the Trial Level in Tanshui and Hsinchu from 1789-1895, 30 J.
Asian Stud. 255-279 (1970).
Cappelletti, Mauro, and John Clarke Adams, Judicial Review of
Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 1207-1224 (1966).
Cardozo, Address Before N.Y. State Bar Association, 55 Pro. N.Y.
S. B. Ass'n. 263 (Jan. 22, 1932).
Cella, Alexander J., The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom
of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to
Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 1-43 (1968).
- - - - - - - - - The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech

176

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuoms SERIEs

or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative
Coequality, 8 Suffolk L. Rev. 1020-1095 (1974).
Chen, King C., Peking's Attitude Toward Taiwan, 17 Asian Survey
903-918 (1977).
Cheng, Chi-Yu, The Chinese Theory of Criminal Law, 39 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 461-470 (1948).
Cheng, Tien-hsi, The Development and Reform of Chinese Law, 1
Current Legal Prob. 170-187 (1948).
Cheng, F.T., Fragments of Chinese Law Ancient and Modern, 1
Chinese Culture 1:1-14 (1958).
Cheng, Sheldon, S.D., A Study on the Temporary Provisions of the
Constitution of the Republic of China, 13 Chinese Culture 4:38-57
(1972).
Chinn, Dennis L., Distributional Equality and Economic Growth: The
Case of Taiwan, 26 Econ. Development & Cultural Change 65-79
(1977).
Chiu, Hungdah, The United States Status of Forces Agreement with
__ the Republic of China: Some Criminal Case Studies, 3 Boston
College Int'l & Comp. L.R. 67-88 (1979).
Cleveland, James, Legislative Immunity and the Role of the Presentative, 14 N.H.B.J. 139-155 (1973).
Cohen, Jerome Alan, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization,
54 Calif. L. Rev. 1201-1226 (1966).
Cole, Taylor, The West German Federal Constitutional Court: An
Evaluation After Six Years, 20 J. Pol. 278-307 (1958).
Comment, Constitutional Changes in China, 5 Am. J. Int'l L. 200-204
(1911).
Comment, Linkletter, Shott and the Retroactivity Problem in
Escobedo, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 832-855 (1966).
Comment, Partial Retroactivity: A Question of Equal Protection, 43
Temp. L.Q. 239-249 (1970).
Cooper, John, Political Development in Taiwan, in China and the
Question of Taiwan 46 (H. Chiu ed. 1979).
Crosskey, William Winslow, The True Meaning of the Constitutional
Prohibition of Ex Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 539-566
(1947).
Currier, Thomas S., Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201-272 (1965).
Deener, David, Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1079-1099 (1952).
Dennis, William, Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the
United States and China, 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 829-837 (1928).

SELECTED BmLIOGRAPHY

177

Dietz, Gotteried, America and Europe- Decline and Emergence of
Judicial Review, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1233-1272 (1958).
Emerson, Thomas 1., The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law &
Contemporary Problems 648-671 (1955).
Ervin, Jr., Sam J., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on
Congressional Independence, 59 Va. L. Rev. 175-195 (1973).
Frankel, Marvin E., The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U.
Penn. L. Rev. 1031-1959 (1975).
Frankfurter, Felix, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Penn. L. Rev.
311-317 (1955).
- - - - - - - - - The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices,
105 U. Penn. L. Rev. 781-796 (1957).
- - - - - - - - - a n d James M. Landis, The Supreme Court
under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1-29 (1928).
Freund, Paul A., A Supreme Court in Federation, 53 Colum. L. Rev.
597-619 (1953).
Field, Oliver P., Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 Mich. L. Rev.
315-331 (1922).
Geck, Wilhelm Karl, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative
Survey of Present Institutions and Practices, 51 Cornell L.Q.
250-304 (1966).
Gen. Lewis, Some Characteristics of the Ancient Chinese Law, 48
Asiatic Rev. 156-160, 233-240 (1952).
Grant, J.A.C., Judicial Control of Legislation, 3 Am. J. Comp. L.
186-198 (1954).
Judicial Review of Legislation under the
Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 670-676
(1934).
Haddad, James B., Retroactivity Should be Rethought: A Call for the
End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
427-441 (1969).
Herrey, John G., and Joseph J. Kelley, Jr., Some Constitutional
Aspects of Statutory Regulation of Libels on Government, 15 Temp.
L.Q. 453-492 (1941).
Holdsworth, W.S., Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th
Centuries, 29 Yale L.J. 841-858 (1920).
Hucker, Charles 0., The Traditional Chinese Censorate and the New
Peking Regime, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1041-1057 (1951).
Itoh, Hiroshi, Judicial Decision-Making in the Japanese Supreme
Court, 3 Law in Japan 128-161 (1969).
Jacobs, Bruce, Taiwan 1978, 19 Asian Survey 20 (1979).
Johnson, Philip, Forward, the Supreme Court of California, 1967-68,
56 Cal. L. Rev. 1612-1632 (1968).

178

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuoms SERIEs

Jones, William C., Studying the Ch'ing Code - the Ta Ch'ing Lu Li,
22 Am. J. Comp. L. 330-364 (1974).
Keeton, George W., The New Chinese Codes, 8 J. Comp. Leg. 3d ser.
225-238 (1926).
- - - - - - - - - The Progress of Law Reform in China - II,
19, 20 J. Comp. Leg. 3d ser. 197-211 (1937), 210-221 (1938).
Kelsen, Hans, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of
the Austrian and American Constitution, 4 J. Pol. 183-200 (1942).
Kommers, Donald P., The Federal Constitutional Court in the West
German Political System, in Frontiers of Judicial Research 73-132
(J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus ed. 1969).
--------Judicial Review in Italy and West Germany, 20
Jahrbuch Des Offentlichen Recht Der Gegenwart 111-133 (1971).
Lobingier, Charles Sumner, The Corpus Juris of New China, 19 Tul.
L. Rev. 512-552 (1945).
Loring, Charles, American Extraterritoriality in China, 10 Minn. L.
Rev. 407-411 (1926).
Luhman, Stanley, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Disputes Resolution in Communist China, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 1284-1359 (1967).
McNelley, Theodore, The Japanese Constitution: Child of the Cold
War, 74 Pol. Sci. Q. 176-195 (1959).
McWhinney, Edward, Judicial Concurrence and Dissents: A Comparative Wiew of Opinion-Writing in Final Appellate Tribunals, 31
Canadian B. Rev. 595-625 (1953).
Michael, Franz, The Role of Law in Tradition, Nationalist, and
Communist China, 9 China Q. 124-148 (1962).
Mishkin, Paul J., The Supreme Court 1964 Term -Forward: the
High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 56-102 (1965).
Mitchell, J.D.B., Sovereignty of Parliament- Yet Again, 79 L.Q. Rev.
196-223 (1963).
Monaghan, Henry P., First Amendment "Due Process", 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 518-551 (1970).
Nadelman, Kurt H., The Judicial Dissent, Publication v. Secrecy, 8
Am. J. Comp. L. 415-432 (1959).
Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907-951 (1962).
Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 77
Yale L.J. 366-389 (1967).
Note, They Shall Not Be Questiond . . ., 3 Stan. L. Rev. 486-496
(1957).

SELECTED

BmuoGRAPHY

179

Opponheim, Edward E., Congressional Free Speech, 8 Loy. L. Rev.
1-34 (1955-1956).
Ostrager, Barry Robert, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme
Court Constitutional Interpretation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289-308 (1973).
Paul, James C.N., and Murray L. Schwartz, Obsenity in the Mails: A
Comment on Some Problems ofFe<kral Censorship. 106 U. Penn. L.
Rev. 214-253 (1957).
Paul, James C.N., The Post Offu:e and Non-Mailability of Obsenity:
An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 44-68 (1961).
Peake, Cyrus H., Recent Studies on Chinese Law, 52 Pol. Sci. Q.
117-138 (1937).
Plucknett, Theodore F.T., Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40
, Harv. L. Rev. 30-70 (1926) .
./Pound, Roscoe, The Chinese Civil Cod€ in Action, 29 Tul. L. Rev.
277-327 (1955).
- - - - - - - - Justice According to Law, Part II, 14 Colum.
L. Rev. 1-26 (1914) .
./
Progress of the Law in China, 23 Wash. L.
Rev. 345-362 (1948).
Price, Ernest, Extraterritoriality in China, 11 Oreg. L. Rev. 264-282
(1932).
Quigley, Harold Scott, Extraterritoriality in China, 20 Am. J. Int'l L.
46-68 (1926).
Radin, Max, The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe,
41 W.Va. L.Q. 112-130 (1934).
Reed, The Rule in Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 9 Am. L. Rev. 381-410
(1875).
Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1113-1182 (1973).
Rossum, Ralph A., New Rights and Old Wrongs: The Supreme Court
and the Problems of Retroactivity, 23 Emory L.J. 381-420 (1974).
Rupp-Brunnedk, Wiltraut, The Fe<kral Constitutional Court, 20 Am.
J. Comp. L. 387-403 (1972).
Schwartz, Herman, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process: A
Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719-767 (1966).
Shientag, Bernard L., From Sedition Libel to Freedom of the Press, 11
Brooklyn L. Rev. 125-154 (1942).
Sigler, Jay A., Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 Geo. L.J.
30-54 (1965).
Smelser, Marshall, Legislative Investigation: The Problem in Historical Perspective, 29 Notre Dame Law. 163-192 (1954).

180

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN SruoiEs SERIES

Spruill, Jr., James A., The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.
L. Rev. 199-203 (1940).
Stimson, EdwardS., Retroactive Application of Law- A Problem in
Constitutional Law, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 30-56 (1939).
Tao, Lung-sheng, The Sino-American Status of Forces Agreement:
Criminal Jurisdiction over American Soldiers on Nationalist
Chinese Territory, 51 B.U. L. Rev. 1-30 (1971).
- - - - - - - - R e f o r m of the Criminal Process in Nationalist
China, 19 Am. J. Comp. L. 747-765 (1971).
Teng, Chinese Influence on the Western Examination, 7 Harv. J. Asia
Stud. 267-312 (1943).
Thayer, James Bradley, The Case ofGelpecke v. Dubuque, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 311-320 (1891).
Tyau, M.T.Z., Extraterritoriality in China and the Question of Its
Abolition, Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 133-149 (1921-23).
Vance, W.R., Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 Minn. L. Rev.
239-250 (1918).
Veeder, Van Vechten, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative
and Executive Proceeedings, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 131-146 (1910).
Bigoriti, Vincenzo, Italy: The Constitutional Court, 20 Am. J. Comp.
L. 404-414 (1972).
Wada, Hideo, The Supreme Court of Japan as Adjudicating Agency
and its Function, 23 Jahrbuch Des Offentlichen Recht Der
Gegenwart 537-548 (1974).
Wang, Chung-hui, Revision of the Chinese Criminal Code, 13 Ill. L.
Rev. 219-233 (1918).
Warren, Charles, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain
Classes of Civilians to Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 Am. L. Rev.
195-228 (1919).
Williams, Justin, Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look,
59 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 665-679 (1965).
Wing Mah N., Foreign Jurisdiction in China, 18 Am. J. Int'l L.
676-695 (1924).
Yang, Chung-sen, Career Judiciary in the Republic of China, 2
Chenghi L. Rev. 122-159 (1970).
Yankwich, Leon R., The Immunity of Congressional Speech - Its
Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. Penn. L. Rev. 960-977 (1951).
Zuckerman, Harvey Lyle, Obscenity: In the Mails, 33 So. Cal. L. Rev.
171-188 (1960).

INDEX

181

INDEX
Administrative agencies, 123
Administrative court: procedures of, 120,
120 n.66. See also court
Administrative injunction, 115, 116
Admonitory decision, 153, 154
Appeals, Chinese procedure, 23
Austin, John, 147
Blackstone, 127
Blake, Odgers, 27, 28
"Board of Punishment," 23
Calder v. Bull, 110
Career system: examinations 42, 42
n.110. See judiciary selection
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 148
Civil law, 13, 14
Cochran v. Couzens, 135, 136, 141
"Code of Six Chapters," 14
Codes: civil, 35, 36, civil procedure, 37,
38, 44, criminal, 32-34, history of, 14,
15, Kung-Ssu-Lu, 31, Ta Ching Lu Li,
15, 15 n.18, Tang, 14, 15
Coffin v. Coffin, 135, 140, 141
Commercial law, 36
Committee on the Discipline of Public
Functionaries, 42
Communist party, membership in, 111114
Confucianism, 12, 12 n.6, 13
Confucius, 9 n.1, 11, 18
Constitution: interpretation of, 80, 103,
U.S. article III, 79, 80
Constitutional court: description of, 5, 68,
69, jurisdiction of, 86, 87, request of
review by, 86, 87, standing, 87
Constitutional law: early Chinese, 5, 6,
development of Chinese, 6, 7
Consultative council, 49, 50
Control Yuan, 101
Council of Grand Justices: constitutional
issues, 84, description of, 7 n.7, 70,
74-79, government agency standing before, 81, opinions of, 93-95, quorum of,
89, 90, requests of, by individual, 102,
103, requests of, by local administration, 101, standing before, 80, 84, 85,

statistical survey of output of, 97-100,
voting requirement of, 89, 90
County magistrate, duties of, 21
Court: administrative, 41, 118-124. See
also administrative court, District, 32,
40, High, 32, 40, Military, 107, Supreme, 32, 40. See also constitutional
court.
Dicey, Albert van, 1 n.1
"Draft Constitution of the Temple of
Heaven," 53, 54, 67
Dynasties: Chin, 11, 12, Han, 13, Tang,
13
"Eight Considerations," 20, 22
Emperor Kang Hsi, 26
.
Evidence, admissibility of, 38
Executive Yuan, 99, 101, composition of,
63 n.55
Exhaustion of remedies, 87
Ex post facto doctrine, 105, 110, 112
Extraterritoriality, 28, 30, 59
Family: in mediation, 24, 25, in penal
system, 17, 18, 34, 35, political unit, 16,
17, 31
Freedom: of the press, 124-131, personal,
116 n.54
Fung Yu-Lan, 11 n.5
Grand Bench, 88
Grand Justices: qualifications of, 70, 76,
selection of, 77, 78, tenure of, 73. See
also Council of Grand Justices
"Hundred Days Reform," 45, 45 n.1
Imperial Law Codification Commission,
30-34
Inter-agency conflicts, see "Judicialization"
Inter-governmental disputes, see Legislative Yuan
Interpretation No. 80, 108
Interpretation No. 86, 144, 145
Interpretation No. 9, 84, 85

182
Interpretation
Interpretation
Interpretation
Interpretation

CoNTEMPORARY

No.
No.
No.
No.

AsiAN STuoiEs SERIES

129, 108-110, 114
122, 100-101
68, 108
3735, 132, 133

Johnson v. New Jersey, 149
"Judicialization": definition of, 81, description of, 81-84
Judicial review: definition of, 1, 2, European origin of, 2 n.2, 3, origin of, 2, 3
Judicial Yuan: composition of, 69, description of, 69, duties of, 69, Organic
Law of the, 70
Judiciary: education of, 43, qualifications
of, 72, selection of, 42, 44, workload of,
44,44 n.114
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 135, 141
Kuomintang, 53, 57-60, 77
Lawyers: role of, 37, 71, 161, "Song
Kuan," 44
Legalisms, 11
Legalists, 10, 11, 13
Legal philosophy, Chinese, 9, 10
Legislative Yuan, role of, 84
Legislature: constitutional role of, 2, 4,
immunity of, 133-144
Li, 16 n.19
Mahler v. Ebby, 111
"Mandate of Heaven," 10 n.2
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 122, 123
Mapp v. Ohio, 149
Martial law, rule, see "State of Siege"
Mediation, extrajudicial, 25, 26, 44
Mencius, 12
Milton, J., 125
Ministry of Justice, 40
National Assembly, 61, 63, 65
Near v. Minnesota, 127-130
"Nineteen Articles," 51
Nine-year Program of Constitutional Preparation, 46, 48
Norton v. Shelby County, 147
Parliament, 2 n.3
Political questions, see "Judicialization"

President: Chiang Kai Shek, 64, powers
of, 63, 64
Presumption of guilt, 22
"Principles of Constitution," 46, 47
Prior restraint, 124-130
Procurator, 32
Provisional assemblies, 48-50
Publication law, 114
Retroactivity, see ex post facto
Reviewing Bench: conference of, 90, 91,
description of, 88, secrecy of, 91, 92
Rules concerning the conduct of business
by the Council of Grand Justices, 88
Rule of law, definition of, 1 n.1

Scales v. U.S., 112
Schenck v. U.S., 127
Secretaries of law, 21, 21 n.34
Self-government, Taiwan record of, 65
Speech and debate clause, 133-136
"State of Siege," 106-108
Statute: constitutional validity of, 145,
146, prospective invalidity of, 152-157,
retroactive invalidity of, 147-152
Statute for Punishment of Rebellions,
105, 105 n.19, 108, 109
Stockdale v. Hansard, 134
Stovall v. Denno, 149, 150
Su Huing, 143, 144, 144 n.160
Taiwan Provincial Assembly, composition of, 143, 143 n.158
Temporary Provisions for the Duration of
Mobilization to Suppress the Rebellion,
63, 64
Tenney v. Brandhove, 136, 137
Torture, use of, in penal system, 22
United States as a constitutional model,
3-5
Wang Tu, 12
Women: Chinese legal status of, 19, 20,
36, as a Grand Justice, 78, 78 n.36
Yuan Shih-Kai, 51, 54

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1977 Series
No.1- 1977
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on
Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp.

$ 1.00

No.2- 1977
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the
Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp.

$ 1.00

No.3- 1977
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van
der Kroef) 31 pp.

$ 1.00

No.4- 1977
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation
and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp.
No.5- 1977
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and
Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index

$ 1.00

$ 3.00

No.6- 1977
The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison
with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook
Hong) 80 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 7 - 1977**
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the
People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22
pp.

$ 1.00

No.8- 1977*
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, With Appended
Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of
Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp.

$ 1.00

No.9- 1977
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by
Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp.

$ 3.00

No. 10- 1977
Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment Proceedings of A Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David
Simon) 217 pp. Index

$ 5.00

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1977 Series
No. 11- 1977
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S.China Relations 62 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 12- 1977
Asian-American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S.
Employment Policy 24 pp.

$ 1.00

1978 Series
No. 1 - 1978 (13)
Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P.
Misra) 31 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 2 - 1978 (14)
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China;
Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu,
with contribution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C.
Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung
and James W~ Morley). 207 pp. Index

$ 3.00

No. 3 - 1978 (15)
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy
of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia
Yeh) 227 pp. Index

$ 3.00

No. 4 - 1978 (16)
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in
Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 5 - 1978 (17)*
The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting
MaoTse-Tung's Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 6 - 1978 (18)Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some
Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 7 - 1978 (19)
A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and
Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp.

$ 2.00

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1978 Series
No.8- 1978 (20)
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities
and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 9 - 1978 (21)
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82
pp. Index

$ 2.00

1979 Series
No. 1 - 1979 (22)
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by
Hungdah Chiu) 54 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 2 - 1979 (23)Social Disorder In Peking After The 1976 Earthquake Revealed By
A Chinese Legal Document (By H\mgdah Chiu) 20 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 3 - 1979 (24)
The Dragon and the Eagle - A Study of U.S. - People's Republic
of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65
pp.

$ 3.00

No. 4 - 1979 (25)
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William
Tay) 108 pp.

$ 3.00

No. 5 - 1979 (26)*
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of
China (Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 6 - 1979 (27)
China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage
Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index

$3.00

No. 7 - 1979 (28)
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected
Studies (Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu 130 pp. Index

$ 2.50

No. 8 - 1979 (29)
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Cooper) 45 pp.

$ 2.00

* Reprinted with revision (all other papers are original).
** Translated from German with revision.

Occasional Papers/ Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1980 Series
No. 1 - 1980 (30)
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu)
200 pp. Index

$ 5.00

No. 2 - 1980 (31)
The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Policy: A Critical Review
(James C. Hsiung) 17 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 3 - 1980 (32)
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S.
Strategies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan) 61 pp.

$ 2.50

No. 4 - 1980 (33)
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and
American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa) 200 pp. Index

$ 3.50

*
**

Reprinted with revision (all other papers are original).
Translated from German with revision.

Forthcoming
No.5- 1980 (34)*
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China
<Hungdah Chiu) About 35 pp.

$ 1.50

---------------------------------ORDER FORM
To Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian
Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West
Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, U.S.A.
Check One:
0

0

Please Send:
No.

Author

Title

Copies

Please start my subscription of the OPRSCAS:
Starting issue - - - - Subscription price is U.S. $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the
price of individual issues in the U.S. and Canada and $12.00
for overseas.)
My check of U.S. $
is enclosed
copy(s)
of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request
billing before making payment) (Make check payable to
OPRSCAS)
Please send book to:
Name/Corp./Library:
Address: (Please include zip code)

-----------------------------------

